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Abstract
ULU AL AMR & AUTHORITY:
THE CENTRAL PILLARS OF SUNNI POLITICAL THOUGHT
by
Hisseine Faradj

Advisor: Susan Buck-Morss
This dissertation evaluates the political history of Islam through the prism of the Sunni
conception of authority. It finds an historical red thread that explains the legal and political
evolution of different types of Islamic government that have, instead of a European-type
sovereign, the Ulu Al Amr (those in authority). In addition, it argues that it is the authority of Ulu
Al Amr that legitimizes temporal power via legal rulings such as Wilayah al ahed (allegiance to a
dynastic monarchy) and Wlayah al qaher (obedience to coercive power and rule). Those rulings
are essential to legitimating historical change. Historical legal opinions among Muslim scholars
hold that the members of the Ulu Al Amr are the Ulama—those with knowledge, the learned,
religious scholars with temporal power. This dissertation claims that contrary to the legal
standards that changed historically in Fiqh al siyash al sharia (the branch Islamic jurisprudence
that addresses political issues), it is the Ulama who were the Ulu Al Amr. It is Ulu Al Amr they
and only they who decide on the exception through Ijma (consensus or agreement of the
community, a source of Islamic law). This view of Ulu Al Amr is most consistent with the Sunni
conception of authority that legitimates the force of temporal power. Finally, this dissertation
argues that the historical evolution of the concept of authority and the legal role of Ulu Al Amr
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are an outcome of political struggles and demands between the Ulu Al Amr (qua temporal power)
and Muslim subjects rather than a set of legal codes frozen in time and space.
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Glossary

Ahl ar-ra'y

is an Arabic term that means 'people of opinion'.

Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd

another term of Ulu Al Amr those in authority

Alim

see Ulama

Amir al-mu’minin

commander of the faithful (the Khalifa title)

Ammeh

commoners, public

Al-malik

the king or sovereign

Bay’a

(from Ba’a, to sell) contract in a form of an oath of allegiance to a leader

Bayt al-mal

Treasury that is collected from Zakat and war booty

Bid’a

innovation connoting impiety

Faqih

see Fuqaha

Fatwa

authorized legal opinion

Fiqh

Islamic jurisprudence

Fiqh al siyash al shariah the branch Islamic jurisprudence that deals with political issues. Also
referred to as Al siyash al sharia
Fitnah

secession, upheaval, and chaos

Fuqaha

(sing. Faqih legal scholar)

Hadith

reports or narrative of what the Prophet said or did

Hila

guile

Ijma

consensus or agreement of the community, a source of Islamic law

Ijtihad

independent human reasoning in Sharia law

Ilm

knowledge or learning, especially Religious Knowledge

Imam

(see also Khalifa) leader of the Muslim community (also leader of
congregational prayer, (modern) head of state

x

Jabariyah

Muslims who deny free agency of the individual. They take their denomination
from Jabr, which signifies “necessity or compulsion;” because they hold a person
to be necessarily and inevitably constrained to act as s/he does by force of God’s
will which is eternal and immutable

Jahiliyyah

Pre-Islamic condition

Jemaah

the collectivity of the Muslim community

Jihad

holy war or personal striving in knowledge, charity, or public service

Khalifa or Khalifat

(see also imam) (of Muhammad) serving as the head of state or leader of the
Muslim community

Khurooj

rebellion

Malik ul mulk

king of kings or the absolute sovereign

Maslaha

the principle that the intent of the law is the good of the community which should
be taken into account more than the enforcement of the law

Mawaly

Muslims who are non-Arabs

Mufti

expert authorized to issue Fatwa or a legal opinion

Mujtahid

person carrying out independent interpretation of Islamic law

Qadariyah

Muslims who are adherents of the doctrine of free will. The word Qadar is
derived from Qadr (power or rights).

Qiyas

reasoning by analogy, a source of Islamic law

Ra'y

personal opinion in adapting Sharia law

Sharia

Islamic law, religious law, Right, Rectitude, Code (the whole body of rules
guiding the life of a Muslim in law, ethics and etiquette); the sources of the
Sharia law found in the Qur’an, Hadith, and Sunna, as well as Fiqh.

Shura

consultation among the members of the community

Sunna

custom, religious tradition of the Prophet Muhammad

Tafsir

is the literal meaning of the Qur’an or Hadith

Taghut

transgressor

Takfiri

leaving society that is considered infidel by isolating oneself from public life

xi

Taqlid

strictly following legal precedents of the past without any innovations or
additions

Taweel

allegorical interpretation or departure from the manifest [Zahir] meaning of a text
in favor of another meaning where there is evidence to justify the departure

Ulama

(sing. Alim) those with knowledge, the learned, religious scholars and experts

Ulu Al Amr

those in authority

Umma

the people or community (of Islam); (modern) nation

Umara

people in command

Wakeel

deputy or agent

Waley

guardian

Wilayah al ahed

allegiance to a dynastic monarchy

Wlayah al qaher

obedience of the members of the community to whomever has captured power by
force

Zahir

manifest meaning of a text or matter

Zakat

"that which purifies" or alms-giving is the practice of charitable giving by
Muslims based on accumulated wealth, and is obligatory for all who are able to
do so. It is considered to be a personal responsibility for Muslims to ease
economic hardship for others and eliminate

INTRODUCTION
Ulu Al Amr & Authority: the central Pillars of Sunni Political Thought

Why and when should one obey authority? This is a universal question that transcends
time and space. It is at the core of the discipline of political science and inevitably includes
questions regarding the self, subjectivity, freedom, equality, and autonomy. Moral codes or laws
require that authority limit arbitrary action. For freedom to have meaning, it must recognize its
opposite: obedience. And for obedience to exist some form of authority must implement rules or
laws.
Like obedience, authority is a universal concept limited by neither time nor space. For
example, the contemporary opposites of the term obedience are liberty, autonomy, and freedom,
which are limited to certain geographies and moments in history. Contemporary political
discourse centers on these terms due to historical circumstances that have taken place in Western
Europe since the middle ages. Obedience to authority and the good laws that subjects live under
necessarily mean that they perceive themselves as free subjects. Conversely, bad authority and
laws provide a framework for subjectivities to be constituted and developed through political
struggles to correct bad laws. While obedience to authority and a set of laws or moral codes
allows for a collectivity to exist, sociologically speaking, obedience regulates expectations and
makes life possible.
Yet, while authority and obedience transcend time and space, obedience has particular
characteristics that unfold in local geographies and specific moments in history. Identities,
cultures, and nations develop around these local characteristics and produce the mosaic of
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subjectivities and identities that are a testament to the creativity and malleability of the human
subject. Hence, every collectivity shares in common a minimum notion of “the good” of the
community. It is also disagreements on “the good” that become the bases of dissent in any given
community. While obedience to good laws and struggles against bad ones is a universal
condition, struggle and obedience unfold according to local contexts and qualities.

In the case of Western Europe, the womb that bore modernity, obedience to authority,
historically evolved in a religious context that produced the legal arrangement of sovereignty.
I argue that sovereignty is the core quality of European civilization and that it became globally
hegemonic in confronting other forms of authority. Western Europe gave the world capitalism
and industrialization through its local internal struggles with medieval forms of authority and
obedience. More precisely, I mean the local struggles against the authority of and obedience to
the Catholic Church and its role in politics that framed resistance projects. According to Herbert
Marcuse:
The Protestantism of Luther and Calvin which gave the Christin doctrine of freedom its decisive
form for bourgeois society, is bound up with the emergence of a new, “young” society which had
first to conquer its right to exist in a bitter struggle against existing authorities. Faced with the
universal bonds of traditionalist feudalism it absolutely required the liberation of the individual
within the earthly order as well (the individual free subject of the economic sphere late essentially
became the model of its concept of the individual) – it required the liberation of the territorial
sovereign from the authority of an internationally centralized Church and a central imperial
power. It further required the liberation of the “conscience” from numerous religious and ethical
norms in order to clear the way for the rise of the bourgeoisie. In all these directions an
antiauthoritarian attitude was necessary… (10)

Thus, the evolution of local legal arrangements in Western Europe into the legal solution of
sovereignty followed from local struggles against authority and obedience to the Catholic
Church. After all, “sovereignty is a form of authority” and a replacement of one form of
authority with another (Jackson 2007, 14). Historically, sovereignty as a legal concept evolved
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from being the local core of European politics to the universal and global principle in
international law. Sovereignty, “is a post-medieval and indeed, anti-medieval arrangement of
governing authority” (Jackson 2007, 6). While sovereignty is anti-medieval in character, it is
ultimately a reaction to religion and the consequence of the role of the Church in Western
Europe.
Local struggles historically unfolded in a context dominated by the Catholic Church.
They shaped the evolution of emancipatory political projects in a particular trajectory that was
local in character and universal in its goals. Consequently, the political and religious character of
sovereignty became the frame in which the evolution of expressions of rights, freedoms,
equality, and the self unfolded, was locally grasped, and finally matured into its contemporary,
secular, universal expression. A prime example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948). Similarly, ideas of obedience were shaped and reshaped as a consequence of these
unfolding struggles. Elshtain illustrates this argument by claiming:
As sovereign state is to sovereign God, so sovereign selves are to sovereign states. Given that
sovereignty in the political sense “names” self-determination for a territorial, collective entity, it
is altogether unsurprising that this logic of sovereignty came unbound and migrated, becoming
attached more and more to notions of the self. (159)

She traces the evolutionary character of the sovereign God who transferred the same authority to
sovereign kings in Western Europe who set the path and the framework in which local actors
could claim sovereignty for themselves against local kings. As a result, the West has given us
two revolutions—the American and the French—that constitute the core of modernist
expressions of sovereignty, a sovereignty of the people, the self, the mind, and reason.
Emancipatory projects took on a local character of European sovereignty. Thus, “to be sovereign
means to exercise absolute power over one's self and one's fate. But another way of putting this
is that the sovereign—whether it is a god, a king, a state, or a mere self—cannot be held
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answerable to anyone. When push comes to shove, sovereignty always trumps law and morals”
(Adam Kirsch, 2008). The point here is not to reduce the entirety of Western civilization to an
essentialized character; on the contrary, the aim here is locate the local context through which
meanings and significations of concepts such as freedom, equality, and autonomy unfold. It is
through struggle that such concepts become meaningful to local subjects in a particular historical
moment. Even after taming sovereign kings who claimed a divine right to rule, the sovereign
domain was limited to other spheres such as the economy, which is sovereign as well. A good
example is Adam Smith’s account of the rights-based state when arguing:
concerns are equally clear and pronounced: in accordance with “the system of natural freedom”
the sovereign has no more than three significant responsibilities, namely, the defence of society
against external enemies, the protection of each individual against any harm inflicted upon him
by another, and the undertaking of such public works as would not be carried out if entrusted to
private profit. (Bobbio, 2005 17-18)

So central is the concept of sovereignty to the Western legal and political context that even when
it was logically incoherent and contradictory, the concept prevailed. More precisely, while
sovereignty in a theological context is a logical, coherent idea—for example, the Sovereignty of
God—once the concept is transferred to politics it becomes inconsistent. Jacques Maritain
demonstrated the problems that logically arise when such transference is made:
But in the political sphere, and with respect to the men or agencies in charge of guiding peoples
toward their earthly destinies, there is no valid use of the concept of Sovereignty. Because, in the
last analysis, no earthly power is the image of God and deputy for God. God is the very source of
the authority with which the people invest those men or agencies, but they are not the vicars of
God. They are the vicars of the people; then they cannot be divided from the people by any
superior essential property. (50)

Accordingly, the problem persists when the sovereign is the king, state, or the people, in the case
of democracy. Susan Buck-Morss illustrates the circular logic of sovereignty when it is applied
to democracies arguing that “if democracies could be self-constituting and self-reproducing, if
they could realize the perfect closure of the Oroborus (snake consuming its tail), there would be
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no decay and no history—but also no hope, no escape from the magic circle of power that is
capable of mystifying any political regime, no matter how democratically conceived” (BuckMorss 2007, 1). Nevertheless, the legal concept of sovereignty prevails and has been historically
globalized via the European imperial colonization of the globe and the creation of international
law.

This dissertation aims at explaining the universal political concepts of authority and
obedience as they have operated historically in the Sunni legal system with attention accorded to
the local character of Sunni Islam. As was the case in the Western European context, Islam was
founded and evolved around particular arrangements of authority and obedience that were
simultaneously universal and particular according to local historical settings and circumstances.
I argue that legal, academic, cultural, and economic problems arise when European historical
struggles against authority are universalized and conflated with other civilizations. I question the
idea that the sovereignty that is absent from other collectivities outside Western Europe becomes
the standard against which modernity, human rights, freedom, equality, and autonomy of other
cultures should be measured. As a result, there is the tendency to make evaluative judgments,
such as:
(1) the “Third World” [is] a singular essentialized entity not in terms of its own existing qualities,
but in term of “First World” qualities which it lacks…
(2) contemporary conditions in the Third World … [are] abstracted conditions of European
historical experience; the Third World is seen as embodying aspects of Europe’s past (feudalism,
etc.)…
(3) only one essential path to modernity exists in the world, and Europe has experienced this path
in advance of the non-Western world (Mirsepassi 2000, 8).

It is the aim of this dissertation to avoid these generalities by locating the local quality and
political language of the evolution of authority and obedience in Sunni Islam’s legal and political
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history. My hope is to shed light on the political language of Sunni Islam according to its local
qualities. But the task is not easy; it requires the reader to temporarily suspend her ideas of what
is familiar in Western politics and put herself in the context of Sunni Islam’s historical political
circumstances. To quote Susan Buck-Morss, “this is not to say that translation among political
languages is easily accomplished. Real differences exist. But promise lies in the apparent
incommensurability, because the attempt forces each language to extend itself creatively,
becoming more than it was, producing an open space in which a new politics might take root”
(Buck-Morss 2003, 6). The aim here is not just to produce another discourse; instead, the aim is
to emphasize and appreciate the universal project of opposition to the abuse of power and the
possibility of democratic discussion in the global public sphere. The need for such democratic
dialogue is not only global. It is most urgent now as the “Arab Spring” is turning from an
emancipatory project against long ruling regime of dictatorships to an ideological battle between
either Shia/Sunni or secularist/Islamist camps. These battles are fought as zero-sum game.
This dissertation argues that the disagreements that led to the split between the two sides
lack a political language that can facilitate a dialogue. The ideological gap that is created
between secularists/liberals and Islamists is due, on one hand, to the ideological commitment by
the secularists to universal concepts such popular sovereignty, human rights, and the autonomy
of the individual, which have European sovereignty at their core, and on the other, to political
Islam’s commitment to Sunni Islamic authority.

The absence of sovereignty in the Islamic legal system, as chapter one demonstrates,
shifts that attention from temporal power to the authority of Ulu Al Amr (those in authority). The
authority of Ulu Al Amr becomes the red thread that runs through accounts of the historical
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evolution of the Islamic legal and political system. It runs from a city state, empire, fragmented
competing monarchies to the nation state. According to Ernest Gellner:
The central doctrines of Islam contain an emphatic and severe monotheism, the view that the
Message received by the Prophet is so to speak terminal, and that is contains both faith and
morals – or, in other words, it is both doctrine and law, and that genuine further augmentation is
to be countenanced. The points of doctrine and points of law are not separated, and Muslim
learned scholars are best described as theologians/jurists. There is no cannon law, but simply
divine law as such, applicable to the community of believers, rather than to the organization and
members of some specialized agency. (6 -7)

Thus, contrary to Western European experience, in Islam the absence of a church that speaks on
behalf of the faith and Sharia was the feature that the Muslim subject used to limit the abuse of
temporal power and authority. Unlike in Western Europe, resistance to abusive authority and
temporal power was possible through clinging to and emphasizing the law and interpreting it in
an emancipatory context that limits temporal power’s force and action. Consequently,
emancipation of the collective and the self from the abuse of power has traditionally been
affirmed through the law, which is historically prior to the state or any political organization.
This local quality has grave consequences in understanding the differences in the role of religion
in Western Europe and Islam. Moreover, this local quality casts a different shade on universal
concepts of autonomy and freedom in relation to religion. More precisely, obedience to authority
in Sunni Islam unfolded in local conditions where:
A socially and politically transcendent standard of rectitude was ever accessible, beyond the reach
of manipulation by political authority, and available for condemning the de facto authority if it
sinned against it. It only needed for that standard to possess an earthly ally, endowed with armed
might, for the sinning authority – if it was held to be sinful – to be in trouble. The political history
of Islam does display the periodic emergence of such a daunting alliance of transcendent rectitude
and earthly might. (Gellner 1992, 7-8)

In this case, temporal power was starved from self-constituting legitimacy making it historically
dependent on the Ulu Al Amr to rule and extract obedience from the Muslim subject.
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Central to understanding authority and obedience in Sunni Islam is the evolution of the
Ulu Al Amr’s authority in relationship to temporal power. This local quality has significant
implications in how Sunni Islam constitutes human rights, freedom, equality, and ultimately the
constitution of the self. Consequently, a question of why one should obey authority is directly
related to Sunni’s historical arrangement of obedience to authority. For example, human nature
in Islam is tied to the Qur’anic account of “the Fall” which frames subjectivities and notions of
the self in a general frame and trajectory. The following verses in the Qur’an provide the context
of the narrative:
But Satan caused them to slip out of it and removed them from that [condition] in which they had
been. And We said, "Go down, [all of you], as enemies to one another, and you will have upon
the earth a place of settlement and provision for a time." 2:36
Then Adam received from his Lord [some] words, and He accepted his repentance. Indeed, it is
He who is the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful. 2:37
We said, "Go down from it, all of you. And when guidance comes to you from Me, whoever
follows My guidance - there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. 2:38

This account of “the Fall” is not corrupting and political organization is not perceived as
an institution that is designed to control the “evil” nature of persons. As a result, the subject is
neither prone to be good nor bad but a subject that is free to choose or deny the right path. In this
context, political institutions are established to make it easy for the subject to choose the right
path and avoid error. Consequently, the nature of obedience to authority is framed around the
“good” of both the individual and the collective, and who defines the good according to the text
is where struggles against authority in the history of Islam are located. Thus, speaking on behalf
of the text in the form of legal opinion/judgment is a claim of authority. As a result, the
authoritative texts of the Qur’an and Sunna are central to struggles for freedom, equality, and
autonomy are located. As such, obedience to political institutions is guided by Sharia but not
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absolute. In fact, obedience in the Qur’an to someone other than God or the Prophet is
mentioned but twice to “those in authority” (Ulu Al Amr in Arabic) in verses 4:59 and 4:83:
Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between
people to judge with justice. Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever
Hearing and Seeing. 4:58
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59
Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O
Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to Taghut, while
they were commanded to reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray. 4:60And when it is
said to them, "Come to what Allah has revealed and to the Messenger," you see the hypocrites
turning away from you in aversion. 4:61
And when there comes to them information about [public] security or fear, they spread it around.
But if they had referred it back to the Messenger or to those of authority among them, then the
ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it. And if not for the
favor of Allah upon you and His mercy, you would have followed Satan, except for a few. 4:83

There is no mention in the Qur’an or Sunna to unconditional obedience to a king or a monarch or
any form of authority. This dissertation argues that historical and legal circumstances allowed
Ulu Al Amr to assume the central role determining when and how a ruler can legally govern the
Umma. Chapter two illustrates that the membership of Ulu Al Amr has changed historically
according to changes in political circumstances. For example, at the founding period of Islam,
due to their proximity to the Prophet, the Four Guided Caliphs were legal authorities and holders
of temporal power. By the end of the Second Civil War (60-73 AH/680-692 CE) temporal power
was a dynastic system of monarchical government. But most important, this dissertation argues,
as chapter two demonstrates, that contrary to the legal standards that changed historically in Fiqh
al siyash al shariah (the branch Islamic jurisprudence that deals with political issues), it is the
Ulama (learned, religious scholars and experts) who were the Ulu Al Amr. It was Ulu Al Amr and
only they who decided on the exception through Ijma (consensus or agreement of the
community, a source of Islamic law.) Consequently, temporal power’s rule over the Umma was

10

legitimized only through the legal authority of Ulu Al Amr, not through conquest or war. Gellner
points out the consequence of this authority type:
It subordinates the executive to the (divine) legislature and, in actual practice, turns the
theologians/lawyers into the monitors of political rectitude – whether or not they always have the
power to enforce their verdicts. The principle that “the community will not agree on error” may
endow communal consensus, rather than the political center, with a kind of legislative authority.
Within this communal consensus, the voice of the learned is liable to possess special weight.
After all, the community must heed an already existing law and it is natural to respect the opinion
of those better informed. (7)

Only then can the historical development of legal concepts in Fiqh al siyash al shariah, such as
Wilayah al ahed (allegiance to a dynastic monarchy) and Wlayah al qaher (obedience to coercive
power and rule) be appreciated and understood politically. Force alone cannot achieve legal
legitimacy in Islam. Accordingly, power as a legitimate temporal quality exists only when it is
bestowed via the authority of Ulu Al Amr. This local distinction between force and power is
central in understanding Sunni political and legal writings. Both concepts were legally developed
by Ulu Al Amr in a specific historical moment. Neither concept can be found in the Qur’an,
Sunna, or Hadith. No temporal power in the history of Islam was able to display a European
character of sovereign power because the qualities of the concept are alien to the legal codes of
Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah. The influence of Ulu Al Amr on political issues is immense since
legally “all major Sunni legal Ulama agree that the state is not a doctrinal pillar or a foundational
part of the religion and as such it is the realm of opinion and disagreements” (Imarah 1988,
208).1 This quality is present in Sunni Fiqh since members of Ulu Al Amr are considered to be
scholars or learned individuals, and their “authority seems to be derived from the fact that the
person wielding authority possesses superior knowledge, insight, or experience. The authority
rests upon these givens, which are accompanied by the person’s ability to give extended reasons
1

. كل تيارات الفكر االسالمي السنية و أعالم علمائها مجمعون على أن ( الدولة ) ليست ( ركنا ) و ال ( أصال ) من أركان الدين و أصوله
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for what he decides to say or do” (Friedrich 1972, 51). While in Shia Fiqh “Ulu Al Amr are those
in charge of the affairs of the Muslim community and they are the leaders of the Umma,
according to verse 4:59 obeying their command is a duty of all Muslims since the verse puts
obedience to them in equal status to obedience of the Prophet that is derived from the obedience
of God” (Al Fahrey 1986, 11).2 The difference in the quality of learned individuals and the status
of prophecy underlines the difference in the conception of authority in Shia, which requires an
entire study devoted to the subject matter.

This dissertation is primarily a legal study in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah focusing on
authority and obedience in Islam. This study records historical events in the legal evolution of
Fiqh al siyash al shariah and analyzes how that evolution took its particular trajectory. But this
is not a historical study on the evolution of Fiqh al siyash al shariah. In fact, there are many
significant changes and developments that took place in Fiqh al siyash al shariah that are
unrelated to the dissertation topic. Surely, there are events that scholars deem important, but
again this is not primarily a historical study. Nevertheless, historical events must be elucidated in
a context that best demonstrates my argument. Finally, I rely on many contemporary Muslim
legal thinkers to discuss and survey Fiqh al siyash al shariah and show what is commonly
accepted as orthodoxy. My intention is to use a body of work that has gained consensus in the
mainstream of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah.
In chapter one I discuss debates among legal scholars concerning the concept of
sovereignty and the nation-state in relation to the Sharia. The chapter illustrates the debate in
Fiqh al siyash al sharia (Sharia-oriented public policy authorizes government leaders to conduct
2

أما القضية الثانية فمترتبة على سيادة الشرع و هي عدم جواز تغيير األحكام الشرعية ال من قبل األمة و ال من قبل الدولة
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government affairs in harmony with the spirit and purpose of Sharia, even at the expense of a
temporary departure from its specific rules) concerning the location of sovereignty of the state as
the highest authority in relation to the Sharia. The debate features three different legal opinions.
The first opinion argues that the sovereignty of the nation-state is compatible with the Sharia.
The second contends that sovereignty is incompatible with Sharia and as such is a heretical
claim that there is an authority above the Sharia. The third and final opinion claims that the
sovereignty and the Sharia are compatible, but that Sharia must provide the guideline to what is
included in the constitution. The debate is ongoing without consensus among legal scholars.
Chapter two investigates that evolution of both Ulu Al Amr and temporal power in the history of
Sunni Islam as a consequence of social and political change. Historically, there is no clear Ijma
or consensus in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah regarding who the Ulu Al Amr are. This chapter
argues that it is the Ulama and not temporal power or the elite are Ulu Al Amr. Furthermore, the
formation of the Ulu Al Amr as the Ulama evolved historically as a consequence of the First and
Second Civil wars (35-40/656-661 and 60-73/680-692, respectively). In the absence of a fixed
text or orthodoxy in Fiqh al siyash al shariah, this chapter challenges the academic utility of the
concept of fundamentalism in political Islam. In fact, the very existence of Fiqh al siyash al
shariah renders fundamentalism an oxymoron. Chapter three investigates the character of
authority and obedience in Sunni Islam. The chapter argues that the character of the authority of
Ulu Al-Amr is a consequence of social and political circumstances that produced a type of
authority similar to that of experts in a particular field of knowledge. Consequently, obedience to
authority in Sunni Islam is conditional and not absolute. This character of authority is
emphasized further in the realm of Al siyash al shariah (Sharia-oriented public policy authorizes
government leaders to conduct government affairs in harmony with the spirit and purpose of the
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Sharia, even at the expense of a temporary departure from its specific rules) because it is a
branch and not a root of Sharia. Fiqh al siyash al shariah is a realm of opinion, and
disagreements on such topics do not undermine Sharia. Chapter four argues that historically the
Ulu Al Amr provided to temporal power in Fiqh al siyash al shariah the special legal status of a
state of permanent war as a part of the process of legitimating dynastic rule. Historically, this
condition provided the legal legitimacy for a shift in the role and function of temporal power
from one that is subservient to Sharia and the Umma to a condition were the Al siyash al shariah
and the Umma are subservient to temporal power. This shift is most prevalent in the evolution of
Fiqh al siyash al shariah, and it is indicative of the authority of Ulu Al Amr in this domain.
Chapter five argues that modernity ushered in a global change in both in physical and
metaphysical realms to all non- European cultures. In the case of Sunni Islam, modernity’s
consequence is twofold: first, the logic of the sovereignty of the nation-state challenged Sunni
authority by permanently centralizing the role of the Ulu Al Amr as part of the state bureaucracy;
hence, the historical appearance of the legal post of the Grand Muftti. The logic of state
sovereignty undermined Sunni authority and the legitimacy of the Ulu Al Amr, who lacked
neutrality, to speak on behalf of Islam. Consequently, the nineteenth century witnessed the
formation of a new and modern Ulu Al Amr. This new class, the modern Ulu Al Amr, challenged
and opposed the traditional establishment of Ulu Al Amr, rejecting obedience to temporal power
via Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher. The aim of this new class, autonomous and reflexive
agents free from tradition, is to reinterpret Fiqh al siyash al shariah according to contemporary
political and social conditions. Thus, modernity set Sunni authority free by democratizing the
office of Ulu Al Amr and providing it with the logical justification for challenging tradition and
authority.
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CHAPTER I
Sovereignty in Islam

On December 17th 2010, a local event in Sidi Bouzid, an impoverished town 190 miles
(300 km) south of the capital Tunis, sparked what became a season of revolutions that swept the
Arab region, toppling decades of dictators and regimes. Among those regimes were Bin Ali of
Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, Gadhafi of Libya, and Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, with presumably
more to follow. The incident began with a young man, Mohammed Bouazizi, the breadwinner
for his family of eight, who traveled to provincial headquarters in Sidi Bouzid, to complain to
local municipality officials. They refused to see him. At 11:30 a.m., less than an hour after a
confrontation with a policewoman, and without telling his family, Bouazizi returned to the
elegant two-story white building with arched azure shutters, poured fuel over his body, and
struck a match (Abouseid, 2011). Today the name of Bouazizi is a symbol of the changes that
have coursed through the Arab world and surprised the rest of the globe.
The revolutions of what became known as "the Arab Spring" started with spontaneous
uprisings that caught lay observers and academics unawares. The uprising challenged decades of
repression and dictatorship. The masses that took to the streets and public squares were from
every walk of life and hardly committed to any particular ideology or organized political party.
Instead, they mobilized and came together to reject economic, social, and political conditions
that they blamed on the ruling class.
Yet once the revolutionary process toppled the dictatorships, Islamic political
parties gained decisive victories at the ballot box in both Egypt and Tunisia. The enthusiasm of
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the mainstream, local, Arab, and Western media was dampened by the electoral victory of the
political parties that are motivated by an Islamic outlook on politics. Many have argued that the
“Arab Spring” has taken a turn for the worse and become an “Arab Winter.” The fear among
observers is that both Tunis and Egypt will follow the path of the Iranian revolution of 1979.
This concern has sparked old and new debates, and issues of political Islam, democracy, and
modernity have assumed greater urgency as observers have tried to determine the direction of
Prime Minster Hamadi Jebali’s Renaissance Movement Party (RMP) in Tunisia and the
President Mohamed Morsi-led Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of Egypt.
With both Tunisia and Egypt in the process of drafting new constitutions, the question
looming in the mind of academics and political observers is what role religion has in both
documents. The main concern is whether Islamic political parties can guarantee citizenship rights
and liberties for women and religious minorities while simultaneously implementing economic
policy geared toward more equitable social justice. After all, religion was not the driving force
behind the revolutions that swept the region. In fact, both the RMP in Tunisia and the FJP in
Egypt, like every other political group, were astonished. And as the elections showed, liberal and
socialist forces were unorganized. This was the case more so in Egypt than Tunisia.
Religion was at the foundation of the RMP and the FJP electoral successes, and it is the
reason why they stand in contrast to the secular political parties. Furthermore, both political
parties are still considered prominent enemies of the old regime in the mind of the public. Beinin
and Stork use the term “political Islam” to describe these movements which this dissertation
applies when speaking about RMP and the FJP. Accordingly, they argue:
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We term the movements in this volume “political Islam” because we regard their core concerns as
temporal and political. They use the Qur’an, and hadiths (reports about the words and deeds of
Muhammad and his Companions), and other canonical texts to justify their stances and actions.
And they do so in all sincerity. (3)

But what is the role of political Islam in the current revolutionary phase in Tunisia and Egypt
when both countries are demanding economic and social change based on respect for civil rights
and liberties? One way to answer this question is by examining the political writings of the
forefathers of political Islam who championed the role of religion in the state as the correct
approach to politics. One cannot properly and fully evaluate the significance of the writings of Al
Maududi, Qutb, or Khomeni without understanding the challenge that the nation-state, with
European sovereignty at its core, posed to Sharia-governed political entities in the context of
colonial and postcolonial states. The theme of the relationship between state sovereignty and
Islam can be traced back to the eighteenth century writings of Jamal Al Din Al Afghani and
continues up to contemporary Muslim scholars and thinkers such as Rashed Al Ghannushi and
Yusuf Al Qaradawi. Both Al Ghannushi and Al Qaradawi are considered the modern Ulu Al Amr
(see chapter five) behind the RMP and FJP. In this sense, they are following their predecessors’
contributions regarding the role of popular sovereignty and the sovereignty of God. They ask, for
example, how the modern conception of sovereignty can coexist with the following Qur’anic
injunction:
Say, "O Allah, Owner of Sovereignty, You give sovereignty to whom You will and You take
sovereignty away from whom You will. You honor whom You will and You humble whom You
will. In Your hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all things competent. (Qur’an, 3:26)

It must be noted though that the contemporary lexical term “sovereignty” (Syaada) differs from
what is used in the verse; instead, the Qur’an uses the word “domain” (Mulk). But the choice of
the word sovereignty is correct because the context of the verse indicates that Mulk is the highest
authority in relation to other legal entities.
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To illustrate the conflict between Qur’anic and modern Western concepts of sovereignty,
consider the following statements. The first statement regarding sovereignty, made by two
Islamic legal scholars, is that “Sharia actually nullifies the ability of the people or the state to
change the law” (Mufti and Wakeel 1991, 9).3 The second statement by a Western academic
scholar describes sovereignty as “a foundational idea of politics and law that can only be
properly understood as, at one and the same time, both an idea of supreme authority in the state,
and an idea of political and legal independence of geographically separate states” (Jackson 2007,
x). The stark and irreconcilable differences are clear in relation to the legal logic of the modern
nation state and international law.
The modern concept of sovereignty is defined as “the power or authority which
comprises the attributes of an ultimate arbitral agent –whether a person or a body of persons
entitled to make decisions and settle disputes within a political hierarchy with some degree of
finality. A sovereign is a person or group of persons (including a representative assembly)
possessed of sovereignty” (Miller, Coleman, Connolly, and Ryan 1987, 492). Accordingly, law
and legitimacy emanate from the agent who is both a temporal and transcendental actor, the
highest in power, the final power, general in effect, and finally independent. It is this conception
of sovereignty with its temporal/transcendental attributes that Sayyid Qutb describes as
“Jahiliyyah” (pre Islamic or pagan). He argues that “this Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against
God’s sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely
sovereignty and makes some men lords over others” (Qutb 2001, 11). While this view of

3

 و بموجب هذه اآلية يتوجب على جميع،و أولو األمر هم الذين يتولون أمور المسلمين في هذه ال شؤون و يقومون بزعامتهم بأمر من هللا سبحانه
المسلمين االنقياد ألولي االمر بعد أن قرنت طاعتهم بطاعة رسول هللا التي تتفرع من طاعة هللا
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sovereignty is in accordance with Fiqh al siyash al shariah (Islamic jurisprudence), there are, as
we shall see later in the chapter, contending legal views on the concept.
This conflict between Western and Qur’anic conceptions of sovereignty was at the heart
of anxieties over the RMP and FJP drafting of constitutions in Tunisia and Egypt. While both
parties claim that they want to be a part of building a modern state that respects civil rights and
liberties, which the revolutions demanded and struggled to achieve, their initial success owed to
their religious character and made it difficult for them to compromise on core issues such as the
role of Sharia in relation to public life.
Many were skeptical that the RMP and FJP could succeed because of political Islam’s
stand on Sharia in public life. Critics questioned whether its values would oppose equal
citizenship rights and civil liberties. More clearly, the model of the modern state that secular
academics and political parties see under threat was a product of historical circumstances that
“required the liberation of the territorial sovereign from the authority of an internationally
centralized church and a central imperial power” (Marcuse 2008, 10). The modern state’s
relationship with religion has its roots in European history, and as such it “is a post-medieval and
indeed, anti-medieval arrangement of governing authority” (Jackson 2007, 6). Nevertheless,
sovereignty remains at its root a reaction against the medieval theological arrangements of
authority and not a rupture with it. Instead, sovereignty maintained the theological qualities of
medieval authority by transferring them into secularized supernatural myths of the nation,
nationalism, and popular sovereignty. Thus, modern sovereignty is inherently antagonistic to any
competing authority, especially the authority of religion and the institution of the centralized
church. Historically, this particular arrangement of authority in its relationship to religion has
played an essential role in the rise of the modern concept of sovereignty. This conception of
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sovereignty over time spread “in marked contrast to ideas of authority in other parts of the world
before Western imperial states intervened and established themselves as a global, and no longer
merely a European or Western system” (Jackson 2007, ix). No state today operates outside this
system of state sovereignty. In fact, “sovereignty is the prevailing idea of political and legal
authority of the modern era” (Jackson 2007, 7).

Yet, many contemporary legal scholars argue that state sovereignty is weakening and
challenged by globalization, non-state actors, and political organizations. Consequently, “the
contemporary salience of religious movements around the globe, and the torrent of commentary
on them by scholars and journalists, have made it plain that religion is by no means disappearing
in the modern world” (Asad 2003,1). In addition, many states today do not adhere to the above
strict idea of sovereignty as the highest authority. For example, both Iran and Great Britain are
sovereign states that operate with a pre-modern logic of authority. My point is to demonstrate
that the strict definition of sovereignty provided by Jackson is constantly violated in the material
world. Therefore, why should we accept that sovereignty could exist only in its modern form in
relation to the past? “It is true that sovereignty is explicitly formulated in the modern
period…but it does not follow that the reality of state sovereignty did not exist in earlier periods
even though the concept itself had yet to be formulated” (Hoffman 1998, 35).The point here is
not to question the modern concept and its relationship to the past and other forms of authority;
instead, it is to demonstrate that other formulations of authority exist side-by-side with modern
sovereignty. As such, modern sovereignty is a point on the continuum of forms of authority that
have existed in European history and not a product of an abrupt appearance in history. This is an
important point of disagreement among academics in the debate over the concept of sovereignty.
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The results of this debate are important and much related to the subject matter of this dissertation
since contemporary international law and human rights are directly related to the concept of
sovereignty.

Yet, applying the strict definition of sovereignty provided above by Jackson to Islamic
legal and political history is theoretically confusing and misleading at best. This methodological
error overlooks the local characteristics of Sunni authority that are specific to the Islam in
general and Sunni Islam in particular. More important, reducing Islamic legal and political
history to a concept that has its historical roots in the history of Europe may lead to conclusions
that are more relevant to European history than Islamic legal and political tradition. For example,
a central of Islamic legal and political writings is derived from the fact that in Islam “Law is
prior to the state” (Ahmed 1965, 481). Consequently, “it is clear that in Islam the state has never
been an end in itself: it has always been universal in character-not for one nation, but for all men
of all nations of humanity” (Ahmed 483). As such, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate
how the adherents of such a view act in a political environment organized around modern
concepts such as state or popular sovereignty. A proper investigation into the concept of
sovereignty and its relationship to any one European tradition should focus primarily on the local
configuration of authority in the legal documents and historical configurations of authority and
power. The aim is to escape the Eurocentric approach to the subject matter that “defines
contemporary conditions in the ‘Third World’ in terms of abstracted condition of European
experience” (Mirsepassi 2000, 8). Adhering strictly to Eurocentric concepts deprives academic
research of the opportunity to understand how other cultures constitute themselves in a world
system dominated by international law, European sovereignty, globalization, capitalism, and
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industrialized powers. How other systems of meaning and thought address sovereignty uncover
the internal dynamic of these systems, as they address and interact within the international
system of state sovereignty. This is less reductive than the academic approach that “defines the
‘Third world’ as a singular essentialized entity not in terms of its own existing qualities, but in
terms of ‘First World’ qualities which it lacks” (Mirsepassi 2000, 8).
Consequently, in avoiding these theoretical problems, one may overcome the problems of
essentializing all non-European cultures into either/or categories compatible with modernity,
democracy, and human rights. More specifically, the aim is to avoid overlooking the varieties
within Islamic legal and political thought and essentialzing Islam into a singular entity. As Susan
Buck-Morss has noted, the political impact of Islamism, “far from monolithic, has been
reactionary, conservative, democratic, revolutionary, conspiratorial—depending on the specific
and changing national and international contexts in which modern Islamism has developed over
a period of several generations” (Buck-Morss 2003, 3). This dissertation contends that the key to
understanding the above variation in orientation toward politics is to investigate and comprehend
how authority is constituted and how sovereignty is understood by Islamic legal and political
thinkers.
This dissertation aims to investigate how European sovereignty operates and coexists
with Sunni conceptions of authority. It draws on the ideat that “sovereignty is a form of
authority” (Jackson 2007, 14). While there are universal characteristics of authority that both
European sovereignty and Sunni authority share, the operation and configuration of how and why
authority is recognized and obeyed is particular to the historical political and social conditions
(both material and ideational) in any system of thought. Nevertheless, “the goal is not to
‘understand’ some ‘other’ discourse, emanating from a ‘civilization’ that is intrinsically different
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from ‘our own’” (Buck-Morss 2003, 4). Rather the goal is to evaluate and understand political
Islam’s ideas of popular sovereignty, democracy, and human rights in light of the Islamic
conception of sovereignty.

The academic research that theorizes sovereignty and state formation in Islamic political
and social history through a Western prism may provide plausible narratives, but such an
investigation overlooks the local qualities and configurations of authority that are innate in the
character of another system of thought. Sovereignty in its Hobbesian relationship to violence,
human nature, or a monopoly of violence faces limits when applied to Islamic political and social
history. Its methodological limitations and problems arise when researching the rise of
contemporary political Islam and Islamic political thought in general. Adding to its
methodological problems the challenges of tracing social and political concepts across time and
space while overlooking the local qualities of the subject matter renders the task daunting and
unproductive. This dissertation argues that while authority and control are universal political
concepts and present in all human collectivities, they must be grasped through their local context
of meaning and significations. A good example of the universal character of authority and
control is the following quote by Herbert Marcuse:
Thus in the authority relationship, freedom and unfreedom, autonomy and heteronomy are yoked
in the same concept and united in the single person of he who is subject. The recoginition of
authority as a basic force of social praxis attacks the very roots of human freedom: it means (in a
different sense in each case) the surrender of autonomy (of thought, will, action), the tying of the
subject’s reason and will to pre-established contents, in such a way that these contents do not
form the ‘material’ to be changed by the will of the individual but are taken over as they stand as
the obligatory norms for his will. (7)

This self-policing character is universal condition and present in the subject and every
collectivity allowing the formation of the self and group identities that constitute the tribe, city,
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state, and nation. Similarly, the formation of the self and group identities occurs in Islamic social
and political history, as well. But to see how this formation of the self and group identities
operates and how obedience is achieved in the Sunni Islamic context one must look at the local
character of authority relationships. More precisely, the aim here is to understand how subjects
are situated in relation to one another, i.e., how authority exerts obedience over the subject and
maintains a collectivity with its system of meaning.

It is central to Islamic political thought that “law is prior to the state” (Ahmed 1965, 481).
Islamic political thinking considers the purpose of the state to enforce the law, not the monopoly
of the legitimate use of violence. It is a fact that neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna (an action or a
statement by the Prophet narrated by legal sources) ordains Muslims to create a state or prescribe
a particular system of government. The state is an expedient to implement Sharia. Consequently,
the state is located under Sharia and not above it, and temporal authority or the Khalifa follows
the same logic. The monopoly of violence is not prior to the state but a consequence of this fact.
The following verses from the Qur’an illustrate the point:
Say, "Indeed, I am on clear evidence from my Lord, and you have denied it. I do not have that for
which you are impatient. The decision is only for Allah. He relates the truth, and He is the best of
deciders." 6:57
Follow, [O mankind], what has been revealed to you from your Lord and do not follow other than
Him any allies. Little do you remember. 7:3
And He is Allah; there is no deity except Him. To Him is [due all] praise in the first [life] and the
Hereafter. And His is the [final] decision, and to Him you will be returned. 18:70

These verses are foundational in Islamic legal and political writings. In fact, I argue that Fiqh al
siyash al shariah, with the aid of actual historical circumstances surrounding the evolution of
Sharia, is the proper area of investigation to understand the configuration of authority in Islam.
The historian G.H. Bousquet, in answering the riddle behind the early success of the Islamic
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conquest, pointed to the importance of Fiqh in understanding Islamic history. He argues against
historical explanations that consider the early conquest of Islam as purely material in nature and
downplay faith’s role. He contends that “a century after the conquest a new civilization was
crystallizing around fiqh” (Donner 2008, xx). “Moreover, the fact that the conquerors did not
stress conversion of subjects does not mean that conquerors were not motivated by religious idea
(xx).” This explains why Islamic empires up to the 19th century such as Ottoman Empire
allowed more than one set of legal codes to exist within the empire. Off course, exceptions exist
in the history of Islam, but, nonetheless, Islamic authority, unlike European sovereignty, allowed
plural legal codes and did not unify under one code of laws.

A lexical warning, I use the term Ulu Al Amr when speaking only about the Ulama
(plural Alim legal scholars) or Grand Mufti (expert authorized to issue Fatwa, a legal opinion).
Explaining the use and the argument that Ulu Al Amr are the Ulama or Grand Mufti will become
abundantly clear in chapter two. But for the moment it is sufficient to state that according to Fiqh
al siyash al shariah the term Ulu Al Amr includes the Ulama but the Ulama do not exclusively
occupy this category. Historically, Ulu Al Amr at one moment in history includes the
Companions of the Prophet and in some other moment in history legal opinions include in it the
Khalifa or temporal power. The justification of this argument is the central topic of chapter two,
which argues that the Ulama and the Companions of the Prophet are Ulu Al Amr and not
temporal power. If, according to Carl Schmitt, the “sovereign is he who decides on the
exception” (5), then sovereignty does not exist in Islamic legal and political writings. Legally,
Ulu Al Amr is the body that is qualified to decide the exception via Ijma (consensus among
Ulama as a source of Islamic law) yet they do not control the means of force. While the Khalifa
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had the monopoly of force he does not decide the exception. This local character is central in
understanding the Sunni legal and political system of meaning. Moreover, no one, including the
Ulu Al Amr, can legally suspend Sharia entirely. Those are the two central characteristics of
Sunni Fiqh al siyash al Shariah that must be understood to theorize accurately how obedience
and control is historically achieved in Sunni Islam and why European sovereignty is a debatable
concept in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. This will become clearer in the following chapters but for
the moment this dissertation uses the Ulu Al Amr as the Ulama.

Historically, legal debates among Ulama (legal scholars) about the concept of
sovereignty in relation to Sharia appeared abruptly in the eighteenth century. Debates on the
concept of sovereignty in relation to Sharia appeared approximately during the colonial period,
which started with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt 1798-1801 CE. Accordingly, “ the dominance
of the idea of sovereignty on the thinking of political and constitutional scholars in the Muslim
states led to the appearance of several legal views in locating the source of sovereignty in the
contemporary Islamic thinking”(Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 21).4 Interest in the concept of
sovereignty was shaped by the advent of the nation state during the colonial period but
internationally the concept was operative in international law. Thus, interest and debates about
sovereignty continued in the postcolonial era as well. According to Mufti and Wakeel, “since
early twentieth century colonial powers propagated the concept of sovereignty as tool to
establish their hegemony and laws for the purpose of secularizing Muslims and marginalizing
Islam and Sharia. This process led the colonized states to establish the principle of popular
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لقد أدت سيطرة فكرة السيادة على التفكير السياسي لعلماء السياسة و رجال القانون الدستوري في بالد المسلمين إلى ظهور عدة إتجاهات في تحديد
 و مع التأكيد بأن البحث أساسا في صاحب السيادة. مصدر السيادة في الفكر السياسي اإلسالمي المعاصر
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sovereignty and abandoned the Sharia to prove that their system of government is similar to
Western states” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 7).5 Consequently, “Muslim legal scholars concentrated
their efforts at theorizing about the concept of sovereignty in general and more precisely, the
attribute of sovereignty as the highest authority and the consequences it holds in relation to the
authority of the Sharia, the will of the Umma (community, or Muslims as a unit), and the state”
(Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 21).6

The Fuqaha agreed unanimously that modern sovereignty contradicts Sharia, which is
superior in location to it. According to As-Sawy “the will of God alone is above any other
competing will and as such Ijma (consensus of Fuqaha in a given age) was achieved on the
subject matter. Ijma follows the Quran and Sunna as a source of law that regulates the Umma.
Throughout the history of Islam there was no opposition to this principle from a minor or a major
sect in Islam” (As-Sawy 2011, 31).7 If the previous statement sounds unequivocal, consider the
following quote by Abu Hamid Al Ghazali (1058–1111 CE), the prominent Faqih in the twelfth
Century, who argues “that in the process of answering who should govern, it becomes clear that
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منذ أوائل القرن الحالي سعى اإلستعمار الغربي إلى نشر مفاهيمه عن السيادة في بالد المسلمين بهدف بسط الهيمنة و القوانين الغربيين فيها و تأصيل
 مما جعل أغلب الدول المستعمرة و التابعة تسارع إلى قرار مبدأ السيادة الشعبية إلظهار و، النزعة الالدينية إلقصاء اإلسالم عن واقع الحياة و التشريع
 باإلضافة إلى تعطيل األحكام الشرعية، تأكيد توافق أنظمتها مع األنظمة الغربية
6

لقد أدت سي طرة فكرة السيادة على التفكير السياسي لعلماء السياسة و رجال القانون الدستوري في بالد المسلمين إلى ظهور عدة إتجاهات في تحديد
 و مع التأكيد بأن البحث أساسا في صاحب السيادة. مصدر السيادة في الفكر السياسي اإلسالمي المعاصر
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 إنما، إن اإلرادة التي تعلو على جميع اإلرادا ت و السلطة التي تهيمن على جميع السلطات فيما تنظمه أو تقضي فيه سلطة أخرى تساويها أو تساميها
 و ال ذكر و ال،  إجماعا ً لم يشذ عنه كبير و ال صغير،  و لقد إنعقد إجماع األمة كلها في مختلف األعصار و األمصار.هي إرادة هللا وحده ال شريك له
 و أن،  و ال حالل إال ما أحله و ال حرام اال ما حرمه،  إنه ال دين إال ما أوجبه هللا و ال شرع إال ما شرعه.. أنثى و ال حر و ال عبد و ال طائع و ال عاص
 فهو..  أو أعطى غيره حق التحليل و التحريم و اإليجاب و الندب، من جادل في هذه ( البنهية) فأحل ما حرمه هللا أو حرم ما أحله أو رد شيئا من حكمه
مارق من الدين كافر بإجماع المسلمين
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there is not rule but God’s rule and neither the Prophet rule over Muslims nor a master over a
slave is above that” (As-Sawy 2011, 31).8
Theologically, during the early period in the history of Islam, legal scholars or Ulu Al
Amr had achieved consensus or Ijma that sovereignty belongs exclusively to God. Consequently,
historically the issue has never been a matter of debate. But disagreements among legal scholars
or Ulu Al Amr were evident beyond this understanding and especially in practical realm of
implementation. Differences between the schools in legal opinions will be spelled out in the
following two comprehensive legal studies compiled on the topic of the modern sovereignty in
Fiqh.
The first survey by the Muslim legal scholars Mufti and Wakeel is divided roughly into
three groups on the issue of modern sovereignty in Fiqh:
First, the Umma and sovereignty legal opinion, which considers the Umma as a whole, is source
of sovereignty, or actually the sovereign. Legally, they justify their claim that the Umma alone is
the source of authority and government in Islam.
One of the scholars who advances this opinion is the prominent 20th Century Muslim Faqih,
Mohamed Al Ghazali Al Saqqa, [who was closely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood of
Egypt.] In his famous book published in 1949, Islam and Political Despotism, he advanced his
Ijtihad (to exercise personal judgment based on the Qur'an and Sunna) that “the Umma alone is
the source of authority and to disregard this fact amounts to a rebellion against both divine
injunctions and historical experience. (22)9

A similar legal opinion was advanced earlier in the nineteenth century by Muhammad Bekhit Al
Mut'aei, the grand Mufti (Sunni Islamic scholar who is an interpreter or expounder of Sharia) of
Egypt (1915-1920), in his book The Truth of Islam and the Rules of Governing, in which he
8

،  بل كل ذلك حكم هللا تعالى و وضعه،  و حكم للرسول و ال للسيد على العبد و ال لمخلوق على مخلوق، و في البحث عن الحاكم يتبين أنه ال حكم إال هلل
ال حكم غيره
9

 أن األ مة صاحبة السيادة على أسا أن ( السلطة العامة لي لها سوى مصدر واحد و صاحب واحد: األمة و السيادة يرى أصحاب اإلتجاه االول-أوال
 و:  حيث يعبر الشيخ محمد الغزالي عن هذا المفهوم للسيادة بقوله.  و لقد أكد إتجاه سيادة األمة و إعتبارها مصدرا للسلطات عدد من الكتاب. هو األمة
 و نصوص الدين و تجارب الحياة تتضافر كلها،،،  و الخروج على رأيها تمرد، من ثم فاألمة وحدها هي مصدر السلطة و النزول على إرادتها فريضة
على توكيد ذلك
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argued “that Muslims are among the first people to advance the legal principle that the authority
is in the hand of the Umma” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 22).10
This opinion that sovereignty resides with the Umma is based on a number of legal
principles, but most important is that according to Sharia, Muslims have the right to choose their
ruler through Bay’a (a contract in a form of an oath of allegiance to a leader). The second
principle is Ijma. This principle was constructed by Muslim scholars based on a number of
Hadiths (plural for Hadith). Most important is the following Hadith: “My nation will not unite
on error, so if you see them differing, follow the great majority.”11 This most-referred-to Hadith
serves as the legal foundation of Ijma for the primacy of the Umma.
Second is “the dual sovereignty legal opinion group who considers the Umma and the
Sharia both as constitutive of sovereignty in the Islamic state” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 25).12
“This view of Fiqh differentiates between two sets of injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna; they
are definitive injunctions and injunctions that are open to interpretations” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991,
25).13 Accordingly, it is only when the injunctions are unclear and open to interpretations that the
Umma acts as sovereign through the process of Ijma. This view is advanced by the contemporary
scholar Hazim Abdel Mutaal Al Saeedi in his book The Islamic Theory of the State Compared
with The State in Modern Jurisprudence. He argues that “sovereignty in the Islamic state resides
in the people…since the Umma is the source of authority and the ruler must obey its will.

10

أن المسلمين هم أول أمة قالت بأن األمة هي مصدر السلطات كلها قبل أن يقول ذلك غيرها من األمم

11

إن أمتي ال تجتمع على ضاللة فإذا رأيتم اختالفا فعليكم بالسواد األعظم

12

 فاألمة و الشريعة يمثالن مصدر السيادة في الدولة االسالمية، فيرون أن السيادة مزدوجة: أما أصحاب اإلتجاه الثاني

13

 فإذا وجد نص قطعي واضح أصبحت السيادة هلل و انتفى دور،  و مجال النص الظني أو عدم ورود نص، و يفرق هؤالء بين مجال النص القطعي
 أما إذا كان النص ظني الداللة فإن دور الجماعة يبرز ليهيمن على األمر و تصبح السيادة الشعبية مكملة لدور الشريعة فيما ال نص. األ غلبية أو اإلجماع
فيه أو فيما فيه نص ظني أو غامض

29

Nevertheless, it is Sharia that sets the limits on the sovereignty of the state or the people.
Consequently, the Umma is free to legislate laws and organize the state accordingly but within
the limits of Sharia” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 26).14Therefore, sovereignty is limited only by a
clear injunction in the Qur’an or Sunna. Thus, it is a self-imposed limitation by the state and the
people.
Third is the legal opinion that considers Sharia as the sole sovereign. Accordingly, the
“Ijma of the Umma was achieved as a principle abiding on Muslims, that is, adherence to the
Qur’an and Sunna and that the arbiter are the Book and the Sunna in any disagreement. As such
it nullifies the sovereignty of the Umma whether limited or absolute” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991,
28).15 Furthermore, “Sharia had emphasized the principle that sovereignty belongs to the law and
not to the Umma. Instead, Sharia gives rights to the Umma only in the area of selecting the Imam
(the leader, and in its highest form, refers to the head of the Islamic state) and scrutinizing his
performance. Therefore, the state does not derive the authority to legislate from the Umma
because it does not have it, and who does not own something cannot pass it to another entity”
(Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 28-29).16 According to Fathi Al Derini, a leading contemporary scholar
in Fiqh al siyasi (Islamic jurisprudence that deals with politics), “the Fiqh al siyasi historically
was unconcerned with the concept of sovereignty as it was a major subject among Western
14

 و لي للحكام في الدولة االسالمية من األمر إال ما تريده األمة و، السيادة في الدولة اإلسالمية تكمن في الشعب فاألمة اإلسالمية هي مصدر السلطات
 فهي الحدود التي فرضتها الشريعة اإلسالمية و لألمة،  أو سيادة مجموع األفراد المكونين للدولة اإلسالمية،  أما عن حدود سيادة الدولة. ترضاه
اإلسالمية أن تضع نظمها و قوانينها في حدود هذه السيادة
15

يؤكد ال بحث مبدأ سيادة الشرع مستندا على أصل مقطوع به مجمع عليه في الشريعة و هو وجوب إتباع ما جاء به الوحي من كتاب و سنة و أن الكتاب
 و بذلك يتقرر بطالن القول ( بسيادة األمة ) المطلقة أو المقيدة أو القول بنظرية السيادة الشعبية. و السنة حاكمان في كل أمر مختلف فيه
16

 فالدولة،  و محاسبته و عزله،  و مراقبته، لقد أكدت تعاليم اإلسالم أن السيادة للشرع و ليست للشعب الذي يمتلك فقط السلطان المتمثل في توليه اإلمام
 و لذلك فالفقه السياسي اإلسالمي لم،  لي بوسعه أن يملكه غيره بداهة، و من ال يملك شيئا،  ألنها ال تملكها أصال، ال تستمد سلطة التشريع من األمة
 و قد أقرت.  الن السيادة في النظرية السياسية اإلسالمية للشرع، يتناول مشكلة السيادة أو الشرعية السياسية كما تناولها ففقهاء السياسة الغربيون
الممارسة السياسية هذا المبدأ لفترة طويلة و لم يبدأ النظر في أصل السيادة و منشئها إال بعد أن تزعزعت معالم الخالفة اإلسالمية
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scholars since Sharia is the sovereign in Islamic jurisprudence. Furthermore, historically the
principle established precedent through the practice of politics by Islamic states and no one
questioned the source of sovereignty or its roots until the fall of the last Islamic Khilafa” (Mufti
& Wakeel 1991, 28-29).17 The author refers to the process of modernization that the Ottoman
Empire embarked upon in its final decades before its collapse in World War I.
Thus, under this legal view of sovereignty, Sharia trumps popular sovereignty and state
sovereignty as well. According to Mufti and Wakeel, “the principle of abiding by the authority
of Sharia ties the governor and the governed to the sovereignty of God; consequently, legislation
is directly derived from the Sharia. Conversely, legislation by the state cannot violate Sharia on
the basis that the Hakimiyyah (sovereignty) is for God” (Mufti & Wakeel 1991, 29).18 It is this
same concept that both Al Maududi and Qutb use in their political writings, and it is to this
school of Fiqh that they belong. This legal opinion is indeed platonic and in the face of social
and political change the most rigid among the other opinions. For example, Qutb argues “the
revelation represented the unequivocal affirmation that the source of the Qur’anic message was
the Allah; He is the sovereign of all sovereignty” (Khatab 2006, 32). Moreover, he states that
“our primary purpose is to know what way of life is demanded of us by the Qur’an, the total
view of the universe which the Qur’an wants us to have, what is the nature of our knowledge
taught to us by the Qur’an, the kind of morals and manners which are enjoined by it, and the
kind of legal and constitutional system it asks us to establish in the world. Thus the Sharia which
17

 فالدولة،  و محاسبته و عزله،  و مراقبته، لقد أكدت تعاليم اإلسالم أن السيادة للشرع و ليست للشعب الذي يمتلك فقط السلطان المتمثل في توليه اإلمام
 و لذلك فالفقه السياسي اإلسالمي لم،  لي بوسعه أن يملكه غيره بداهة، و من ال يملك شيئا،  ألنها ال تملكها أصال، ال تستمد سلطة التشريع من األمة
 و قد أقرت.  الن السيادة في النظرية السياسية اإلسالمية للشرع، يتناول مشكلة السيادة أو الشرعية السياسية كما تناولها ففقهاء السياسة الغربيون
الممارسة السياسية هذا المبدأ لفترة طويلة و لم يبدأ النظر في أصل السيادة و منشئها إال بعد أن تزعزعت معالم الخالفة اإلسالمية
18

 و عدم،  و إلى إنبثاق التشريعات من الشريعة اإلسالمية، و يهدف مبدأ سيادة الشرع إلى إقرار إلتزام الحاكم و المحكوم بشرع هللا سبحانه و تعالى
 و ذلك أسا قاعدة الحاكمية هلل و القانون المطبق في الدولة. إحداث تشريعات أو ممارسات تخالف الشرع
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God has given man to organize his life is also a universal law, as it is related to the general law
of the universe and is harmonious with it” (Qutb 2005, 21&89). Qutb is unequivocally clear that
the primary source for understanding politics and organizing the state is the Qur’an, the very
expression of sovereignty, and as such it stands above human laws. The Fuqaha who adhere to
this school of Fiqh usually argue that the Hakimiyyah of Sharia is clearly stated in the Qur’an.
They refer to the following verses:
Indeed, We sent down the Torah, in which was guidance and light. The prophets who submitted
[to Allah] judged by it for the Jews, as did the rabbis and scholars by that with which they were
entrusted of the Scripture of Allah, and they were witnesses thereto. So do not fear the people but
fear Me, and do not exchange My verses for a small price. And whoever does not judge by what
Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers. 5:44
And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for
an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever gives [up his right as]
charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then
it is those who are the wrongdoers. 5:45
And We sent, following in their footsteps, Jesus, the son of Mary, confirming that which came
before him in the Torah; and We gave him the Gospel, in which was guidance and light and
confirming that which preceded it of the Torah as guidance and instruction for the righteous. 5:46
And let the People of the Gospel judge by what Allah has revealed therein. And whoever does not
judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the defiantly disobedient. 5:47
And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, confirming that which
preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge between them by what Allah has
revealed and do not follow their inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth. To
each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one
nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all
that is] good. To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that
over which you used to differ. 5:48
And judge, [O Muhammad], between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their
inclinations and beware of them, lest they tempt you away from some of what Allah has revealed
to you. And if they turn away - then know that Allah only intends to afflict them with some of
their [own] sins. And indeed, many among the people are defiantly disobedient. 5:49

Ample verses in the Qur’an illustrate the point, but I use these verses to provide the sequential
detail of the injunction. This is even clearer in the verse “[O Muhammad] do not follow their
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inclinations away from what has come to you of the truth” 5:48. The verse is usually presented as
evidence against the previous two schools of Fiqh, arguing that God directly asked the prophet to
implement the law as it was revealed.
Nevertheless, Sharia and the Qur’an and the Sunna have little, if anything, to say about
the state or politics. This legal opinion views the state as a mere executive mechanism that
executes Sharia, which remains constant regardless of changing social and political
circumstances. The political body that executes the law, on the other hand, changes according to
social and political circumstance. Thus, the executive will change to accommodate Sharia.

The second survey is by the contemporary jurist and Faqih, Salah As-Sawy. He divides
the scope of the debate into four genres instead of the three categories of Mufti and Wakeel.
Most important, he argues that “none of the four legal opinions argued that God is not sovereign
as it is the case according to the Western concept of sovereignty” (As-Sawy 2011, 52).19 The
differences between the two surveys are insignificant, but it is worth demonstrating for the sake
of an exhaustive assessment of the concept of sovereignty in Sharia.
The first genre contends that “God is the sovereign, while government is a human matter
with God’s authorization” (As-Sawy 2011, 51).20 According to this legal view, “the Umma does
not have the right to legislate new laws but it is free in the manner of the execution of Sharia”
(As-Sawy 2011, 52).21 The Umma has the authority to choose its leader and to set the standard of

19

أن واحدا منها لم يقرر أن السيادة المطلقة بمعناها السابق أي المصطلح عليه في الفكر الغربي ألحد من دون هللا

20

 بتفويض من هللا،  يرى أن السيادة هلل "ابتالء" أما موضع الحكم فهو بيد البشر: اإلتجاه األول

21

 إنما،  و أنه هلل إبتداء،  فذلك الذي قرر تفرد الشرع به،  أو في إنشاء شرع جديد،  ال يتحدث عن دور األمة في التشريع المطلق: فاإلت جاه األول
يتحدث عن دورها في التنظيم في دائرة المباح أو العفو
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accountability freely according to its needs. More precisely, the Umma is free to regulate and
choose the manner and method of executing the Sharia. In a sense, the Umma is in charge of
executive laws, organization of the state, and standards of implementation for the laws, but the
Umma cannot legislate new Sharia.
Second, similar to Mufti and Wakeel’s first category, the “second current considers the
Umma to be the sovereign” (As-Sawy 2011, 51).22 Yet, according to As-Sawy, “the adherents of
this view of Fiqh do not conceptualize and produce sovereignty in the modern Western sense;
instead, they arrived at the idea of Umma sovereignty by obeying Sharia’s injunctions” (AsSawy 2011, 52).23 In other words, the Fuqaha arrived at this position through the principle of
Ijtihad and Ijma and not from a principle or ideal outside of Sharia.
Third, and similar to Mufti and Wakeel’s second category, sovereignty is dual in
character. According to the adherents of this school “God is sovereign in areas with clear
injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna, and areas with injunctions that are open to interpretation or
without any injunctions are left for the Umma to regulate given that the new legislation does not
contradict Sharia” (As-Sawy 2011, 53).24 Consequently, the Umma has the authority to legislate
when faced with new circumstances that have no clear injunctions in the Qur’an, Sunna, or Ijma.
Its sole restriction is that new laws not contradict an injunction in Sharia.

22

 و يذهب إلى أن السيادة لألمة: االتجاه الثاني

23

 أما اإلتجاه الثاني:  و مما يجب في هذا الصدد أن أصحاب هذا اإلتجاه: الذي نسب إليه الكاتب القول بأن السيادة لألمة يشترك عليه الكاتب نفسه بقوله
 بل أنهم ذهبوا إلى هذا الرأي و في ذهنهم، ال يقصدون من هذا الرأي أن مبدأ السيادة في سياقه اإلسالمي يحمل نف مدلوله في السياق األوروبي
ضوابطه الشرعية
24

 و لكنه يتحدث عن دور األمة في دائرة، فهو الذي قرر أن السيادة خالصة هلل،  ال يتحدث عن سيادة األمة في دائرة الشرع المحكم: اإلتجاه الثالث
 و لكنها ملتزمة في األولى بقواعد،  و سيأتي بيان أن هذه السيادة ليست مطلقة،  و في حالة النص الذي يحتمل تأويله أوجها متعددة، المباح أو العفو
 فال سيادة و ال إطالق،  و ملتزمة في الثانية بضوابط الترجيح المعتبرة شرعا، الشريعة الكلية و مقاصدها العامة
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The last category according to As-Sawy is that the sovereign is the Umma. This is similar
to Mufti and Wakeel’s first category “that as sovereign the Umma is the primary legislator since
the Umma is the entity that chooses to be Muslim and decides to obey Sharia and legislate
according to its principles” (As-Sawy 2011, 53).25 This view is primarily based on the legal
principle that there is no compulsion in religion. Hence, if the Umma decides not to adhere to the
Sharia or religion of Islam, implementing the law becomes meaningless. I argue that in this
category belongs Rashed Al Ghannushi who argues that “God did not make faith a matter of
force and compulsion; instead, it is a matter of understanding and choice. Compulsion by
definition contradicts judgment day since it nullifies human responsibilities for their actions and
most importantly stands in contradiction of Qura’nic verse [There shall be no compulsion in
[acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever
disbelieves in Taghut (transgressor) and believes in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy
handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. {2:256}]” (Al Ghannushi
1993, 36).26 Accordingly, the Umma respects sovereignty as a category of choice and
responsibility. The strict implementation of Sharia and the law is not going to create better
Muslims since this understanding contradicts the above verse and nullifies the very purpose of
Judgment Day.

25

 و أنها في هذه الدائرة هي،  فهو أبعد هذه اإلتجاهات عند اإلطالق النه ال يتحدث إال عن إطالق اإلرادة في إختيار اإلسالم إبتداء: أما اإلتجاه الرابع
 و ألزمت نفسها بإتباع أحكامه، صاحبة السيادة و صاحبة القرار فإذا هي إختارت اإلسالم فقد رضيت بالتقيد بكافة األحكام الشرعية
26

 و من أجل ضمان عدم اإلكراه أوجب اإلسالم على المسلمين التمكن من القوة للقيام في وجه من يحاول فتنتهم عن دينهم.ألحد يكره أهله الخروج عنه
 فإن هللا تعالى ما بني أمر اإليمان على اإلجبار. و أمر المسلمين أن يعتمدو في دعوة خصومهم أسلوب الحكمة و الموعظة الحسنة لتبيين الرشد من الغي
 (( فمن شاء هللا:  و نظير هذا قوله تعالى.  إلن في القهر و اإلكراه على الدين بطالن معنى و االمتحان. و إنما بناه على التمكن و اإلختيار،و القسر
 و إذا كان اإلعتقاد محله القلب فاإلكراه فيه ممتنع أصال. فليؤمن و من شاء فليكفر )) كما ذهب إلى ذلك الرازي
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In general, what is the significance of these contending views on the concept of
sovereignty?
The concept of sovereignty and its two attributes, the source and location of authority, are
the primary cause that divides legal schools. The significance of the configuration of authority
cannot be overemphasized; however, what can be further emphasized is that the concept of
authority in Fiqh is not static and cannot simply be essentialized into one legal view that is
opposed to modern concepts of sovereignty. The concepts of state and popular sovereignty may
after all be compatible with at least one school of Fiqh. More precisely, it is possible to arrive at
the Western conception of sovereignty from Fiqh al siyash al shariah, but that is neither the aim
nor the argument of this dissertation.
Second, according to contending views of sovereignty while there is Ijma on the principle
that God is the sovereign, there is no Ijma in Fiqh about how the previous principle is related to
modern sovereignty. The majority of Western academic literature overlooks this central character
in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Consequently, it erroneously applies the label of
fundamentalism to all forms of political Islam.
Third, I argue that views of sovereignty differ according to whom the Fuqaha considers a
legally qualified member of Ijma. The more inclusive legal opinion on who should be a member
of Ijma will most likely be in accord with As-Sawy’s last category stipulating the Umma is the
sovereign. Conversely, the more exclusive legal opinion on who should be a member of Ijma
will more likely belong to the group that contends God is the sovereign and Sharia is the
sovereign. This is a significant categorization since Ijma is not mentioned in the primary sources
of the Qur’an and Sunna. Instead, it is a legal category that was created though Ijtihad. It is a fact
that there is no Ijma in Fiqh on who should be included in Ijma.
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Finally and most important, this dissertation argues that the concept of modern
sovereignty is more accurately represented in the category of those who are in a position to
constitute Ijma. In Islamic legal theory, those who are in charge of deciding who is included and
excluded in Ijma are the highest authority and must be the focus of investigating authority
configurations in Islam. While there is no Church in Islam, the authority that this group
possesses emanates from the condition “that the legal idea cannot translate itself independently
[which] is evident from the fact that it says nothing about who should apply it” (Schmitt 1985,
31). This is an accurate description of the category of Ulu Al Amr (Trustee or Custodians) that
are mentioned in the Qur’an:
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59

In fact, there is no legal consensus (Ijma) on who they are and how they are constituted, but
“they are entitled to the affairs of the community and have this authority and the leadership of
the Umma in accordance to the Sharia” (Al-Massari 2002, 14).27 The following section will
briefly address the legal category of Ulu Al Amr, which is discussed in detail in the following
chapter.

In conclusion, what is the significance to the contending views of sovereignty, and what
can we say about the concept of sovereignty according to Fiqh?
First, it is evident that the concept of sovereignty as the highest authority is the primary
cause that divides the legal schools into at least three different opinions. More precisely, it is the
question, and the heart of the debate between the Fuqaha, whether Sharia or sovereignty is prior.
27

 و بيدهم قيادة األمة،  الذين يملكون زمام األمور شرعا،  أي أصحاب التصرف في شأن األمة: أولو األمر
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Moreover, that the Fuqaha hold different legal views regarding the relationship between Sharia
and sovereignty belies the Eurocentric academic view that tends to essentialize non-European
concepts into one category opposite itself. In fact, as previously mentioned, there are at least
three contending opinions. The concept of state sovereignty and popular sovereignty may after
all be compatible with at least one opinion of Fiqh, which contends the Umma is the sovereign.
Consequently, it is possible to arrive at a Eurocentric conception of sovereignty from different
legal views and principles of Fiqh, but that is neither the aim nor the argument of this
dissertation.
Second, since there is no Ijma among the Fuqaha or legal scholars on the concept, all
contending views are legally valid, and Muslims are legally able to follow any of these opinions.
This implies there is no consensus among scholars on the compatibility of sovereignty with
Sharia. Therefore, the debate is ongoing.
Third, this dissertation argues that the statutory interpretations above differ according to
who is legally qualified to establish Ijma. Accordingly, the more inclusive legal opinion
regarding which parties can deliberate in the process of Ijma will likely belong to those who
maintain that sovereignty belongs to the Umma. Conversely, the more exclusive or elitist legal
opinion concerning who can deliberate in the process of Ijma will likely belong to the group that
contends God is the sovereign and Sharia has sovereignty over the Umma. This is a significant
categorization since Ijma as a principle is not mentioned in the primary sources of the Qur’an
and Sunna. Instead, it is a legal category that was created though Ijtihad and became legal via
Ijma. There is no Ijma in Fiqh determining who should be included to constitute Ijma.
Finally and most important, this dissertation argues that sovereignty is not key to
understanding authority in Islamic legal and political writings. Instead, the focus of this
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investigation is on those historically in charge of deliberating on new legal circumstances,
including whether or not state and popular sovereignty are compatible with Sharia. Moreover,
the subject of my investigation is focused on the following questions and those who are
historically in a position to designate Ijma: Who is this group that has the power of Ijma? How
do they qualify to be a part of Ijma? Who decides when Ijma is reached? In what ways has Ijma
changed? Most important, what is the historical relationship between Ijma, power, and authority?
Why does any particular group wield influence over Ijma? Each of these questions can be
answered only if we move beyond an exclusive concern with sovereignty.
This dissertation contends that answering these questions is theoretically more rewarding
than investigating whether the concept of sovereignty is compatible with Sharia. Answering
these questions may avoid the inherent methodological problems that come from accepting
Eurocentric definitions—while overlooking local concepts—and then applying these concepts to
other systems of thought.
Primarily, this dissertation posits that the group that is in a position of constituting Ijma is
the closest in structure and character to the sovereign. It follows that those who are in charge of
deciding who is to be included and excluded from constituting Ijma are the highest and final
authority; it is this group on which we focus our investigation into the function of authority in
Islamic legal and political writings. In fact, this highest and final authority is derivative of the
principle of Ijma in Fiqh. It is created by the same group for the sake of addressing changes (in
other words, the exception) in the established law. Consider the following example from
Mohammad Hashim Kamali:
Siyasah (politics) in its widest sense has five purposes: the protection of the faith, life, intellect,
lineage, and property. The Ulama are (religious scholars; theologians) unanimous on the point
that the protection of these values constitutes the ultimate objective of Sharia itself, despite the
fact that a specific reference to this group of values can be found neither in the Qur’an nor in the
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Sunna. General consensus (Ijma) on the protection of these values is not based on any particular
provision of the Qur’an or the Sunna, but on the overall contents of these source-texts and on the
numerous commands and prohibitions that are designed to protect these values. The same can be
said of the Qur’anic verses that enjoin the community in the pursuit of good and prevention of
evil. The good and evil are nowhere listed exhaustively in the Qur’an or the Sunna but can be
known through a general investigation of these sources. (146)

So who is this group, and how did they come to occupy the highest point in the hierarchy of
authority? According to Carl Schmitt, “this individual or group is the outcome of the fact that the
legal idea cannot translate itself independently” (Schmitt 2005, 31). Therefore, this category of
the sovereign is the outcome of the application of the law. Furthermore, the Qur’an actually
acknowledges a group that should apply the legal idea. In the famous verse 4:58 in the Qur’an,
which this undertaking maintains is the threshold of the political theory of the Qur’an, this
faction is mentioned by name, Ulu Al Amr (trustees, guardians). In fact, this is the only instance
in the Qur’an that Muslims are directed to obey an entity other than God or the Prophet. It is
important to note that the verse is primarily concerned with temporal authority and to understand
the scope of that authority the verse must be read sequentially for a fuller appreciation of the
consequences of the order of obedience in verse 4:58
Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between
people to judge with justice. Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever
Hearing and Seeing. 4:58
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59
Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O
Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to Taghut (a
person who overstep boundaries of the law), while they were commanded to reject it; and Satan
wishes to lead them far astray. 4:60

Verse 4:58 reads: “that obedience [is] to be given as three levels: (a) Allah; (b) His Prophet; and
(c) those charged with authority otherwise known as Ulu Al Amr or Sultan in Islamic terms”
(Omotosho 2000, 1). Thus, obedience to Ulu Al Amr is conditional and tied to the other two
higher sources of authority, who are God and the Prophet. It is also important to note that the
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Qur’an does not mention obedience to a king, Amir, Sultan or any other temporal power. This
dissertation argues that a proper investigation of authority in Islamic legal and political writing
must focus on this group, the Ulu Al Amr as the highest and final authority in relation to temporal
power and government. It is the Ulu Al Amr who have the power to give legitimacy to temporal
power and government, whether it is the Amir, Khalifa, or Sultan. Actually, there is one more
verse in the Qur’an that testifies to the authority of Ulu Al Amr in the matter of the law after the
authority of God and the Prophet:
And when there comes to them information about [public] security or fear, they spread it around.
But if they had referred it back to the Messenger or to those of authority among them, then the
ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it. And if not for the
favor of Allah upon you and His mercy, you would have followed Satan, except for a few. (4:83)

This task that is assigned only to the Ulu Al Amr is beyond the domain of temporal power,
whether a Khalifa or Amir. The exception to this rule is the period of the Four Guided Caliphs
who were simultaneously included in both Ulu Al Amr and the Caliphs. But even then, they
could not achieve Ijma since the term Ulu Al Amr is plural not singular. Again, the significance
this exception will be clear in the following chapter.
Yet, there is no Ijma directing who is to be included in Ulu Al Amr since the Qur’an and
Sunna are mute on the matter. According to Al-Massari, “there are at least six different opinions
in Fiqh on who should be included in Ulu Al Amr” (Al-Massari 2002, 15-14).28 This means that
historically there is no Ijma clarifying who should be among Ulu Al Amr, and the constitution of
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:  األول:  أشهرها ستة، أم ا المراد ((بأولي األمر)) في الشرع الواردة في اآلية السابقة فقد إختلف أهل العلم من المفسرين و غيرهم في ذلك األقوال
:  الثاني.  و هو قول جمهور السلف و الخلف،  قال النووي،  و رجمة اإلمام الطبري.  قاله جمع من السلف منهم أبو هريسة و إبن عبا،أنهم األمراء
 أنهم:  الثالث.  و الحسن البصري و النخعي و غيرهم،  رضوان هللا و سالمه عليه،  و به قال جمع من السلف منهم جابر بن عبدهللا، أنهم العلماء
 و الظاهر و:  قال ابن كثير:  الخام.  قاله عكرمة،  رضي هللا عنهما،  أنهم أبوبكر و عمر:  الرابع. أصحاب محمد صلى هللا عليه و سلم قاله مجاهد
 و الشوكاني و،  و ابن القيم الجوزية،  منهم أبو بكر العربي،  و قد اختار هذا الرأي جمهرة من أهل العلم. هللا أعلم أنها عامة في كل األمراء و العلماء
 و يرى بعض أهل العلم أن المراد بهم ما هو أعم من العلماء و األمراء من زعماء و وجهاء و كل من كان:  الساد. الشيخ عبد الرحمن بن سعدي
متبوعا و هم المعروفون بأهل الحل و العقد
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the group changed historically from one period to another. Yet, Ulu Al Amr historically is the
group who are entitled to make decisions on Sharia and have the authority over it. The following
chapter will deal in detail with the concept of Ulu Al Amr.
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CHAPTER II
Who are Ulu Al-Amr?

On March 21, 2013“[a] large explosion killed at least 42 people inside a central
Damascus mosque…including the top Sunni cleric in Syria, one of the major remaining Sunni
supporters of President Bashar al-Assad’s embattled government in the civil war” (Mourtada and
Gladstone, 2013). Mohammad Said Ramada al-Bouti, a contemporary example of a modern
member (a state bureaucrat) of an establishment Ulu Al Amr, served as an essential source for
theological legitimacy of Syria’s secular Ba'ath party government. His support for the Assad
regime legitimated its rule and policies against the armed opposition that is currently battling for
power. Al-Bouti’s role in Syria illustrates the historical importance of the legitimacy that the Ulu
Al Amr has as an integral part of government rule over Muslims. For example, Turkey and Syria
make the paradoxical claim that they are secular states yet entrust theological affairs to a
governmental department that is a part of the state bureaucracy. Another example is the Ba'ath
party in both Iraq and Syria always projected itself as Pan-Arab, modern, and secular. Yet both
Saddam Hussein and Bashar Al-Assad during their crises appealed to religious figures, members
of the state’s theological and bureaucratic establishment, for legitimacy. All contemporary Arab
states and certainly some Western states such as Great Britain are riddled with this character,
which violates Jackson’s account of sovereignty. But the question here is why in the Arab and
Muslim world are theological affairs not left to private organizations but instead regulated by the
state? The answer is that the state’s appeal for legitimacy requires an authoritative source in the
eyes of Muslim subjects.
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This chapter focuses on the authority Ulu Al Amr and its legal aspect. The argument is
that it is a prominent historical feature of the political construction of Sunni Islam. Furthermore,
the authority of this group of individuals has played a central role in Suuni Islamic politics
throughout the contemporary period. With the advent of modernity and with it the nation-state
the Ulu Al Amr group has been reduced to one individual, the Grand Mufti. Chapter four, the
history of the formation of Ulu Al Amr, and chapter five describe the role of the Grand Mufti,
who replaced the traditional Sunni class of Ulu Al Amr.

The loss of Al-Bouti, according to experts, was a serious setback depriving the Syrian
Ba'ath government of legitimacy in the midst of a violent armed struggle. Yet, what concerns us
here is why a secular Ba'athist government needs, in the eyes of the Syrian people, the support of
Al-Bouti to legitimize its rule and fight against the uprising. More generally, why do secular
governments throughout the Middle East establish ministries of theological affairs while
claiming to be secular? The answer lies in the legal role of Ulu Al Amr and the type of authority
it has practiced throughout the political history of Islam. This chapter will focus on the historical
foundation and the evolution of Ulu Al Amr, the scope of Ulu Al Amr authority, and its legal
ability to defend the actions of temporal power.

In this chapter and the subsequent one, I will rely on the scholarship of Mohammed AlMassari in the area of Sharia in general and Fiqh al siyash al shariah in particular. Al-Massari is
a Saudi political dissident and activist who is currently exiled in London. He is the founder of
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Hizb ut-Tahrir and currently the Chairman of the Party of Islamic Renewal. The party’s mission
is to bring about political and social reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Al- Massari is a
Salafi but interestingly a critical opponent of the Wahhabi theological state establishment. His
publications debates the Saudi Ulama’s legal claim over the legitimacy of the royal family and
its practices. Al-Massari’s political activism and critique of the Royal family has led to charges
by the establishment Wahhabi Ulama that he is a “libertine.” This dissertation considers AlMassari’s work, which is on the foundational legal sources of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah, as
a reliable representation of Sunni orthodoxy.

Linguistically, Ulu Al Amr is a compound of Ulu (those of or those who) and Al Amr
(authority). “It is said that the word Ulu is a plural word that has no singular term but most likely
this word is plural for the word ‘Walee’ meaning one who or one of. Both Ulu and Walee must
appear in a compound words, for example (those with authority) or (those in charge of) or (those
with intellect)” (Al-Massari 2002, 13).29 The plural linguistic character of the word Ulu in the
legal term Ulu Al Amr signifies the basis for the argument that the principle of Shura
(Consultation) necessitates that the category must be plural and cannot be reduced to one person.
Consultation necessarily takes place among two or more individuals. “The second part of the
term, Al Amr and the word in the Arabic language could mean either to order an action or to
forbid an act” (Al-Massari 2002, 13).30

29

 في مثل، بمعنى ((ذوو)) أي أصحاب و ال يأتي إال مضافا،)) و األرجح أن يكون جمعا ل ((ولي. ال مفرد له: و قيل، جمع:  أولو- : المعنى اللغوي
 يعني ذوي أو أهل أو أصحاب العقول،)) ((أولوا األلباب
30

 أي قبل أمره:  أمره فأتمر:  يقال.  و يجمع على أوامر:  ما هو ضد النهي١ :  يطلق و يراد به:ألمر
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The term Ulu Al Amr is mentioned in the Qur’an in chapter 4 verses 59 and 83, and the
term appears in the Hadith of the Prophet as well. In the Qur’an the verses are as follows:
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and Ulu Al Amr (those of
authority) among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if
you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59
And when there comes to them information about [public] security or fear, they spread it around.
But if they had referred it back to the Messenger or to Ulu Al Amr (those of authority) among
them, then the ones who [can] draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it. And
if not for the favor of Allah upon you and His mercy, you would have followed Satan, except for
a few. 4:83

While in the Hadith Ulu Al Amr is mentioned as follow: “three habits that the heart of a Muslim
should never be angry of, sincere labor, advice to those in the Ulu Al Amr, and to remain among
the community…” (Al-Massari 2002, 13).31 Note that Muslim obedience to temporal authority is
mentioned only in the verse 4:59 and even then, obedience is conditioned by the Sharia. Yet AlMassari explains that while “the term Ulu Al Amr is clearly present in the Qur’an and the Sunna,
the exact legal meaning of the term is not quite clear and therefore remains unresolved among
scholars of Sharia” (Al-Massari 2002, 14).32 Consequently, it is not clear from the Qur’an and
Hadith which group of individuals Muslims should obey, and it is open to historical
interpretation depending upon whom the Umma see the Ulu Al Amr fit to be among and
represent. Historically, the configuration of Ulu Al Amr concerning who is qualified to be
among them changed according to social and political change. Thus, the legal evolution of the
category of Ulu Al Amr challenges scholarship that applies the concept of fundamentalism to
political Islam. If by fundamentalism we mean adherence to textual and theological orthodoxy,

31

 و لزوم الجماعة، و مناصحة والة األمر، اخالص العمل هلل: و في الحديث الصحيح ثالث خصال اليغل عليهن قلب مسلم أبدا

32

 أشهرها، اما المراد ب أولي االمر في الشرع الواردة في اآلية السابقة فقد اختلفت أهل العلم من المفسرين و غيرهم في ذلك على أقوال.
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then we will demonstrate that as an historical fixed category the achievement of Ijma (consensus)
is an impossibility. Legally Ulu Al Amr in Sunni Fiqh and according to Sharia are “those in
charge or concerned with legal matters of the Umma, thus they are the highest authority
establishing the legality and legitimacy of matters that concern the community” (Al-Massari
2002, 14).33 While it is legally accepted in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah that Ulu Al Amr
means temporal power, those who are in charge of affairs of the Umma, I argue that this legal
view was accurate only during the founding period when temporal power and the legal
knowledge of the Ulama united in the persons of the Four Guided Caliphs. After the Second
Civil War (60-73AH /680-692 AD) the two characteristics were permanently severed. Dynastic
rule meant that only during the early history of Islam, the period of the Four Guided Caliphs,
could an individual be simultaneously both a Khalifa and Alim [singular of Ulama]. Accordingly,
once temporal power became dynastic the function of the post changed and became a mere
executive branch of government, in charge only of executing and implementing Sharia. Since
that historical moment the executive has been legally excluded from deciding on the exception.
Moreover, from this point temporal power depended on the authority of the Ulama on their
legitimacy to rule and be obeyed by the Umma. It is precisely this change that Ernest Gellner
noted regarding the nature of government in Islam, but he failed to notice the evolutionary
change that took place in the nature of government. He makes this point when he is discussing
the Sharia by arguing that:
The fact that, in this way, legislation is pre-empted by the deity has profound implications for
Muslim life. It does not merely mean that a fundamentalist may have difficulties in accepting
modern law and legislative practices; it also means that a certain kind of separation of powers was
built into Muslim society from the very start, or very nearly from the start. This version of the
separation of power did not need to wait for some Enlightenment doctrine concerning the
33

 و بيدهم قيادة األمة، أي اصحاب التصرف في شأن األمة الذين يملكون زمام األمور شرعا: أولو االمر: المعنى الشرعي
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desirability of a pluralist social order and of the internal balance of independent institutions. It
subordinates the executive to the (divine) legislature and, in actual practice, turns the
theologians/lawyers into the monitors of political rectitude – whether or not they always have the
power to enforce their verdicts. The principle that ‘the community will not agree on error’ may
endow communal consensus, rather than the political doctrine, with a kind of legislative
authority. Within this communal consensus, the voice of the learned is liable to possess special
weight. After all, the community must heed an already existing law and it is natural to respect the
opinion of those better informed. (7)
Clearly, Gellner captures the dynamics of the evolution of Sharia but his argument at its core

demonstrate sovereignty problematic logic, as chapter five demonstrates. He views the
theologians/lawyers or the Ulama as referees of a divine law that is frozen in time and space. He
fails to note the role of Ulama in harmonizing modernity and sovereignty with Sharia (see
chapter one). This is precisely why he uses the term fundamentalism and argues that the
“fundamentalist may have difficulties in accepting modern law and legislative practices.”
Moreover, while Gellner accounts for Ijma (consensus) as a source of legitimacy that provides
the Ulama with legitimate authority, his view does not capture the scope of harmonization
between the modern and the Sharia, contrary to what chapter one demonstrates in regard to the
concept of sovereignty. He sees modern law as encapsulated sovereign law that has to be
accepted and implemented a wholesale.
Nevertheless, the purpose of referencing Gellner here is to demonstrate that the function
and nature of temporal power changed historically by becoming a mere executive power and not
a source of legitimacy. Thus, the Ulu Al Amr referred to in verse 4:59 cannot include dynastic
temporal power, which is required to be obeyed by the Umma. It is precisely by the end of the
Second Civil War that this change consolidated the legal role of the Ulama as the Ulu Al Amr
(mentioned in verse 4:59). Obedience is limited to Sharia and not arbitrary laws. Consequently,
this dissertation argues that Ulama are the logical legal members of the Ulu Al Amr because they
and only they legally decide the exception.
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Further evidence supports the argument that the Ulama decide who is legally to be excluded
from the category of Ulama. The following section of the chapter demonstrates historically the
legal power of the Ulama to define who is to be included and excluded from the category of Ulu
Al Amr, who can be legally labeled as Ulu Al Amr and excluded from temporal power.

Legally, Al-Massari provides a historical legal survey in Sunni Fiqh that includes six
different legal opinions that guide legal scholars when explaining who or what constitutes Ulu Al
Amr:
The First, according to the Salaf (early scholars). Ulu Al Amr consisted of the Umara (people in
command). Scholars upholding this opinion include: Abu Hurairah (603-681 CE), Abd Allah Ibn
Abbas (619-687 CE), and Al Nawawi (1234-1278 CE).
Second, according to some of the Salaf (a Sunni legal school) the scholars such as Jabir ibn
Abdullah (d. 697), Al Hasan Al Basri (642–728 CE) and others, they are the ulama (religious
scholars).
Third group, according to a group of Mujtahids (religious scholars), Ulu Al Amr were the
Companions of the Prophet.
Fourth, according to Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl (d. 636 CE) a Companion of the Prophet, the Ulu Al
Amr were only Abu Bakr (573-634 CE) and Umar ibn Al Khattab (579-644 CE) the first and the
second Khulafa (plural for Khalifa).
Fifth, according to Ibn Kathir (1301-1373 CE) Ulu Al Amr are both those in command of
temporal power and the Ulama. Many scholars, among them Abu Bakr ibn al-Arabi (1076-1148
CE), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350 CE), and Muhammad ash-Shawkani (1759-1834
CE), followed this legal opinion.
Sixth, other legal scholars argue that the term includes the Ulama, those in command, the elite,
and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd or those in command among the leaders and the elite of the community
and who have followers. (14-15)34

Al-Massari’s list of legal opinions has several political and legal implications. First and the most
important implication, is the clear lack of historical legal consensus on who are to be included
34

. و هو قول جمهور السلف و الخلف، قال النووي، قاله جمع م ن السلف منهم ابو هريرة و ابن عبا و رجمة االمام الطبري، انهم األمراء:االول
 أنهم: الثالث. و الحسن البصري و النخعي و غيرهم، رضوان هللا و سالمه عليه، و به قال جمع من السلف منهم جابر بن عبدهللا، انهم العلماء:الثاني
 قال ابن كثير و الظاهر و هللا:  الخام. قاله عكرمة، رضي هللا عنهما، انهم أبو بكر و عمر: الرابع. قاله مجاهد-صلى هللا عليه و سلم-أصحاب محمد
 منهم أبو بكر بن العربي و ابن القيم الجوزية و الشوكاني و الشيخ، اعلم انها عامة في كل األمراء و العلماء و قد اختار هذا الرأي جمهرة من أهل العلم
 و. و يرى بعض أهل العلم أن المراد بهم ما هو أعم من العلماء و األمراء و الزعماء و وجهاء و كل من كان متبوعا:  الساد.عبد الرحمن بن سعدي
هم المعروفون بأهل الحل العقد
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among the Ulu Al Amr in Sunni Islam. Accordingly, the Sunni Muslim subject is not clearly
commanded by God to obey a particular form of government. Instead, the Muslim subject is
commanded to obey the law or Sharia. Thus, the question of who should rule, who legitimately
rules the Umma is an historical and political question in Sunni Islam open to interpretation. Fred
Donner argues that:
In the generation after Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E. (that is, from about 31/650 until 73/692),
the community of Believers was torn apart internally by a bitter dispute over the question of
leadership. This dispute manifested itself particularly in two periods of open strife among the
Arabian leadership of the Believers' movement, which we can call the First and Second Civil
wars (35-40/656-661) and (60-73/680-692, respectively). (145)

The political question of temporal power and its legitimacy was to be resolved not according to
legal injunctions but according to historical circumstances and what Muslims viewed as a
legitimate form of government. This explains the historical rise of the Ulu Al Amr whose central
role was to serve as the Ulama and provide human resolution to questions of law that
transcended temporal power and but were capable of furnishing temporal powers with
legitimacy. This is precisely how the body of Sharia and Fiqh siyasah shariah (the branch Islamic
jurisprudence that deals with political issues) evolved and grew over time addressing temporal and

spatial change.
It is imperative for academic scholarship to take into account these local characteristics of
temporal power and the legal and historical frames that shaped their evolution. Only then can the
centrality of the role of Ulu Al Amr become clear and provide a coherent reading of the political
and social history of Sunni Islam. The role of Ulu Al Amr becomes marginal and insignificant, if
academic scholarship views it through the prism of the European conceptions of temporal power
or sovereignty.

50

Except for the first legal opinion, Al-Massari’s list included the Ulama. The Ulama were
not an issue in the first case because Abu Hurairah and Ibn Abbas were Companions of the
Prophet and accordingly temporal power and Alim came together in the Four Guided Caliphs. In
a technical sense the Ulama were present in the first opinion as well. As the Companions period
drew to a close questions of piety and knowledge of faith became less important, which allowed
for a dynastic Caliphate rule based purely on blood lineage. Donner explains this historical
process:
With the Second Civil War in particular, we are palpably moving into a new phase in the history
of the community of Believers. The era of the companions of the prophet is rapidly drawing to a
close, and the dramatis personae are now members of a younger generation who had no memory
of the prophet or of the struggles that shaped his life. One senses an attenuation of the intensely
charismatic quality of the early movement, with its clear-sighted concern for piety and observing
God’s will; the commitment to piety is still there, but it has become more routinized and less
personal and is tempered among many Believers with more practical and this worldly concerns.
(190)

Hence, we have the legal opinion of Al Nawawi who held that Ulu Al Amr was the Umara
(people in command). Writing during the Abbasid Dynasty (750-1258 CE) and during the violent
sacking of Baghdad by the Mongol Hulagu Khan (1218 – 1265 CE) Al Nawawi stressed the
importance of Umara [singular Amir] and the military. Accordingly, his legal opinion is an
outlier and a response to the sacking of a Muslim empire for the first time.
Third, the legal opinions in the third and fourth categories hold that the Ulu Al Amr
mentioned in the Qur’an and the Sunna are associated with the Companions of the Prophet.
According to Sharia, Muslims owe obedience only to temporal power. This legal view follows if
one holds that obedience is only to Sharia and the role of temporal power is more or less to
execute the law. Moreover, it appears that the third legal opinion questions whether a figure can
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arise that can command authority similar to the Prophet’s Companions. Yet, the legal opinion
may not exclude the role of Ulama’s Ijtihad over new legal issues facing the Umma.
The fourth legal opinion was held by Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl who died early in the Battle of
Yarmouk in 636 CE before the outbreak of the two Civil Wars. Accordingly, Ikrimah’s legal
opinion was based on events where the transition of temporal power was executed smoothly and
before violent disagreements took place among Muslims regarding who should rule over the
Umma. At the time, the need of Ulama or Ulu Al Amr was not central to the Muslim community
since the Companions of the Prophet were many and could address new circumstance
authoritatively due to the their proximity to the Prophet.

Fourth, that the Ulama as Ulu Al Amr are included in the second, third, fifth, and sixth
legal opinions supports my argument that the Ulama evolved to become the Ulu Al Amr
mentioned in the Qur’an. Moreover, the scope of time that these legal opinions are expressed in
is over a long span of time, making them more or less accurate reflections of the majority of
legal opinions.
Fifth, in the sixth legal opinion there appears for the first time a new legal category, Al
Hall Wal-Aqd in Fiqh siyasah al shariah. Al Hall Wal-Aqd includes Ulama, Umara, and the
elite. This new legal category is investigated in detail later in the chapter, but what is relevant
and significant at the moment is that Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd appeared in the third century in the
Islmaic calendar and reflects the evolution of Fiqh siyasah al shariah, which has consistently
included the Ulama as Ulu Al Amr even when the legal term changes.
Consequently, temporal power in Islam is limited historically by certain legal constraints.
Regardless of emergencies, Sharia cannot be entirely suspended. Debates regarding the
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emergency powers of the executive and the ablitiy to suspend the law have yet to limit this
ability in the most advanced democracies. The restriction of temporal power under Sharia
historically necessitated the formation and crystallization of Ulu Al Amr as the authority that
bestows legitimacy on temporal power. Hence, the acts that contradict the law are experienced as
merely violence. They never set precedent but are tolerated and resisted as violence unless the
Ulama who are the Ulu Al Amr legitimate them. There are ample examples in the history of
Islam when pure violence and bloodshed by temporal powers occurred. When Muslims were
unable to fight the illegitimate actions of temporal power, they tolerated them as violence.
Historically, the consequences of force and violence never produced legitimate laws even when
Caliphs were in complete control of their Muslim subjects. A good example is provided by
Donner to make this case:
we see in the civil wars—and particularly in the second—the emergence of those fissures that
have, ever since, divided the once united community of Believers. Ali’s claims to be amiralmuminin during the First Civil War become gradually transformed into the beginnings of a true
sectarian movement, Shi'ism, that held the family of 'Ali in special reverence; it received its
defining event in the massacre of 'Ali s son Husayn at Karbala' in the Second Civil War, an event
that came to be commemorated by later Shi'ite groups, It would be a century and more before
Shi'ism would fully refine many of its central concepts, such as the notion of the imamate or
ideal, God-guided leader of the community, but the later movement has its roots in the First and
Second Civil wars. These events thus became the starting point for the construction of two
different narratives of legitimation in the Islamic community one Shi'ite, focusing on the family
of Ali, and the other (eventually called Sunni) focusing on the sequence of actual power-holders,
including the Umayyads. We have also seen how a third group, the ultra-pious Kharijites,
emerged during the First Civil War; although constituting only a small minority of Muslims
today, they were quite significant in the first several centuries of Islam. (190-191)

In this case, the violence that temporal power perpetrated against the offspring of the Prophet and
Companions was an example of total control over Muslims. Such violence was unable to gain
legitimacy. In fact, the Umayyad dynasty was the first to rely on Ulu Al Amr to grant legitimacy
to their dynastic rule, as chapter four demonstrates. In Sunni historical books this period of
immense violence is usually referred to as Fitnah (upheaval and chaos) to venerate the Umayyad
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dynasty especially the Companion Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan (602 – 680 CE) the founder of the
dynasty. Donner explains how the Fitnah label was used as a justification for the violence:
The traditional Muslim sources provide us with lengthy reports about the events of the mutiny
and those that followed, which we call the First Civil War; our sources refer to these events as the
first fitna, using a pejorative Qur’anic word meaning "temptation, seduction" (by the lure of
worldly advantage). The goal of all these reports is either to demonstrate Uthman’s guilt or to
exculpate him (or, similarly, to provide moral judgments on other participants in the events).
(154)

Note that the First Civil War started with the assassination of Uthman Ibn Affan (557- 656 CE).
He was a Companion of the Prophet and the Third Guided Caliph, a clan member of Muawiyah,
who in the name of avenging Uthman used the assassination as an excuse to overthrow the
Fourth Guided Caliph Ali Ibn Abi Talib (600- 661 CE), a Companion and the cousin of the
Prophet.
The limitation of temporal power in Islam is demonstrated in the two different historical
narratives that the Sunni and Shia have regarding these events. They serve as historical sources
and foundations for the identity of both sects of Islam. Moreover, the lack of supernatural or
theological justifications, at least in Sunni theological texts, for the massacre of the family of the
Prophet and the establishment of the dynastic rule of Banu [house of] Umayya is a clear sign of
the earthly character of the dynastic Caliphate that have ruled over the Muslim Umma ever since.
Instead, the justification of the dynastic rule is explained in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah as the
best outcome possible for the Umma among the worst possibilities, mainly civil strife and
bloodshed. Even for Banu Abbas, who toppled the Umayyad dynasty in 750 CE and established
the Abbasid dynastic rule, their justification was based of the corruption of the Umayyads. Never
did they claim they were bestowed with a supernatural duty even though they were directly
descended from the Prophet via his youngest uncle Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566–653 CE).
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The key difference between temporal power in Sunni Islam and European sovereignty is
precisely the key idea that Buck-Morss claims is fundamental to Christianity and absent from the
Sunni Khalifs or members of Ulu Al Amr: the quality of the supernatural. Buck-Morss argues:
The fundamental idea of Christianity is the Incarnation, the coming into visibility of the invisible
and sovereign God. The veneration of icons became the practical manifestation of this idea, as the
point of visibility of the relationships between divinity and humanity, Father and Son, Virgin
Mother and Child, Redeemer and believer. The icon, wherein the Word (logos, that is, the ideal
concept; in our case the political collective) takes on flesh, provides direct, experiential access to
these enigmatic relationships. (4-5)

In fact, the spirit/flesh distinction plays no role in the development of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al
shariah. In Islam the flesh remained temporal and those who occupy the flesh are bound by the
Qur’an and the Sunna as the expressions of God. But neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna speak
directly to the Muslim subject. They are historically expressions of the learned experts, the
Ulama who this dissertation argues are Ulu Al Amr. Moreover, the absence of and prohibition
against icons forced temporal power in Islam to remain under Sharia, depriving them of a
legitimate authority who spoke and acted on behalf of the divine. While the Christian nomos as
Buck-Morss argues “is virtual only: Paul’s nomos rules the realm of the spirit, leaving the
material world unchanged. Obedience to the Roman imperial order is still binding; at the same
time the term oikonomia, deployed in the spiritual realm, reasserts its law-preserving function by
commanding the obedience of the ‘new man’ (Paul’s repeated term) to live according to
Christianity’s predestined plan” (6). Applying oikonomia as a quality of temporal power
produces this theoretical error. Academic scholarship overlooks the historical dilemma of
temporal power in Islam, namely how legitimacy and obedience can be extracted from the
Muslim subject or the Umma without the appeal to supernatural justification. The answer has
been to look for a legal source with the authority to bestow legitimacy on the acts of temporal
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power; hence Ulu Al Amr. It is important to note that the formation of the Ulu Al Amr was
gradual and became central as the Companions of the Prophet died.
The consequences of the local quality of Sunni temporal authority are immense, and they
require a political theorist to redefine political concepts such as freedom, tyranny, equality, and
autonomy when investigating Islamic legal and political thought. More precisely, discussions of
human rights and subjectivities must account for this quality of authority in Islam and the limits
on the state that are embedded in Sharia and the role of Ulu Al Amr’s authority as a legitimating
function. Academic scholarship on political Islam usually claims that it is a return to pure forms
of government from the founding period of Islam and the subsequent strict adherence to
theological texts. This academic literature overlooks the rejection of movements associated with
political Islam to orthodoxy. The logical context of this claim challenges the establishment of
Ulu Al Amr’s authority, its part as the new Ulu Al Amr in the modern state bureaucracy. In other
words, political Islam cannot be reduced to a purportedly fundamentalist movement because, in
fact, it does not adhere to orthodoxy. On the contrary, it challenges orthodoxy by appealing to
new interpretations of the law that may contradict Fiqh al siyasah shariah. In doing so, political
Islam claims to have the correct interpretation of the law. Consequently, it claims that it is the
legitimate Ulu Al Amr with the proper authority to overthrow temporal power. This claim, which
will be thoroughly investigated in chapter five, finds its expression in the sovereignty of the
modern state.
It is important to restate that none of the legal opinions provided by Al-Massari
established Ijma in Fiqh siyasah al shariah. A plurality of legal opinions has existed, and which
opinion gains prominence in which historical period depends upon which particular school of
Fiqh gains dominance via the support of temporal power. Thus, it is important to examine the
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role of the temporal powers, which have historically assumed the enforcement role in the
Ulama’s legal rulings. It is clear that the Khalifa, or temporal power, has a stake in advancing the
legal opinions that serves its interest and confers legitimacy on its actions. The development of
Fiqh siyasah al shariah has historically depended on the interaction of both institutions. It has
emphasized obedience to temporal power by producing legal opinions at particular moments that
decisively outlawed resistance to dynastic corruption as chapter four demonstrates. This
emphasis on obedience to temporal power was particularly the case during historical periods
when obedience to the Khalifa was treated as an article of faith, and any form of resistance or
change was labeled an apostasy. Yet in the Qur’an and Sunna there is no reference to apostasy as
such because the sacred texts and traditions of Islam have no reference to what type of
government should be established or clear references to who exercises temporal power and how
it is to be established. Historically, Muslims placed their trust in the Ulu Al Amr as custodian of
the law who looked out for the good of the community by placing checks on temporal power. If
Ulu Al Amr violated the trust of the Umma, other legal scholars would challenge and correct
them. A good example is the Abbasid Caliphate’s use of legal opinions to overthrow the
Umayyad dynasty. Al Hasan Al Basri (642–728 CE) (see chapter four) and other legal scholars
who challenged the corruption of temporal power and the establishment Ulu Al Amr provided
early legal justification for the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty. Therefore, Ulu Al Amr never
constituted a body that was considered to be a unified church and never had a monopoly on the
meaning of the primary sources. In fact, Shia Islam views the rule of these dynastic empires as
illegitimate and a corruption of the faith. The following section will briefly discuss the Shia
account of Ulu Al Amr, how they view the legal status of Ulu Al Amr, and the nature of
obedience to authority.
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Shia Islam holds that after the death of the Prophet the issue of who governed the Umma
was the greatest of all concerns. According to Imam Abu Ja'far ibn Ali al Baqir (676-733 CE) the
most important matter of faith in Islam was obedience to the Imam of the Muslim community (Al
Fahery 1986, 7).35 Unlike Sunni Islam, the nature of Siyasah al shariah in Shia Islam is divine,
and temporal power resides in both the Imam, who is to be obeyed, and the temporal ruler. Sunni
Islam considers the post of temporal power or Khilafa as a historical consequence derived from
the principle of Maslaha. Shia Islam has a divine Imam. Al Fahrey explains the Shia Fiqh views
on Ulu Al Amr as follow:
Ulu Al Amr are those in charge of the affairs of the Muslim community and they are the leaders
of the Umma. According to verse 4:59 obeying their command is incumbent upon all Muslims
since the verse requires obedience to them, which is equal in status to obedience to the Prophet,
which in turn is derived from obedience to God. But this verse did not clarify a number of points
and left this task for Hadiths to provide the details of its meaning. The first is the importance of
knowing who Ulu Al Amr is in any historical period so that Muslims will obey and be ruled by
rulers in accordance to the Qur’anic verse. This command is clear from the Hadith of Ali Hamza
who said: “Abu Ja'far said that those who worship Allah and those who do not know Allah are
those who worship in vain. I said, so what is the knowledge of Allah? He said: to believe in Allah
and the Prophet, and to take Ali and to take the Imams after him as your guidance and to be on
their side for the sake of Allah. And to stand against their enemy for the sake of Allah; only then
will the knowledge of God be achieved. (6-11)36

The question of Ulu Al Amr in Shia Islam has several consequences that separate it from the
Sunni sect of Islam: First, it was the cause of the split among Muslims in the founding period that

35

 و أما من ال يعرف هللا فإنما يعبده، إنما يعبد هللا من يعرف هللا: قال لي أبو جعفر عليه السالم:األحاديث األخر منها ما في الكافي عن أبي حمزة قال
 جعلت فداك فما معرفة هللا ؟ قال تصديق هللا عز و جل و تصديق رسوله ص و مواالة علي علي و االئتمام به و بأمة الهدى و البراءة:  قلت.هكذا ضالال
الى هللا عز و جل
36

 ( أطيعو هللا و أطيعو الرسول و أولي االمر منكم ) أولي االمر لي: تستمد والية االمر شرعيتها من اآلية الكريمة:المراد من االمر في أولي االمر
 و أولو األمر هم، الدنيا. بل األمر هنا بمعنى الشأن الراجح إلى أمور الدين، كما أن األمر بمعنى الشيء أيضا ً لم يكن مرادا قطعا،االمر في مقابل النهي
 و بموجب هذه اآلية يتوجب على جميع المسلمين االنقياد ألولي،الذين يتو لون أمور المسلمين في هذه الشؤون و يقومون بزعامتهم بأمر من هللا سبحانه
 النقطة األولى في هذا الميدان هي ضرورة معرفة: االمر بعد أن قرنت طاعتهم بطاعة رسول هللا التي تتفرع من طاعة هللا ضرورة معرفة ولي االمر
 و هذه الضرورة مقررة في،ولي االمر في كل زمان ليلتزم المؤمنون طاعته و ينقادوا لحكمه تنفيذا لمضمون اآلية الكريمة التي انطلق منها البحث
 قال لي أبو: الحديث الشريف المتواتر (( من مات و لم يعرف إمام زمانه مات ميتة الجاهلية )) و في األحاديث االخر منها في الكافي عن أبي حمزة قال
 جعلت فداك فما معرفة هللا ؟ قال تصديق هللا عز و:  قلت. و أما من ال يعرف هللا فإنما يعبده هكذا ضالال، إنما يعبد هللا من يعرف هللا: جعفر عليه السالم
جل و تصديق رسوله ص و مواالة علي علي و االئتمام به و بأمة الهدى و البراءة الى هللا عز و جل
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historians call the First Civil War. The split was over the question of who was to govern the
Umma and what would the nature of the state and government be. Consequently, there is no
distinction between Ulu Al Amr’s authority and temporal power in the Fiqh of Shia Islam.
Second, in Shia Islam the Imam and his offspring are the Ulu Al Amr of a given historical period,
and therefore membership is based on the lineage of the Prophet’s House and not on knowledge.
Third, the issue of Imamates in Shia Fiqh is a sacred matter and obedience a religious duty. For
the Shia obedience to the Imam and government is a matter faith and not derived from
independent judgment based on the principle of Maslaha. As a result, the question of who is to
govern and be obeyed was a contentious issue since the founding of the Islamic state. The
contemporary divide in the Muslim community, or Umma, between Sunna and Shia is evidence
of how deep the split was in the community over issues of authority, obedience, and temporal
power in the early period of Islam. It is clear that during its founding prominent members of the
community were obliged to serve the community according to their proximity to the Prophet.
The following section addresses the Sunni legal term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, which is
mentioned in Al-Massari’s sixth legal opinion. The legal term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd appeared
around the third century in history of Islam and was a substitute for the term Ulu Al Amr. The
aim here to investigate the contractual language of this legal term in order to demonstrate the role
Ulu Al Amr had in marginalizing the Umma or Muslims in choosing their rulers and participating
in the political matters of the state. The evolution of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd is indicative of the
legal role that Ulu Al Amr had in addressing social and economic changes.
The legal term of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd has characteristics similar to Ulu Al Amr, but
according to Al Tareeqy “the term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd historically appeared and developed late
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in the history of Islam” (17).37 He further states that “similar to many legal concepts in
jurisprudence, the historical origin of the term is vague, and once it appeared it became a popular
term used frequently by the Ulama” (Al Tareeqy 1998, 17).38 Legally, jurists regard the term Ahl
Al Hall Wal-Aqd as the product of Ijtihad since it does not appear in the Qur’an or the Sunna.
The appearance of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd demonstrates the scope of the Ulu Al Amr’s
authority, which gives legal legitimacy to newly invented terms, categories, and concepts that
later become the legitimate orthodoxy and an essential part of Fiqh. This type of authority is
something that temporal power could not achieve without Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd.
Power and violence have no authority and alone cannot give legitimacy to government, which
Alyas Ahmed demonstrates by arguing that “in Islam, we already know that law is prior to the
state, and that there is a perfect sovereignty of Law which cannot be changed by human hand”
(481). This primary feature of Islamic juridical and political writings stands in contrast to the
modern conception of the state under international law as it is represented in European
sovereignty with its monopoly of violence in a given territory. Alyas Ahmed has in mind the
clear junctions in the Qur’an and Sunna and not Siyasah al shariah, which is the area that is
open to Ijtihad and Ijma since the primary sources are mute regarding how they are to be
regulated. Consequently, the scope of Siyasah al shariah is limited only when it runs against
clear injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna, and even then those injunctions may be violated in
some circumstances under the principle of Maslaha.

37

38

 و الصالة و العلماء و أولي االمر و نحو ذلك، و اإليمان،  اإلسالم:  كألفاظ، و إن كان لم يرد في الشرع بهذا اللفظ،و هو اصطالح ظهر متقدما

 و االحتساب و أهل الحسبة، و األصوليين و النحو و النحاة، أصول الفقه:  شأنه شأن كثير من المصطلحات مثل، و لكنه اصطالح نشأ من قبل العلماء
 و عنهم أخذه كثير من أهل، األصوليين و أهل الفقه السياسي:  و هكذا و قد استعمله طائفتان من أهل العلم... و أهل االجتهاد و أهل اإلجماع
 و لقد يصعب على الباحث مهما بذل من جهد أن يصل إلى نقطة البدء في استعمال هذا المصطلح من حيث التاريخ.االختصاصات في العلوم االخرى
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According to Al Tareeqy, “legal disagreements among scholars about the issue of
membership of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd and who exactly is to be included and excluded in it have a
long history. But all legal opinions incorporated what commonly came under the purview of the
Ulama, the Companions of the Prophet, and the two Guided Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet
in ruling the Umma” (Al Tareeqy 1998, 22).39 This lack of consensus is legally similar to the one
discussed earlier about Ulu Al Amr. Moreover, like Ulu Al Amr, the linguistic root of Ahl Al Hall
Wal-Aqd is similarly vague. These differences over who precisely is to be included and excluded
among Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd are due to the absence of Ijma on the subject matter. As a result,
those who are in authority maintain their status based on Ijtihad and based on injunctions in the
Qur’an or the Sunna. Thus, the historical evolution of Ulu Al Amr to Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd
indicates a response to social and political changes that indicate the success of temporal power to
control the class of Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd.
Linguistically, the first word of the term, Ahl, refers to those who have the authority to
decide a matter. The rest of the term combines two words Al Hall (to cancel) and Al Aqd (to
contract). Both words in the term intended to refer to a contract by regarding general matters
including Syasa (politics), logistics, the Sharia and the justice system…” (Al Tareeqy 1998,
26).40 Linguistically the themes of commerce and contract are at the center of the meaning of the
category. Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd divides the community into two sections. The first are those who
are competent to enter into commerce and contracts. The second is the public which delegates
39

. هو قول الجمهور السلف و الخلف: و قال النووي. و رجحه اإلمام الطبري، أنهم األمراء-١ : و قد اختلف في المراد بهم على أقوال من أشهرها
 أنهم أبو بكر و-٤ ) أنهم أصحاب محمد (ص-٣ . جابر بن عبدهللا و الحسن البصري و النخعي و غيرهم: أنهم العلماء و به قال بعض السلف منهم-٢
عمر
40

 السياسية و اإلدارية و، عقد نظام جماعة المسلمين في شؤونهم العامة:  و المراد.  العقد و الحل،  أن هذا اللفظ قد جمع بين أمرين: و الحاصل
التشريعية و القضائية و نحوها ثم حل هذا
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the power to enter in commerce and contract to Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. Clearly, commerce here
stands metaphorically for the industriousness that leads to the good life on earth and the reward
of paradise in the afterlife.
Conceptually, according to Al Tareeqy, there are at least five legal opinions covering the
concept of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd:
First, they are the scholars who perform Ijtihad. The second, they are the Ulama and the
leadership of the community and the elite. Third, they are those of honorable backgrounds and the
elite. Fourth, they are the best of the community, who are trustworthy, and those entrusted with
Muslim affairs. Fifth, they are Ulu Al Amr who are mentioned in verse 4:59 even though scholars
historically disagreed on the meaning of the term in the verse.” (27-29)41

Al Tareeqy’s list does not explain why the term Ulu Al Amr was replaced by Ahl Al Hall
Wal-Aqd. Replacing terms did not solve the lack of Ijma and the legal vagueness of the concept.
Yet, these five new legal opinions achieved two important goals: First, there must always be a
body that commands and requires obedience, unlike the Ulu Al Amr in Al-Massari’s fourth
category, which allowed for the possibility of the Umma as the source of authority. The second,
there is no reference to the Umma at all as a source of authority, which eliminates any possibility
for the public to be included among Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. Effectively, this legal demarcation
creates a permanent division between two classes of people; the first is a class that is legally
permitted to enter into contracts with temporal power and the general public who are out of this
legal relationship. Effectively, establishing a class structure where one class decides “the good”
of the Umma and the other is to obey the outcome.

41

 أنهم:  االتجاه الثاني.  أنهم العلماء من أهل االجتهاد:  االتجاه األول: و باستقراء كالم أهل العلم و آرائهم نجد أن ثمة عدة إتجاهات في المراد بهم
.  أنهم أفاضل المسلمين المؤتمنون على أمر المسلمين:  االتجاه الرابع.  أنهم األشراف و األعيان: العلماء و الرؤساء و وجوه النا االتجاه الثالث
 انهم اولو االمر المذكورون في قوله سبحانه ( يا أيها الذين آمنو أطيعو هللا و أطيعو الرسول و أولي االمر منكم ) و اذا كان العلماء قد: االتجاه الخام
 و أهل الحل و العقد ) يمكن أن يفسر، فإن هذا الرأي يفيد أن كال من الطائفتين ( أعني أولي األمر،اختلفو في تفسير المراد بأولي االمر في اآلية الكريمة
إحدهما باألخرى
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The language of the Qur’an, Islam’s ultimate legal source, is the idiom of commerce and
contracts. I am arguing the Qur’an’s language incorporates three common themes based on
commerce and the freedom of contract: the first is that the Qur’an speaks directly to Muslims
and not to a particular person or a group that mediates between God and the Umma; instead, its
language directly addresses Muslims, both individually and collectively, to choose the right
religion and to act accordingly without reference to Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. This
direct appeal to Muslims effectively removes the authority of any group from obstructing the
duty of Muslims to bring about the good and forbid evil. The second is that because Meccan
society was a mercantile culture the language of the Qur’an is largely expressed metaphorically
in the language of commerce. It is a contract between the Prophet and God that provides rewards
in the Hereafter in exchange for following religion rightly. According to the Qur’an, this contract
requires Muslims to act according to the faith, and on Judgment Day deeds are judged and put on
a scale to assess a fulfillment of obligations. Thus, to establish a legal category such as Ahl Al
Hall Wal-Aqd is to establish a class that is able to enter into or forgive Aqd (contract), but most
important the class acts as a delegate on behalf of the community thus denying members of the
Umma the freedom to deliberate and engage directly in the process of establishing political
agreements or Bay’a. This legal view directly changed the nature of obedience and authority in
Islam by establishing two classes: one of free and mature Muslims who can engage in Bay’a and
another, a majority, who are excluded from the process. The legal discourse produced to defend
the new categorization is not to be found anywhere in the Qur’an. On the contrary, there is
ample evidence in the Qur’an that all Muslims, including slaves, should give Bay’a—enter into
contract with God and the Prophet by a handshake—and in entering the faith defend it. The
following are examples from Qur’an that speak to the claim:
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Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for
that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah , so they kill and are killed. [It is] a
true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is truer to
his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that
which is the great attainment. 9:111
How wretched is that for which they sold themselves - that they would disbelieve in what Allah
has revealed through [their] outrage that Allah would send down His favor upon whom He wills
from among His servants. So they returned having [earned] wrath upon wrath. And for the
disbelievers is a humiliating punishment. 2:90
[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say,
"Our Lord is Allah." And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there
would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name
of Allah is much mentioned. And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah
is Powerful and Exalted in Might. 22:4
[O Muhammad], tell My servants who have believed to establish prayer and spend from what We
have provided them, secretly and publicly, before a Day comes in which there will be no
exchange, nor any friendships. 14:31

The third and most important commercial theme in the Qur’an is the reference to the
literal scale upon which human deeds will be weighed and the fate of humanity, including
Muslims, will be determined on the Day of Judgment. Unlike Christians, Muslims cannot be
saved by the recognition of the divinity of God alone; action guided by belief is what determines
faith. When a person cannot act, heartfelt intentions count. The duty to engage in direct action
falls on the community and cannot be delegated to a class of people who will deliberate and act
on behalf of the Umma. Thus, individual action throughout a person’s life is transformed into
weighed units of good and evil to be measured against one another. Consequently, the individual
determines his fate. The following verses in the Qur’an support this point:
And O my people, give full measure and weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their
due and do not commit abuse on the earth, spreading corruption. 11:85
We have already sent Our messengers with clear evidence and sent down with them the Scripture
and the balance that the people may maintain [their affairs] in justice. And We sent down iron,
wherein is great military might and benefits for the people, and so that Allah may make evident
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those who support Him and His messengers unseen. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in
Might. 57:25
And O my people, give full measure and weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their
due and do not commit abuse on the earth, spreading corruption. 11:85
The Most Merciful, Taught the Qur'an, Created man, [And] taught him eloquence. The sun and
the moon [move] by precise calculation, And the stars and trees prostrate. And the heaven He
raised and imposed the balance. That you not transgress within the balance. And establish weight
in justice and do not make deficient the balance. 55: 1-9

Therefore, the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd is limited by clear
injunctions in the Qur’an and the Sunna, and as such Muslims are held accountable on the Day
of Judgment for obedience contrary to the Sharia. Yet, as mentioned before in the realm of
Siyasah al shariah, the scope of authority is much more extensive. Thus, in an effort to increase
their scope of authority, and in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunna, Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd
historically use Fiqh to emphasize obedience to authority over the duty of the Muslim subject to
“ordain the good and forbid evil.”42 For example, the Bay’a became limited to the Ulama, the
leadership of the community, and those who enjoy an elite status among the community.
Consequently, resistance to the ruler or temporal power was outlawed even if the ruler is corrupt.
Unless a clear apostasy is admitted by the ruler or temporal power, Muslims are to obey and not
to resist. This argument is justified by a Hadith that a corrupt ruler is punishment from God, and
Muslims are to scrutinize and correct their heart and action instead of resistance to corrupt rule.
A good contemporary example is al-Bouti’s use of this exact argument to justify his support of
Bashar Al Assad’s regime and simultaneously outlaw efforts to topple him from power
(Mourtada and Gladstone, 2013).

42

""األمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر
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Again, Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd’s use of Islamic legal and political writings puts in question
academic literature’s reliance on “fundamentalism” in addressing the social and political
phenomena of political Islam. The term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd never appeared in the primary
sources, yet the scope of their authority was established by Fiqh. Al Tareeqy argues that “the
term Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd was not mentioned in the Qur’an and the Sunna but was developed by
the Ulama as many other legal terms that are foundational such as those entitled to engage in
Ijtihad, Ijma, and other legal terms used in the Sharia” (32).43 As a result, there is strong
evidence for arguing that historically temporal power had an overwhelming interest in
controlling the legal process in a matter that was most advantageous to temporal power. In most
aspects of life the Ulu Al Amr or Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd are legally limited by Sharia when a legal
matter is clear, for example in the areas of the penal code, inheritance, family law, property and
commerce. But in the area of Siyasah al shariah, the matter is quite different since “All Muslim
Sunni thinking currents including its prominent figures agree the “state” is not a pillar or
foundation of the faith ….” (Imarah 1988, 208).44 Therefore, the omission of reference to
government and state in the primary sources increases Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd’s scope of authority
and in the area of Siyasah al shariah “since the principle of the sovereignty of the Sharia is
aimed to govern the ruler and the ruled alike in accordance to both God’s Law. Accordingly,
administrative laws are limited by the Sharia and nothing is legislated that would contradict
God’s Law, which is precisely the meaning of the sovereignty of God” (Mufti and Wakeel 1991,
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 شأنه شأن الكثير من المصطلحات التي تواضع، و إنما هو من وضع العلماء،و اذا عرفنا ان هذا المصطلح لم يرد بهذا اللفظ في القران و ال في السنة
 و أهل اإلجماع و أهل الحسبة و األصوليين و النحويين و األدباء الى غير ذلك من المصطلحات، مثل أهل ا الجتهاد،عليها أهل االختصاصات العلمية
 فهذه... كل تيارات الفكر االسالمي السنية و أعالم علمائها مجمعون على أن ( الدولة ) ليست ( ركنا ً ) و ال ( أصالً ) من أركان الدين و أصوله
األركان و األصول قد حددها
44
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29).45 This quote is a testament of the authority Ulu Al Amr as the experts who function as a
monitoring body or a check on the acts of temporal power. Therefore, this dissertation argues
that this check of Ulu Al Amr on temporal power is the most important character and theme in
Islamic legal and political writings and to understand the political and social consequences of
this feature is to understand the logic around which the entire edifice is organized.
Dynastic rule in Islam was secured through a restricting of Bay’a to a small group of
individuals and marginalizing the public. Thus it is in the interest of temporal power to control
the process and ensure an outcome that increases its power and control over Ulu Al Amr. For
temporal power to control the process of inclusion/exclusion in the matters of Al siyasah and the
Imamah is to ensure legitimacy to arbitrary power. The institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr and the
faith by temporal powers is precisely the point over which modernist reformers—Jamal ad-Din
al-Afghani (1838/1839 – 1897) and Mohammed Abduh (1849 -1905) and more recent figures
like Hasan al-Banna (1906 – 1949) and Sayyed Qutb (1906 – 1966)—object. They all agree that
the demise of the Islamic Caliphate and the spread of ignorance among Muslims are due to the
Umma’s lack of control over temporal power, which governs arbitrarily with the blessing of the
institutionalized religious establishment, the state Ulama. The political figures mentioned above
demanded all Muslims be included in Bay’a and hoped they would be the source of authority
they thought had existed during the early founding period. These figures wanted to restore the
role of the Umma, have it included among Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, and have it participate and
deliberate in Siyasah al shar’iyyah according to the principle of Maslaha (the good of the
community). Furthermore, they all agree that in the period of Ottoman rule the closed
45

 و عدم، و يهدف مبدأ سيادة الشرع إلى إقرار التزام الحاكم و المحكوم بشرع هللا سبحانه و تعالى و الى انبثاق التشريعات من الشريعة اإلسالمية
 فالقانون المطبق في الدولة.  و ذلك أسا قاعدة الحاكمية هلل.إحداث تشريعات أو ممارسات تخالف الشرع
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membership of Ulu Al Amr via a Grand Mufti under temporal power would dampen reform
attempts. These political figures were the new Ulu Al Amr, as chapter four demonstrates, who
would challenge the establishment Ulu Al Amr over their authority to hold temporal power and
their accountability to the Umma and Sharia.
In sum, historically, the legal category of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd appears to include those
who have social and political influence and status in society, but it has effectively left out the
public or Umma. Those with wealth, political influence, and most important, military might, are
in charge of determining the good of the community and alone able to participate in the process
of Shura. The average member of the Umma is secondary to these groups, and whatever the
outcome of the Shura of the Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd the Umma expects to obey its mandates.
The outcome of this legal change effectively introduced a new type of authority and
obedience into the legal system of Sharia. Nevertheless, the legal practice of Ijma is conducted
only by the Ulama who are members of Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, and due to the legal knowledge
they possess they are able to participate in this process alone. And it was the Ulama that actually
established this new legal category, even though it is vague and historically did not achieve Ijma.
Thus, it can be maintained that the Ulama are the class that constitutes the essential element for
any legal legitimacy. They are the only legal class that remained unchanged in both categories of
Ulu Al Amr and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. In fact, they are the only members in both legal categories
that possess the legal authority to legitimize their own practices and legal status. They have the
authority to include or exclude other social and political sectors in the Umma. Most important, is
the ability of the members of Ulu Al Amr and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd, through the principle of Ijma
the Ulama, to label actions that they consider illegal as Bid’ah (innovation) and therefore label
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them as evil and stoppable. Yet, due to a lack of legal consensus or Ijma, neither Ulu Al Amr nor
Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd could establish themselves as clear legal categories.

The following section investigates the relationship between temporal power and Ulu Al
Amr. Historically, temporal power in the Islamic political system took different legal labels:
among them Khalifa, Imam, Amir, and Sultan. To understand the significance of these labels and
how temporal power is able to govern legitimately, we look to Ulu Al Amr legal opinions and
historical interaction between them and temporal power. For example, the legal significance of
“the Khalifa or Imam was historically a persistent source of major conflicts due to substantive
disagreements among Muslim scholars both in the past and the present” (Nowar 1996, 7).46 The
source of disagreement can be divided into the following categories: “the method of selecting of
the Khalifa or Imam and the duties and obligations of the post. The source of discord among Ulu
Al Amr is over the precise characteristics of the Khalifa or Imam” (Nowar 1996, 7).47 “AlShahristani (1086–1153 CE) argued that the greatest source of disagreement that divided
Muslims was over the method of the selection of the Khalifa or Imam.” (Nowar 1996, 7).48 This
disagreement is because neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna addresses such legal matters
practically. They leave the question of the Khalifa’s character open to Al siyasah al shar’iyyah,
which evolves according to social and political change. Consequently, temporal power in Islam
46

 كثر الكالم و الجدال فيه بين العلماء القدامى و الحديثين و باعتباره المشكلة الرئيسية الكبرى التي، موضوع الخالفة او اإلمامة موضوع قديم متشعب
دار عليها البحث السياسي في االسالم خالل العصور المختلفة و باعتباره الموضوع الرئيسي للنظام السياسي في االسالم و في الدولة اإلسالمية و قد
شهدت العصور اإلسالمية مدى اختالف الفقهاء حول هذا الموضوع
47
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ان خالفهم هذا يمثل أعظم خالف فكري في االسالم

 اذا ما سل سيف في االسالم على قاعدة دينية مثل ما سل اإلمامة في كل، و في ذلك يقول العالمة الشهرستاني و أعظم خالف بين األمة خالف اإلمامة
زمان و مكان
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is a legal category without a clear historical definition settled by practice and legal precedents.
The precedents that developed in the history of Fiqh Al siyasah al shariah in accordance to
special social and political circumstances are then treated as foundational legal opinions for
future generations to follow. These legal opinions, which legitimize new practices, do not
contradict a clear injunction in the Qur’an or Sunna, which confirms that “historically the
Prophet did not clarify the matters and methods of the Khilafa or Imamah and died without
nominating any person to occupy his legal position” (Nowar 1996, 7).49 This understanding is
consistent with the Sunni Fiqh, which affirms that “the Prophet did not discuss the standards or
qualifications for such a post or a method for Muslims to choose this post” (Nowar 1996, 7-8).50
The matter was left for the Umma to regulate, a task which Ulu Al Amr assigned to themselves.
Because matters of obedience and governance were not determined by the Quran and the
Sunna, historical circumstances gave rise to Ulu Al Amr who instituted the expert authority over
legal texts and a particular type of obedience from the Umma. Historically, Ulu Al Amr is the
legal body that legitimized and set the qualifications and limits for the post of temporal power to
rule the Umma. Consequently, temporal power derived its authority from Ulu Al Amr and as a
consequence lacked legitimacy of its own. What legitimacy accrued to it came from the consent
of Ulu Al Amr or at other times was extracted through force and violence. Thus, the lack of
definition or qualification in the original sources of temporal power is evidence that temporal
power or the Khalifa was not intended to be a source of law. This is the opposite in character of
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تاريخيا ان الرسول صلى هللا عليه و سلم لم يبني امر الخالفة او اإلمامة بوضوح فقد توفي عليه الصالة و السالم دون ان يعين احد لتولي إمامة او
 كما انه لم يترك نصا مكتوبا و لم يبني الطريقة التي يتم فيها االستخالف، خالفة المسلمين
50

و لم يحدد الشروط التي يجب ان تت وفر في الحاكم و غيرها من األمور بالعين او الوصف و إنما أوضح القواعد العامة و بين المثل األخالقية و ترك
االمر شورى بين المسلمين
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the type of sovereign power that had historically developed in Europe where “for long time, one
of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death. In a
formal sense, it derived no doubt from ancient patria potestas that granted the father of the
Roman family the right to ‘dispose’ of the life of his children and his slaves; just as he had given
them life, so he could take it away” (Foucault 1978, 135). Conversely, temporal power’s function
is to best execute the laws in accordance with Sharia and through the process of the Shura of Ulu
Al Amr and Ahl Al Hall Wal-Aqd. Moreover, who is qualified for temporal power and how he is
selected increased the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr through the legal practice of Ijma.
Temporal power in Islamic legal and political writings was never the source of the law, the legal
source of life and death.
Scholars have argued that the Ulu Al Amr’s disagreement over the post of the Khalifa is
important for two reasons: Al Mawardi (972-1058 CE), among others legal scholars, contended
that the legitimacy of the post is based on a rational foundation. Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328 CE)
and a second group of scholars argued that temporal power is based on the law and not rational
faculties (11). These different legal opinion demonstrate the scope of the authority of Ulu Al
Amr, who are able to debate on foundational legal issues that are absent in the Qur’an and Sunna
and give legitimacy to the temporal power rule over the Umma and demands its obedience.
The first opinion justifies temporal power via rational faculty and argues that “if it was
not for the ruler, the people would live in chaos and negligence” (11). It is a deductive line of
reasoning by the Ulama to arrive at a legally binding ruling that will be referenced by future
legal scholars as a part of Fiqh. This process is possible because Ijma on the subject matter has
never been achieved. This lack of consensus provides judges with the space and freedom to base
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their opinions on the circumstances that they are facing. Thus, according to the first opinion,
government is necessary for the purpose of executing Sharia. Consequently, the form and nature
of government is secondary to its function. The Caliphate in this sense is a tool to execute the
law that has no theological character. As such, the Caliphate is based on a rational justification
absent of religious duty.
While the second opinion is legally justified based on“the obligation where temporal
power is trusted with guarding and implementing Sharia; consequently, the Khilafa is a duty that
the Sharia requires Muslims to create” (Nowar 1996, 10).51 Thus, it is Sharia, law that requires
the establishment of a Caliphate free from lineages, clans, or statuses. In fact, the establishment
of the Caliphate is a religious duty. According to Al-Turtushi (1059 – 1127 CE), “God required
the community to create the post of Khalifa or Sultan on earth so that the strong will not oppress
the weak and to correct injustice among Muslims” (Nowar 1996, 10).52 Accordingly, temporal
power was created out of necessity, the necessity to implement Sharia. Consequently, the legal
bases that Ulu Al Amr use to justify temporal power is Sharia, which protects the weak from the
strong. The rationalist jurists Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 CE) argued that the Khilafa “according to
rational views is the best method of achieving worldly benefits and shielding subjects from harm
according to the Sharia” (Nowar 1996, 12).53 The two legal opinions divided the Ulama, and
neither achieved Ijma regarding the Khalifa’s requirements and obligations.
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كان تعيين او وجود االمام او الخليفة واجبا ً حتميا علي الجماعة االسالمية

ان اول اختصاص للخليفة او االمام هو حفظ الشرع و علي هذا األسا
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 ولوال ان هللا تعالي أقام السلطان في االرض يرفع، ان هللا تعالي أمتن علي الخلق بإقامة الخليفة او السلطان علي االرض:لهذا القول يقول الطرطوشي
القوي عن الضعيف و ينصف المظلوم من الظلم ألهلك ألقي الضعيف و تواثب الخلق بعضهم علي بعض فال ينتظم لهم حال ال يستقر لهم قرار فتفسد
االرض و من عليها
53

 حمل الكافة علي مقتضي النظر العقلي في جلب المصالح و دفع المضارة او حمل الكافة علي مقتضي النظر:و الخالفة علي حد قول ابن خالدون هي
الشرعي في مصالحهم االخيرة و الدنيوية الراجعة اليها
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It is important at this point in the chapter to focus on the legal principle of Ijma. It is
important to note that Ijma is the foundation of the authority of Ulu Al Amr and puts it at the
apex of the state, which in turn furnishes temporal power with the legitimacy to govern. While
establishment of temporal power and the state are not mentioned in the Qur’an and the Sunna;
“the majority of Muslims regard the establishment of Imamah or Khilafa a religious duty”
(Nowar 1996, 13).54 In fact, it is the sudden death of the Prophet that necessitated the
necessitated the invention of the post of Khalifa. This is a good example to demonstrate the
historical role of Ulu Al Amr’s authority in making the establishment of Imamah of Khilafa a
religious duty. Ulu Al Amr possesses legal legitimacy through Ijma to introduce innovative
practices of temporal power in social, political, and religious matters. Once consensus is
achieved regarding a new social, political, or religious issue, the legal opinion will become part
of Fiqh and the legal justification for future similar circumstances. The Ijma is one of Islam’s
dominant sources of law, and its authority is only eclipsed by the Qur’an and Sunna.
Accordingly, “Ijma during the time of the Companions of the Prophet was based on two legal
foundations: first, that the Ijma is the third legal source after the Qur’an and the Sunna. Second,
understanding Sharia necessitates knowledge of the Ijma of the Fuqaha that is established in the
historical evolution of Fiqh” (Al Gassass 1983, 18).55
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و فيما يتعلق بالخالفة كفرض او ركن فا ن مذهب أغلبية األمة اإلسالمية هو ان إقامة اإلمامة او الخالفة الشرعية الصحيحة فرض أساسي من فروض
الدين بل هو الفرض األعظم الذي يتوقف عليه تنفيذ ساىرالفروض النه كما يقول احد األئمة من أتم مصالح المسلمين و اعظم مقاصد الدين
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 ان اإلجماع هو الدليل الثالث بغد: اوال:و بعد هذا نستطيع القول ان اإلجماع ف ي عصر الصحابة و التابعين لم يكن له غير قاعدتن أصوليتين فقط
 انه البد النعقاد اإلجماع من معرفة أقوال ذوي الرأي من الفقهاء: و ثانيا.القران و السنة
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During the early period of Islam the legal concept and practice of Ijma had not been
settled upon because the method and concept of Ijma were not found in the Qur’an or in Sunna.
Ijma became the third source for law and has developed historically with the evolution of Fiqh.
Al Gassass further provides a Hadith by the Prophet that legally supports the claim of the Hadith
of Muaz “when the Prophet asked him: what would be your judgment, if you are asked to judge
on a matter? Muaz answered, I will judge in accordance to the Qur’an, the Sunna and if the
matter is not to be found there, then through my Ijtihad on the situation at hand in accordance to
my opinion. The Prophet pat him on the chest and said, thank God who guided you the
messenger of the Messenger to what pleases God” (Al Gassass 1983, 10).56 This is evidence that
the role and the authority of Ulu Al Amr developed in an evolutionary matter. More precisely,
Ulu Al Amr were able to carve their legal role without clear reference to legal injunctions in the
primary sources. Ulu Al Amr created Ijma and gave it legal importance after the Qur’an and the
Sunna. Accordingly:
After the Prophet’s death and during the early period of Islam, if a new situation occurred that
required a legal justification, the Companions of the Prophet would primarily look in the Qur’an
for an answer. If that is not possible, they will look in the Hadith and if they could not find an
answer there (and here were the differences in opinion would appear) the Khalifa summoned the
prominent members of the Companions and takes their Shura or advice. If the sum of the
opinions achieve consensus, then Ijma is achieved and the matter becomes the legal ruling for
future similar circumstances, but if they were unable to achieve consensus then the Khalifa makes
the decision on their behalf. (Al Gassass 1983, 10)57
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، اقضي بكتاب هللا: قال، كيف تقضي ان عرض لك قضاء: حين سأله رسول هللا صلي هللا عليه و سلم-  رضي هللا عنه- و هذا ما ورد في حديث معاذ
 اجتهد رأيي: قال، فاءن لم يكن في سنة رسول هللا صلي هللا عليه و سلم: قال، فبسنة رسول هللا صلي هللا عليه و سلم: قال، فاءن لم يكن في كتاب هللا:قال
 فقال الحمد هلل الذي وفق رسول هللا صلي هللا عليه و سلم لما يرضي، فضرب صدري: قال.و ال الو
57

 فان لم، فاءن لم يجدوا حكمها التمسوا ذلك في احداث الرسول، فكانت اذا وقعت الحادثة ينظرون في كتاب هللا- اما بعد وفاته صلي هللا عليه و سلم
 فإذا اتفقوا علي امر كان،يجدوا ( و هنا يظهر الخالف بطريقة االستدالل مع العصر السابق ) جمع الخليفة كبار الصحابة و حفاظهم فيشاورهم في االمر
 و اال حسم الخليفة الخالف،الرأي الجماعي هو المرجع
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Accordingly, Ijma has a central role as a legal role in the evolution of the Sharia. This is
precisely why “Muslim scholars had a great interest in Ijma by studying its origins and created
subfields within the legal principle and studied and commented on the disagreement between the
schools of Fiqh in its legal implications … until Ijma became a legal branch of science in its own
right” (Al Gassass 1983, 18).58 The legal principle of Ijma is a testament to the scope of the
authority of Ulu Al Amr, which historically solely developed Sharia under new political
circumstances. Moreover, the careful treatment that Ijma historically received is due to its direct
relationship to the foundations of the religion, thus, some Ulama charged Bid’a (innovation) for
those who deny the authority of Ijma since it has the same weight as the Qur’an and the Sunna.
Again, this is a clear example of the scope of authority that Ulu Al Amr has as the source of
legitimacy which temporal power must rely on to govern and extract obedience from the Umma.
It is Ulu Al Amr who decide the conditions of obedience and the legitimacy of the temporal
power. Yet, their authority is not unlimited, and there are historical examples where they lost
their authority over the community.

In conclusion, this chapter set out to demonstrate the historical legal changes in temporal
power and Ulu Al Amr were a response to temporal and material conditions. The absence of
theological injunctions in the Qur’an and the Sunna regarding a particular form of government or
a type of temporal power over the Umma allowed for variations in forms of governments

58

 و احتجوا، و مثلوا لكل مساءله، فدرسوا أصوله و فرعوا مساءله المجملة،و بعد هذا نستطيع القول ان اظهر علماء المسلمين اهتماما بالغا باإلجماع
، ثم وضعوا خالصات هي زبدة جهدهم.... و ما ينبني عليها، فعرضوا لخالفاتهم، و قارنها ذلك بمذاهب الفرق االسالمية،لها بما تيسر لهم من ادلة
 ان اإلجماع هو الدليل الثالث: اوال:فوصل إلينا اإلجماع علما كامال متكامالإلجماع في عصر الصحابة و التابعين لم يكن له غير قاعدتن أصوليتين فقط
 انه البد النعقاد اإلجماع من معرفة أقوال ذوي الرأي من الفقهاء: و ثانيا.بغد القران و السنة
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throughout the history of Islam. More important, Ulu Al Amr (as the only body mentioned in the
Qur’an to command obedience from Muslims) established their authority over Al siyash al
shariah which played a central role in the development of the body of Fiqh al siyash al shariah.
This dissertation argues that the legal category of Ulu Al Amr is central in properly
understanding and appreciating the local characteristic of Sunni Islamic political thought.
Therefore, using the Western conception of sovereignty with its historical circumstance on Sunni
Islamic legal and political history is faulty and misleading. Understanding the legal role of Ulu
Al Amr provides coherence to the development of Fiqh al siyash al shariah and the central
importance of the subject in the legitimacy of temporal power.

The significance of the role of Ulu Al Amr and the type of authority they have over Fiqh
al siyash al shariah is twofold. First, temporal power in Sunni Islam possesses qualities different
from European kings and monarchs and forms of legitimacy that bind and secure the obedience
of the Christian subject to the temporal sword. Historically, temporal power in Sunni Islam
remained subject to the authority of Ulu Al Amr from which it acquired legitimacy and the ability
to secure obedience of the Muslim subject. In fact, the reliance on Ulu Al Amr for legitimacy is a
permanent feature of the history of Muslim governments. The issue of legitimacy remains a
problem for modern state governance. Even the founder of modern secular Turkey, Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk created a department of theological affairs, whose existence ran contrary to the
constitutional principles enshrined in the Turkish Constitution. This topic is discussed in chapter
five, but for now my aim is to demonstrate that Sunni Islam has historically had a form of power
that is different in structure than Western types of power. Power never generates legitimacy but
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exists as force unless it is legitimate and proper according to Sharia. It is up to Ulu Al Amr to
decide the exception when necessary. Temporal power in Sunni Islam lacks the Byzantium or the
Roman quality that surrounds the monarch with a supernatural aura. This supernatural quality
historically provided European monarchs a quality that is absent in Sunni Islam or Islam in
general. Of course that does not mean that these qualities are historically are essential and
unchanging. Such claims are reductionist and inaccurate. After all, natural law and the writings
of St. Thomas Aquinas and other Christina thinkers including Luther and Calvin are testament to
the limitations of obedience in Christian legal and political thought. Instead, what is intended
here is to demonstrate that at the core of Western legal and political writings resides a generative
frame of legitimacy that allows for the unfolding of politics and power in a coherent frame that
may produce endless verities addressing time/space change. For example, Susan Buck-Morss
explains a core theological quality that surrounds the sovereign. While the office historically
changes from King to president to Volk or proletariat there are coherent qualities that are present
with us today. She argues that:
More than the sum of merely empirical individuals of which Hobbes’s Leviathan is composed,
sovereignty is a transcendent category. The sovereign is an icon in the theological sense. He (or
she) embodies an enigma—precisely the power of the collective to constitute itself. The sovereign
figure as personification of the collective demonstrates the power of the visible image to close the
circle between constituting and constituted power, explaining why even when the illegalities of an
individual sovereign are exposed, the faith of the believer is still not shaken. As long as the circle
appears closed, sovereign power remains intact; likewise, and conversely, as long as sovereign power
remains intact, the circle appears closed. The closing of the circle demands a miracle, and the icon of the
sovereign figure provides it. As a metaphysical figure, the sovereign connects the world of lived

politics with the Platonic world of eternal forms. The legitimacy of political power continues
even in secular modernity to maintain this ideal connection In US political experience, “the
American people” is the Platonic form that operates, an imaginary collective to which George W.
Bush habitually appeals. In Hitler’s Germany, it was the ethnic Volk. In the Soviet Union, the
“proletariat” was no less a metaphysical concept: the Bolshevik Party ruled in the name of the
proletariat as an ideal, not an empirical reality. (2-3)
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The metaphysical aura that surrounds the European sovereign furnished the post with local
European characteristics enabling it to play an essential role in the historical on evolution of the
state. While in Sunni Islam both the Khalifa and Ulu Al Amr are merely temporal individuals
who are entrusted with a certain task to perform and likely to face resistance, if they overstep this
task (see chapter five). Thus, to read the history of Sunni Islam as a history of state formation
similar to European history, and to judge it according to the European qualities it lacks. is to
overlook local context and qualities.
Furthermore, contrary to the idea that the sovereign represents the personification of the
collective in the West, in Islam and particularly in Sunni Islam Sharia personifies the collective’s
adherence to monotheism. Miracles and the supernatural are not qualities that signify legitimate
rule and obedience. Instead it is the law and Ulu Al Amr’s authority that furnish temporal power
with legitimacy. Historically, it is possible to find examples in Islam of saints and figures who
claimed supernatural powers, but the omnipresence of the law namely Sharia has stripped
temporal power the ability to be the source of the law. In fact, no one, including Ulu Al Amr, can
decide exceptions during crises by suspending Sharia as a contemporary sovereign might wish.
Central to the Sunni legal system is this limitation, which academic scholars must take into
account when making theoretical judgments about political Islam or Islam in general.
Historically European sovereigns, as Jean B. Elshtain explains, possessed supernatural qualities
that were central to the evolution of European legal system. She elaborates on Kantorowicz’s and
explains:
This personalization of earthly rule is documented masterfully in Ernest Kantorowicz’s classic,
The King’s Two Bodies, as he unpacks the king’s “twinned nature,” embodied in mortal “natural”
man and the office which perdures in perpetuity with another “body” holding that office when a
previous fleshy monarch dies: the King is dead. Long live the King! The king comes to supplant
the pope as the mediator between the earthly and the divine. Thus, in the embodied account, “the
king appears the perfect christomimetes … with regard to power, since his power is the same as
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that of Christ... the One who is God and Anointed by nature, acts through his royal vicar who is
‘God and Christ by Grace.” The will of the ruler brings the body to life. The head must “literally
be an individual mind or will. Most clearly of all, supreme power we cannot be except…in one,”
else it would be supreme. (63)

These qualities in Sunni Islam were not bestowed on the members of the Prophet’s family or his
Companion. While many figures in Islam claimed Prophet-hood and supernatural qualities and
tried to rule the Muslim Umma accordingly, few were able to achieve the minor and limited
success of the Ahmadiyya movement that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) founded during
India’s colonial period. But even in this case the legal characteristics of the European sovereign
were alien to what Mirza claimed. More precisely, the supernatural quality is not an end in itself
but an end for the purpose of the establishment of legal legitimacy that commands obedience and
authority. Thus:
The state of superhuman ‘absolute perfection’ of this royal persona ficta is, so to speak, the result
of a fiction within a fiction: it is inseparable from a peculiar aspect of corporational concepts, the
corporation sole. Blackstone gives credit entirely to the Romans for having invented the idea of
corporation-"but our laws have considerably refined and improved upon the invention, according
to the usual genius of the English nation: particularly with regard to sole corporations, consisting
of one person only, of which the Roman lawyers had no notion." That kind of man-made
irreality-indeed, that strange construction of a human mind which finally becomes slave to its
own fictions-we are normally more ready to find in the religious sphere than in the allegedly
sober and realistic realms of law, politics, and constitution; and therefore Maitland's often caustic
criticisms are understandable and appear fully justified. (Kantorowicz 1957, 5)

While, persons with supernatural qualities and miracles can be found in the Qur’an, Muslims
view the Qur’an as the direct expression of God and it renders supernatural powers secondary in
importance. In a sense, Islamic temporal power or the Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the
Faithful or Leader of the Faithful), Khalifa, or Sultan remained weaker and more vulnerable in
comparison to the divine qualities that European sovereign historically possessed. Consequently,
to speak of a king that is sovereign in Islam is to confuse European history with the history of
Islam. This confusion is quite important, and will become clearer in chapter, five when the
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quality of the sovereign is transferred from the sovereign king to the sovereign state or the
people.
In short, this condition, which is specific to Sunni Islam, necessitates the rise of Ulu Al
Amr in a moment of history after the passage of the Companions of the Prophet. It plays a central
role in the development of Islamic legal and political writings and practice. Ulu Al Amr, as will
be demonstrated in chapter four, played a central role in legitimizing a dynastic monarchy that
had no foundation in the Qur’an or the Sunna; an issue that was directly behind the two civil
wars in the early history of Islam. The ripples of the violence they caused resulted from the
questioning of the legitimacy of temporal power to rule over Muslims. It is today personified in
the division of Muslims into Sunni and Shia Islam. As a response to these painful historical
events Ulu Al Amr literally invented the two legal principles that guarantee dynastic rule in the
history of Islam. This historical fact is important because it confirms the central arguments of the
chapter, first, that Ulu Al Amr are legally the Ulama. Second, this chapter challenges the
academic scholarship that applies the concept of fundamentalism to contemporary forms of
political Islam that claim an adherence to theological orthodoxy. It asks how such a claim can be
justified in the absence of a negative view of human nature or legal injunctions for a specific
form of government or political institution. This important metaphysical/theological difference
regarding human nature and government is discussed in detail in chapter three.
Secondly, it is important to note that Ulu Al Amr never achieved a sacred status. Ulu Al
Amr are learned individuals whose authority is limited to the authority of experts in theological
juridical matters. More precisely, even though Ulu Al Amr are legally “to decide the exception”
they are revered for their expert knowledge without sacred or supernatural qualities attached to
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their persons. Thus, the authority that Ulu Al Amr possesses is limited to expert authority and not
a religious injunction. Only, when a legal matter achieves Ijma in a particular moment in history
does that legal matter become binding on Muslims. The Second Civil War and the Umayyad’s
downfall is an example of the limitations of temporal power manipulation by the Ulu Al Amr.
The authority of Ulu Al Amr is the topic of the following chapter, which will demonstrate the
limits of the authority of Ulu Al Amr.
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CHAPTER III

Authority and Obedience in Sunni Islam

In chapter one we established that European colonialism and the advent of the modern
nation-state made the concept of sovereignty exogenous to Sharia because “sovereignty is a type
of authority relationship” and competes in hierarchy and finality with other forms of authority
(Lake 2003, 304). The debates were foremost about the primacy of sovereignty in relation to
Sharia, and they appeared abruptly during the colonial period with the arrival of the modern
European state. Modern Fuqaha and legal jurists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
addressed sovereignty, but its lack of a connection to the early Fiqh in Sunni or Shia
jurisprudence lends little merit to a historical investigation into Islamic legal and political
writings. My aim is to avoid superimposing concepts that had historically developed in a specific
spatial and temporal trajectory and later became hegemonically global in a context where the
concepts do not merit similar attention.
This dissertation argues that the focus should instead be on the concept of authority that
is endogenous to Fiqh al siyash al shariah. A clarification is necessary before embarking on the
investigation at hand. This chapter does not advance the thesis that Sunni authority is entirely or
exclusively local in character; on the contrary, Sunni authority shares universal qualities with
other systems of meaning. For example, obedience and rule enforcement are universal in any
collectivity. Yet, the question of why and how an agent is obeyed is embedded in a local context
of political and social struggles. Accordingly, we must investigate the concept of authority in
general, i.e., its universal character and then narrow the scope to what is relevant to the Qur’an,
Sunna, and Fiqh. The aim here is not to investigate a concept only in relation to Western

82

sovereignty but also to understand the characteristics of Islamic authority that hold are both
universal and local.
According to Lake, “authority can be generally defined in a social environment as X
demands Y to adhere to X’s rules, and Y freely follows these rules” (Lake 2003, 304). This
definition has similarities to “Dahl’s definition of power where A commands B to do something
she would not do otherwise” (Lukes 1974, 11). Their similarity is the source of academic
difficulty in clearly defining the two separate concepts. This dissertation will be no different, but
the aim here is that once the act of obedience by the Muslim subject in relation to Ulu Al Amr is
explained, the concept of authority in Islamic and legal writings will be mapped and constructed.
Ulu Al Amr’s character and constitution, which have been subject to historical struggles for
temporal power, have made defining its authority difficult.
Yet there are still certain universal theoretical characteristics of authority that are present
in every collectivity and social and political settings. Lake argues that there are three hallmarks
of authority that are related to this issue. First, “authority is based on free consent of the actor or
a degree of consent. Second, authority involves an absence of force. And finally, authority is
never unlimited or unrestrained” (Lake 2003, 304-05). These parameters distinguish the concepts
of power and authority by avoiding their collapse into each other. The first characteristic of
authority as free consent to authority accurately describes Muslims who voluntarily adhere to
Islam and obey Sharia as an affirmation of faith. Accordingly, Sharia represents the moral
standard of right and wrong with which the subject makes senses of her social and political
environment. Furthermore, the question of force is settled in the Qur’an:

83

There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear
from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut (transgressor) and believes in Allah has
grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing.
2:256

Apostasy in Islam is not relevant here since apostasy by definition negates volunteerism and do
not recognize authority. The third characteristic actually describes the limitation that Ulu Al-Amr
had to address historically since Islam and “Muslims can understand transparently what they
need to understand, how they need to act, to be saved” (Gould 2008, 12). Furthermore, “the
absence of definitive interpretations breeds a certain tolerance, for example, among the four
orthodox schools of law in Sunni Islam, because the differences do not matter” (Gould 2008, 12).
Definitive interpretations in Islam do not exist because there is no authoritative body or a church
that exercises a monopoly (Gellner 1981, 1). Consequently, total obedience in temporal and
spiritual realms (realms that in Islam are actually one) does not exist in Sunni Islam. Instead, the
relationship between authority and obedience has been historically shaped by struggles over
interpretations of injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna. “Authority seems to be derived from the
fact that the person wielding authority possesses superior knowledge, insight, or experience. The
authority rests upon these givens, which are accompanied by the person’s ability to give
extended reasons for what he decides to say or do” (Friedrich 1972, 51). This quality is
applicable to the authority that Ulu Al Amr legally possesses in developing Fiqh. Accordingly,
Fiqh, as a legal discourse regulating the relationship between Ulu Al Amr and the Muslim
subject, constitutes a form of authoritative communication. Therefore, disagreements over
authoritative communication take place not only among experts but also, though rarely, among
the public.
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Historically, disagreements among Ulu Al Amr over the meaning of a particular political
verse in the Qur’an have had social and political significance. A prime example are the
disagreements over the scope of obedience of Ulu Al Amr in verse 4:59 of the Qur’an:
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you
(Ulu Al-Amr). And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you
should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.

The scope and weight of the authority becomes doubly significant when legal or expert reasons
provided by Ulu Al Amr address a matter about which the Qur’an and Sunna are mute or vague.
In fact, neither the Qur’an nor Sunna posits a clear theological injunction regarding the duty of
Muslims to create government to protect the faith. Historically, the forms of governments that
existed in Islam are the consequence of expediency and struggles among warring factions.
Consequently, the role of the expert scholar in history as a member of Ulu Al Amr defines the
scope of authority and obedience it requires of the Muslim subject to these new forms of
governments in accordance with Sharia. Khadduri illustrates the scope of the authority Ulu Al
Amr has over the executive power and the Umma as it relates to governance and justice:
In the Traditions (Sunna & Hadith), the Prophet sought to explain the meaning of the abstract
maxims of justice enunciated in the Qur’an by specific examples, expressed in legal and ethical
terms, to distinguish between just and unjust acts as well as to set underlying rules indicating
what scale of justice ought to be .Since the Prophet dealt essentially with particular questions, the
theologians and other scholars found in the Traditions precedents on the strength of which they
formulated their theories of justice. However, neither in the Qur’an nor in the Tradition are these
specific measures to indicate what are the constituent elements of justice or how justice can be
realized on Earth. Thus the task of working out what the standard of justice ought to be fell upon
the scholars who ought to draw its elements from the divers authoritative sources and the rulings
and acts embodied in the works of commentators. (10-11)

This is precisely the location of temporal power’s historical struggles to control the
membership of Ulu Al Amr. This struggle is doubly important because, first, neither the Qur’an
nor Sunna designates who are precisely designated as “those in authority” or Ulu A Amr. Second,
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membership in Ulu A Amr changed historically in Fiqh al siyash al shariah as chapter two
demonstrates. Consequently, this lack of consensus made it possible for temporal power to
control the Ulu Al Amr’s independence and restrict its membership.

Let us now focus on the linguistic meaning of “authority” in Arabic. We are immediately
faced with a linguistic challenge since the term has no direct equivalent in Arabic. For example,
according to the Al Mawrid dictionary, Sulta is the literal Arabic translation for the term
authority. Sulta shares the same root with the word Sultan, which in Arabic is equivalent in
English to a prince or princely power. Most important, the word Sultan appears twelve times in
the Qur’an, which is the most important authentic linguistic source in Arabic.59 The word Sulta,
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7:71 [Hud] said, "Already have defilement and anger fallen upon you from your Lord. Do you dispute
with me concerning [mere] names you have named them, you and your fathers, for which Allah has not
sent down any authority? Then wait; indeed, I am with you among those who wait."
10:68 They have said, "Allah has taken a son." Exalted is He; He is the [one] Free of need. To Him
belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth. You have no authority for this [claim].
Do you say about Allah that which you do not know?
12:40 You worship not besides Him except [mere] names you have named them, you and your fathers, for
which Allah has sent down no authority. Legislation is not but for Allah. He has commanded that you
worship not except Him. That is the correct religion, but most of the people do not know.
14:22 And Satan will say when the matter has been concluded, "Indeed, Allah had promised you the
promise of truth. And I promised you, but I betrayed you. But I had no authority over you except that I
invited you, and you responded to me. So do not blame me; but blame yourselves. I cannot be called to
your aid, nor can you be called to my aid. Indeed, I deny your association of me [with Allah] before.
Indeed, for the wrongdoers is a painful punishment."
15:42 Indeed, My servants - no authority will you have over them, except those who follow you of the
deviators.
16:99 Indeed, there is for him no authority over those who have believed and rely upon their Lord.
17:65 Indeed, over My [believing] servants there is for you no authority. And sufficient is your Lord as
Disposer of affairs.
34:21 And he had over them no authority except [it was decreed] that We might make evident who
believes in the Hereafter from who is thereof in doubt. And your Lord, over all things, is Guardian.
37:30 And we had over you no authority, but you were a transgressing people.
37: 156 Or do you have a clear authority?
40:35 Those who dispute concerning the signs of Allah without an authority having come to them - great
is hatred [of them] in the sight of Allah and in the sight of those who have believed. Thus does Allah seal
over every heart [belonging to] an arrogant tyrant.
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in contrast, does not appear in the Qur’an, which makes the term most likely a modern one. Sulta
probably appeared during the arrival of the modern state system in the Arab world. It appears in
descriptions of the sovereign and authority in the modern nation-state. Furthermore, when
examining the term Sultan, depending on the context of the verse the word could mean, rule,
command, influence, control, or power. Therefore, to avoid the possible confusions that may
arise from investigating the concept of authority linguistically in Islamic legal and political
writings, the focus of this investigation is on the outcome of authority as a result of the faithful
subject’s voluntary obedience . In addition, obedience is required for all variations of the term
Sultan. As an outcome of authority, obedience should be viewed in the light of Friedrich’s three
characteristics of authority to avoid collapsing authority and power. The aim here is to
investigate the nature of obedience that is voluntary and simultaneously constitutes the subject
who is acting according to authority on behalf of the faith.

“The Arabic term for obedience, ‘Al taah,’ is mentioned many times in the Qur’an and
Sunna” (Al-Massari 2002, 11).60 It is a legal term, but it is mentioned only once in the context of
obeying someone other than God or the Prophet. According to verse 4:59—“O you who have
believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you
disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and
40:56 Indeed, those who dispute concerning the signs of Allah without [any] authority having come to
them - there is not within their breasts except pride, [the extent of] which they cannot reach. So seek
refuge in Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the Hearing, the Seeing.
53:23 They are not but [mere] names you have named them - you and your forefathers - for which Allah
has sent down no authority. They follow not except assumption and what [their] souls desire, and there
has already come to them from their Lord guidance.
60

 ورد لفظ الطاعة في القران الكريم و في السنة النبوية: المعنى الشرعي
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the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result”—Accordingly Muslims are ordered to
obey those in authority. Al-Massari argues that “linguistically the word al taah in the Arabic
tongue means the opposite of the word coercion ‘Al kurh’” (11).61 Moreover, “conceptually the
word Al taah in Sharia means the act of adherence to whatever is ordained or forbidden by Ulu
Al Amr, rulers, or those who govern according to the Sharia without resistance or objection
regardless if orders are advantageous or not to the subject who obeys” (Al-Massari 2002, 12).62
The English term “obedience” shares with the Arabic term Al taah” a sense of constraint on
action. Accordingly, authority’s central quality is the power to influence and command thought,
opinion, or behavior.

What is the significance of obedience in Islam? How does Sharia regulate it, and what
limits to obedience does the Muslim subject impose on authorities? According to Ibn Taymiyyah
(1263-1328 CE), “because God made it a duty of Muslims to ordain the good and forbid evil,
this condition is impossible without power and government, and the same can be said about
Jihad, justice, and Haj…cannot be performed without the power of government (Al-Massari
2002, 33).63 For Ibn Taymiyyah the limit of obedience is directly tied to proper implementation
of Sharia. A proper authority requires a standpoint that binds both strong and weak members of a
collectivity. Therefore, the Muslim subject’s quest for salvation, the duty to ordain the good and
forbid evil, is doubly significant; first, it is the authority of Ulu Al Amr that define the scope and
61

 كذلك،  و إنطاع له،  و أطاعه إطاعة،  الن و انقاد:  و طاع يطاع و أطاع:  و قال ابن سيدة...  نقيض الكره:  الطوع: و في لسان العرب
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 أو األمر ذي الوالية،  االستجابة و االنقياد لما يأمر به و ينهى عنه ولي األمر:  و المراد بالطاعة هنا: المعنى اإلصطالحي المراد في البحث
 أو لم يوافقه بشرط أن ال يأمر بمعصية،  سواء أمر بما يوافق الطبع،  و ذلك بإمتثال األمر و النهي دون منازعة و معارضة، الشرعية
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 و كذلك سائر ما أوجبه من الجهاد و العدل و إقامة الحج و،  و ال يتم ذلك بقوة و إمارة، و ألن هللا تعالى أوجب االمر بالمعروف و النهي عن المنكر
الجمع و األعياد و نصر المظلوم و إقامة الحدود ال تتم إال بالقوة و اإلمارة

88

proper actions toward ordaining the “good” and forbidding “evil” especially, in the realm of
governance. Second, Ulu Al Amr, which acts as an executive responsible for the implementation
of Sharia, provides us with the purpose and function of government in Islam. Islam emphasizes
that salvation is primarily achieved through a subject’s good works. The responsibility of
temporal power is to provide the environment where such action can flourish. This characteristic
and function of the state is directly tied to the specificity of the concept of authority, which limits
the scope of obedience to both Ulu Al Amr and temporal power. This dissertation argues that a
clear understanding of the character of authority and obedience is essential in understanding
Islamic legal and political writings. Mahmud Al-Alusi (1802 – 1854 CE) in his commentary on
the Qur’an verse 4:59 states that the meaning of obedience to Ulu Al-Amr is limited to obedience
to God. “Obedience is linked to God and the Prophet and not independent of the injunctions of
the Qur’an and Sunna” (Al-Massari 2002, 35).64 Obedience is limited to what is exoterically
clear in Sharia, to what guarantees salvation in the next world. This fact is illustrated in the
Qur’an, 99:1-8:
When the earth is shaken with its [final] earthquake (1) And the earth discharges its burdens (2)
And man says, "What is [wrong] with it?" (3) That Day, it will report its news (4) Because your
Lord has commanded it. (5) That Day, the people will depart separated [into categories] to be
shown [the result of] their deeds. (6) So whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it, (7)
And whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it. (8)

Accordingly, Muslims and non-Muslims will stand in judgment responsible for their actions in
the temporal world, and only through repentance will their bad deeds be forgiven. These bad
deeds must be followed by good deeds unless physically it is impossible to act accordingly; only
then will intentionality substitute for action.

64

 أما الطاعة في المعصية فقد إتفق أهل العلم على أن الطاعة في المعصية ال تجوز،  و ليست مستقلة، إذن فطاعة أولي األمر تابعة لطاعة هللا و رسوله
كما ذكر النووي في صحيح مسلم
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In sum, according to Sharia, action in the temporal world is the path through which
Muslims achieve salvation. This fact limits obedience simultaneously to arbitrary authority and
temporal power and produces a specific character and arrangement of both authority and
obedience. The Prophet’s Hadith “there is no obedience to a creature of God in disobedience of
the Creator” (Kamali 2002, 24) illustrates the character of authority and obedience. Another
Hadith amplifies the sentiment: “when you see my community afraid of telling a tyrant, ‘O
tyrant’, then it is not worth belonging to it anymore” (Kamali 2002, 24). Clearly these Hadiths
set a limit on the scope of authority and obedience to the expert authority that Ulu Al Amr
historically had. Yet as we moved away from the founding period of the Four Guided Caliphs
emphasis on obedience to authority became prominent. This development was simultaneously
accompanied by a legal emphasis on the concept of the Ammeh (commoners) as subjects whose
duty was the unconditional obedience to Ulu Al Amr and temporal power.
Nevertheless, there are groups of Hadiths that illustrate absolute and unquestionable
obedience to temporal power and Ulu Al Amr, but, according to these same Hadiths, Sharia
limits obedience. Unlimited obedience is demanded, though, in areas where the Qur’an and
Sunna remain silent, and those areas are immense especially in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. It is in
questions about the state or government that the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr is greatest
because neither the Qur’an nor Sunna address those topics. It has been over this matter that
historically Ulu Al Amr divided into at least two groups regarding the limits of temporal power
and government. This division will become more apparent as evidence unfolds that the opposing
the opposite views backed by Hadiths are less significant in Sharia in general while in Al siyasah
al shariah their significance cannot be overemphasized.
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Again, the Hadiths concerned with obedience to authority stand in at least two
oppositional categories, which have historically divided the Ulu Al-Amr. Omotosho argues:
Muslim scholars are divided on the issue. While some of them see the power of “those charged
with authority” (Ulu Al-Amr) as a limited one and therefore object to absolute obedience, others
hold the view that with available Qur’anic evidence and Hadith of the Prophet in support of their
rights, they deserve full and unquestionable obedience.
Their difference seems to have emanated from their understanding of the available references –
Qur’an and Hadith alike. Both Q4:59 and at least six out of the available Hadith ask the faithful
to obey his leader without any condition attached. So, some of the jurists rely on this and
therefore insist that obedience to the instruction of the Ulu Al-Amr is absolute. (3)

Historically, this division over obedience to authority runs up to the present and sometimes
appears within the same schools of Fiqh. For example, among the Salafi/Wahabi schools in
Saudi Arabia, the division is clearly present between the Jamiah Salafism and the Salafi-Jihadi
school. The Salafi-Jihadi holds that Muslims have a duty to correct the actions of temporal
power that contradict Sharia, by force if necessary. Conversely, the Ulu Al-Amr of the Jamiah
Salafism demand absolute and unconditional obedience to temporal power, whether it contradicts
Sharia or not. The division between those who sought to intervene as Muslims in temporal
power versus those granted absolute and unconditional obedience came to the fore during the
First Persian Gulf War (1990-1991). The disagreement was over the role of the United States as
an ally fighting on behalf of the Gulf monarchies against Iraq. While the matter was a blatant
violation of Sharia, nevertheless, the Grand Mufti of the Saudi kingdom emphasized the legality
of the matter and demanded the total obedience of the people to the monarchs in accordance with
Sharia. The Salafi-Jihadi school, in contrast, considered the Fatwa (considered opinion given by
a qualified scholar, i.e., a Mufti) a sign of the corrupt nature of temporal rulers and the
establishment Ulu Al Amr, which was a part of the state bureaucracy and a rubberstamp to
temporal power.
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Second the concept of politics or Al siyasah al shariah in relation to Ulu Al Amr and
Sharia overall has a distinctive relationship to authority and obedience. According to Ilyas
Ahmed:
In Islam, we already know that Law is prior to state, and that there is a perfect sovereignty of Law
which cannot be changed by human hands …Thus it is clear that in Islam the state has never been
an end in itself: it has always been universal in character-not for one nation, but for all men of all
nations and humanity. (481)

Thus, Islamic public and administrative laws temporal laws are the product of human agency in
accordance with the Maslaha or “good” of the community. Al siyasah al shariah plays a
different role and has a different character and domain than in the European tradition. Sharia
which is prior to the state is different from Canon law in that its scope covers both public and
private realms. Therefore, when investigating politics in Islamic legal and political writings the
European conception of the political with its plurality of definitions must be abandoned in favor
of Al siyasah al shariah, which has a stricter scope and meaning in Islamic political and legal
writings. As Ahmed points out, Al siyasah al shariah is directly related to those duties and
obligations that the executive is limited to in implementing Sharia. Al siyasah al shariah is an
entire branch of Fiqh under Sharia and cannot overcome its hegemony. Kamali illustrates this
point:
This [Al siyasah al shar’iyyah] is a broad doctrine of Islamic public law that authorizes rulers and
judges, that is, the Ulu Al –Amr, to determine the manner in which the Sharia should be
administered. A ruler may accordingly take discretionary measures, enact rules and initiate
policies as he deems appropriate in the interests of good government, provided that no substantive
principle of the Sharia is thereby violated. (142)

This means that Al siyasah al shariah can be labeled as public or administrative laws as long as it
remains tied to the principles of Sharia. Thus, politics has never been an independent domain of
Sharia or permanently regulated by an ethical reference point of the Sharia. For example, if we
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can imagine Machiavelli writing in Al siyasah al shariah then his advice to “the prince” must be
according to the ends of Sharia and not primarily to achieve princely power and consequently
stability and peace. In fact, the Realpolitik school of thought contradicts the existence of moral
law. There are periods in history where a ruthless Khalifa is better than a weak and pious
Khalifa. Nevertheless, once the ruthless Khalifa is in power, he must obey Sharia and implement
it according to Ulu Al Amr’s legal interpretation of the law. Ibn Qayyim Al Jawziya (1292-1350
CE) a Sunni Hanbali jurist defined Al siyasah al shariah as “whatever action that orients the
people closer to the good and steers them away from corruption, even if the issue at hand is not
Sunna and Qur’an” (Imarah 1988, 55-56).65 Historically, this definition has achieved consensus
among Sunni Fuqaha but not the Shia who consider obedience to the Imamah (leader of the
Muslim community) an article of faith.
There is more freedom and space for Al siyasah al shariah in Sunni Islam than in Shia
Islam. Unlike in Sunni Islam, the state and the leadership of the community according to Shia
Islam are not a sub branch of Sharia but a primary source of faith. Conversely, in Sunni Islam
because the state and leadership of the community are sub branches of Al siyasah al shariah
there is greater acceptance of disagreement. In brief, Sunni Islam is an outward and public
oriented religion; yet neither the Qur’an nor Sunna entail or promote a specific form of
government. Overall, the Sharia restricts and set limitations to all forms of government that
developed historically in Sunni Islam.
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،  و دور الجهد البشري في صنع السياسة، ) الذي يحدد لنا معنى الشريعة١٣٥١-١٢٩٢ هـ١٥١-١٩١ ( و من هؤالء األئمة االمام ابن قيم الجوزية
 ( بكسر الحاء و-  مبناها و أساسها على الحكم:  ( إن الشريعة:  يقول، التي هي جزء من الشريعة إذا كانت محققة ل مصالح النا و مقررة للعدل بينهم
 ما كان من األفعال بحيث يكون النا معه أقرب إلى الصالح و أبعد عن: و السياسة...  و مصالح العباد- )  أي الحكمة و العلة و السبب، فتح الكاف
 و ان لم يشرعه الرسول و ال نزل به وحي، الفساد
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Furthermore, Abu Hamid Al Ghazali (1058-1111 CE) argued that “the theory of the
Imamah is not a foundational part of the faith; instead, it is secondary, a branch, and, therefore, it
is in the domain of Fiqh a subject to deliberation” (Imarah 1988, 52-53).66 The state and
leadership of the community and forms of government are not in the domain of faith so long as
they do not contradict the principles of Sharia. It is precisely over issues of state and leadership
where disagreements may arise because primary sources are mute. The authority of Ulu Al Amr,
and the unchecked authority of the expert, trumps temporal power and is a source of legitimacy.
Historically, temporal power has struggled to control and to shift the type of authority that
emphasizes correct action in accordance with Sharia to a type of authority that emphasizes
obedience to temporal power.
For Muslims, the state and governance are executive tools to achieve what is in accord
with the ends of the law. Most important, the state and leadership posts were established in early
Islam as tools to implement Sharia and protect the faith from external attacks by neighboring
states. Thus, “Islam as a religion, belief, and Sharia including the foundational five pillars of the
faith, plus the Qur’an and Sunna all are Divine injunctions and no believer can claim the
contrary. But Islam as a religion never ordained a particular system of government due to the
logic that Islam is applicable regardless of time and space. Therefore, the constant evolving
human mind is entrusted to construct systems of governments according to benefit of the
collective and in accordance to the general principles of the faith” (Imarah 1988, 53-54).67
66

67

 بل من الفقهيات،  و ليست من فن المعقوالت فيها،  ليست من المهمات. إن نظرية اإلمامة: يكرر الغزالي هذا المعنى فيقول

 و بسنته التشريعية التي بلغ بها الرسول عليه الصالة و،  و بأركانه الخمسة التي بني عليها و بكتابه المعجز-  عقيدة و شريعة-  كدين، إن اإلسالم
 لكن االسالم كدين.. )  و لي لمؤمن أن يدعي أن شيئا من ذلك هو من (وضع االنسان، )  إن ذلك كله ( وضع إلهي.. السالم تفصيالت ما أجمله الوحي
 الن منطق صالحية الدين اإلسالمي لكل زمان و مكان يقتضي ترك النظم المتجددة قطعا بحكم التطور للعقل،  لم يحدد للمسلمين نظاما محددا للحكم،
 و في إطار الوصايا العامة و القواعد الكلية التي قررها هذا الدين،  يصوغها وفق مصلحة المجموع، اإلنساني الرشيد
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Historically, the evolution of Fiqh al siyash al shariah led to a gradual increase in
obedience to temporal power and the state and underlay the original purpose that the state and
temporal power were assigned to serve. This evolution will become clearer in chapters four and
five. This evolutionary shift entailed a change in expert authority from one that emphasized right
action in accordance with Al siyasah al shariah to one that emphasized obedience in the name of
Maslaha of the Umma, particularly obedience to temporal power, over actions of ordaining the
“good” and forbidding “evil.” A good example is the marginalization of the Muslim subject’s
role in the Bay’a by gradually making it exclusive among few people to legitimize temporal
power rule.
It is precisely in the area of governance that Fiqh al siyasah al shariah can accommodate
the different views regarding who can legally govern the Umma without violating the principles
of Sharia. It is in this realm that the authority of Ulu Al Amr is at its peak. Consequently, they
historically possessed the authority to demarcate the parameters of debates and struggles on
which type of government and political organization best served the implementation of Sharia
and the good of the Umma (the people or community of Islam). Imarah argues that the “omission
of details regarding governance, politics, and the state from the Qur’an is intentional” (54).68 As
a result, Al siyasah al shariah is a flexible field shaped by human reason in accordance to the
Maslaha of the Umma. The authority of Ulu Al Amr in this realm decides the exception which
cast a particular and central character to Sunni form of authority.
The character of Ulu Al Amr authority in the realm of Al siyasah al shariah differs from
its authority in the realm of Sharia. Ulu Al Amr’s flexibility and freedom in the former are much
68

و نحن نعتقد أن صمت القرآن الكريم عن تفصيل نظم الحكم و السياسة للمسلمين هو موقف إلهي مقصود
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wider and allow for personal views and interests to be expressed. Consequently, Ulu Al Amr
were able to widen the scope of Al siyasah al shariah, and Al siyasah al shariah evolved into a
branch of Fiqh. Kamali provides an account of the wide scope of Al siyasah al shariah arguing
that:
Siyasah in its widest sense has five purposes: the protection of faith, life, intellect, lineage, and
property. The “uluma” are unanimous on the point that the protection of these values constitutes
the ultimate objective of Sharia itself, despite the fact that a specific reference to this group of
values can be found neither in the Qur’an nor in Sunna. General consensus (ijma) on the
protection of these values is not based on any particular provision of the Qur’an or Sunna, but on
the overall contents of these source-texts and on the numerous commands and prohibitions that
are designed to protect these values. The same can be said of the Qur’anic verses that enjoin on
the community the pursuit of good and prevention of evil. Good and evil are nowhere listed
exhaustively in the Qur’an or Sunna, but can be known through a general investigation of these
sources. (146)

This passage demonstrates the elasticity of the scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr over Al siyasah
al shariah, which covers and defines Sharia itself.
It is important at this point to state that the above evidence and arguments present a
challenge to the academic literature that applies the term fundamentalism equally to Islam and
other religions. It overlooks local historical, legal and geographical configurations. This
academic genre must answer the question of how religions across time and space share the same
internal operational configurations and dynamic. The aim here is to emphasize the argument of
the dissertation that while religion across time and space has universal characteristics; its
particular configurations in any given time and space produce different systems of meaning and
signification. Karl Lowith demonstrates in the following quotation the particular internal
configurations of Western systems of meaning that remain Jewish and Christian in character; he
states:
We of today concerned with the unity of universal history and with its progress toward an
ultimate goal or at least toward a “better world,” are still in the line of prophetic and messianic
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monotheism; we are still Jews and Christians, however little we may think of ourselves in those
terms. But within this predominant tradition we are also the heirs of classic wisdom. We are in the
line of classical polytheism when we are concerned with the plurality of various cultures as such,
exploring with boundless curiosity the whole natural and historical world for the sake of
disinterested knowledge which is quite untouched by any interest in redemption. (19)

This argument is doubly important; first is the idea that contemporary political concepts
ultimately have their roots in religion, which shapes the internal character and configuration of
contemporary secular concepts. As such, the academic’s use of the universal concept of
fundamentalism becomes problematic because it refers to notions of obedience to authority that
is local to Western systems of meaning. Second, that Islam today exists in a world
hegemonically dominated by Western standards of morality and human rights results in political
questions about the compatibility of Islam with modernity and democracy. Western critiques
overlook the historical roots of Islam in their contemporary context or assume that they do not
exist.
Lowith’s argument is directly tied to contemporary debates on revolutions in Tunisia,
Yemen, Libya, and Egypt, the so-called “Arab Spring.” For example, the ideological division
between the Islamist and secular political parties over the draft of constitutions in both Tunisia
and Egypt has its roots in the Sunni authority versus European sovereignty ideological division.
As a matter of fact, the collapse of political dialogue in both countries has led to massive
demonstrations and violence on the streets and in public squares by Islamists, secular forces, and
counter-revolutionary forces of the old regimes. In Egypt, the conflicts eventually led to the 3rd
of July coup.
The gridlock between the two sides is directly tied to the Islamic legal conception of
authority and its manifestation, obedience in relation to secular modernity. The conflict has its
roots in the Islamic concept of authority and the historical Western conception of sovereignty.
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The two concepts give us various subjectivities on how modernity, freedom, autonomy, and
citizenship are constituted and dispensed. This gap between Western sovereignty and Sunni
authority at the conceptual level is presently overlooked due to the absence of political language
on both sides that can facilitate and allow for a democratic dialogue. The “Arab Spring” abrupt
arrival exposed the absence and lack of political language on both sides that enable a successful
transition to democratic governance. Similarly, the ideological division over the role of Islam in
public life is clear in public and social media, which believe that they hold irreconcilable
worldviews. This impasse is a hallmark of colonialism, which hegemonically introduced and
nurtured intellectuals who adopted modern subjectivities without democratic debates with those
representing local political and social structures. Similarly, Islamic political and legal writings
made little effort to address the modern European idea of sovereignty, which is at the core of the
institution of the modern nation-state, civil rights, and liberties. Secular forces suspect that
political Islam in its haste to reject Western subjectivities and modernity has also rejected basic
principles of freedom and equality. Behind the tension between political Islam and secular forces
are two causes. The first is the absence of political language on both sides that can allow for a
common platform to be achieved. Instead, all political parties are focusing on the political action
level of elections and organizing on the ground or looking of alliances that could advance there
electoral gains. The second is tied to historical resistance to colonialism and the arrival of
modernity and the modern state. This is the central topic of chapter five.
The abrupt arrival of the revolutions took everyone by surprise and made plain that
theoretical dialogues between both sides were nonexistent. The lack of dialogue was due to the
historical role and success of the old regimes in pitting the two groups against one another so that
any possible coalition to challenge the status quo would be impossible. The old regimes’ strategy
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was carried out at every political and societal level including in education, the media, the
economy, and legal system.

This brings us to the second cause which is tied to colonialism, modernity, and local
resistance. The violent military imposition of the modern state and with it the values of European
modernity have created an intellectual split in the postcolonial intelligentsia. On the one hand,
local intellectuals adopted Western subjectivities such as nationalism, and on the other hand,
Muslim intellectuals produced an Islamic discourse that rejected European Western subjectivities
as a toxic influence on the Muslim world. The main character of this split is the exclusionary
discourse between those who adopted Western subjectivities and those who hold the Sharia as
the main shield protecting the Umma from the intellectual hegemony of the West. A good
example of the new sovereignty and the nation-state project is the role Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of
Turkey and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran had in reconstituting local subjectivities into
Western colonial subjectivities and identities similar subjectivities and identities. They swept
away local legal codes and subjectivities by force to clear the way for Western sovereignty and
subjectivities. Historically, political Islam resisted the process of physically and intellectually
Westernizing Muslim values. During the period of resistance to colonial European powers,
secularists who were part of the resistance viewed the Caliphate and Islamists as symbols of
weakness tied to decline and colonization by European powers.
Similarly, today, secularists view contemporary Islamic political parties as hijackers of
the revolution who want to prevent the values of modernity, the Enlightenment, and human
rights from taking root in Tunisia and Egypt. This dynamic will be developed in the final
chapter, which deals with the modern state and this dialectic between both sides. But for the time
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being, it is important to emphasize that the gridlock that followed the Arab Spring is due to a
lack of theoretical debates about Western sovereignty and Islamic conceptions of authority and
obedience.

Let us now turn the focus of the chapter on the concept of obedience as a manifestation of
authority. It is also important to reiterate the idea stated earlier, mainly that authority is different
from power, which requires coercion or the threat of force to secure obedience. While obedience
in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah is obedience to expert opinion, authority emanates from the
same source that guides individuals’ moral standards. This moral standard acts like a glue that
holds collectivities together and makes their existence as voluntary associations possible.
Obedience takes the character of acting in accordance with what is moral and rightful.
What is more important is that concepts of authority and obedience have a religious
character and belong to the subject of political theology. The internal character of both concepts
has its roots in religious experience. This dissertation argues that the political concepts of
authority, obedience, freedom, autonomy, and human rights are characteristically Christian in
their configurations, operation, and character. Carl Schmitt argues this point:
all significant concepts of the modern theory of state are secularized theological concepts not only
because of their historical development—in which they were transformed from theology to the
theory of state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but
also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological
consideration of the concepts. (36)

Similarly, this dissertation argues that both authority and obedience in Sunni systems of meaning
have Islamic characteristics that are still operative today but, as chapter five demonstrates, under
the sovereignty of the modern nation-state. This condition is due to the colonization of the
Muslim empires and the imposition of the modern states structure by force and legally via
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international law. This dissertation maintains that the best place to map the genealogical
difference of these concepts, at least in the case of the three monotheist religions, is “the Fall” of
Adam.
The account of the Fall that is shared among the three monotheist religions is also the
point where the religions develop different roots, take various directions, and give us
heterogeneous political theologies and different subjectivities. While there are many themes in
the sacred texts that lead to fruitful insights, this dissertation asserts that each account of the Fall
of Adam is significant due to its direct relation and influence on the concepts of the proper forms
of authority and obedience. After all, the three monotheist religions hold that Adam was cast out
of Heaven after the Fall, hence populating the Earth. The different accounts of the Fall shaped
political concepts and are still with us today in the Western tradition whose secular discourse has
its roots in theology.
It is important to state here that my aim is not to reduce Western thought into essential
characters and qualities. Instead, I intend to demonstrate that heterogeneous cultures and
subcultures within the West are a testament to the endless varieties and creative differences that
spring from the same genealogical roots. What I propose here is to refer to the a priori
assumptions that operate in these systems of meaning. Most relevant to this investigation is the
theological account of the Fall that is at the core of authority, obedience, freedom, autonomy,
progress, and human rights in general. According to Karl Lowith:
one must ultimately refer back to this idea of man if the “sociological” investigations of Weber
and Marx are to be understood in their fundamental and radical significance. “To be radical is to
grasp things by the root. But for man the root is man himself.” The radically thisworldly view of
man expressed here is a presupposition for both Marx and Weber.
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“Man, who has found in a fantastic reality of heaven, where he sought a supernatural being, only
his own reflection, will no longer be tempted to find only semblance of himself—a non-humanbeing—where he seeks and must seek his true reality” (Marx). (42-43)

Thus, while the genealogical roots of “what a person is” share the same reference points for
Marx and Weber, the two theoretical views are quite different, and their theorists produced
different explanations and analyses of capitalism. Similarly, the same dynamic applies to Islamic
legal and political writings. Consequently, the argument here is that theological accounts of the
Fall in the Qur’an have a direct influence on how authority and obedience are constituted and
framed and produce various subjectivities in Islam. It is precisely the influence of the conception
of a person in the Islamic narrative in general and in Sunni Islam in particular that renders
European sovereignty alien to Islam’s system of meaning and signification.
Let us now examine theological accounts of the Fall in the Qur’an. First, the Qur’an
provides us with a narrative of a dialogue between God and the Angels regarding knowledge of
“Adam’s Fall” before the event took place. The Qur’an narrates the Fall as follow:
And [mention, O Muhammad], when your Lord said to the angels, "Indeed, I will make upon the
earth a successive authority." They said, "Will You place upon it one who causes corruption
therein and sheds blood, while we declare Your praise and sanctify You?" Allah said, "Indeed, I
know that which you do not know. 2:30

The significance of such an account is that even though it was known by God according to the
verse before Adam was created that the Fall was imminent, Adam was still created. The purpose
of this act is for Adam and his descendants to become the “successive authority” on earth to
carry and implement God’s law. A “successive authority” means to be God’s Khalif on earth.
The following four verses reveal other reasons behind that act of creation:
And He taught Adam the names - all of them. Then He showed them to the angels and said,
"Inform Me of the names of these, if you are truthful." 2:31
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They said, "Exalted are You; we have no knowledge except what You have taught us. Indeed, it
is You who is the Knowing, the Wise." 2:32
He said, "O Adam, inform them of their names." And when he had informed them of their names,
He said, "Did I not tell you that I know the unseen [aspects] of the heavens and the earth? And I
know what you reveal and what you have concealed." 2:33
And [mention] when We said to the angels, "Prostrate before Adam"; so they prostrated, except
for Iblees (devil). He refused and was arrogant and became of the disbelievers. 2:34

Thus, unlike the Christian accounts, knowledge is not the product of the Fall but the reason that,
despite murder and bloodshed, Adam was created. It is not helpful to apply our understanding of
knowledge on these verses. Knowledge here has a particular context regarding the ability to
discern right from wrong, and to seek knowledge as an attribute is more important than the
capability to kill and shed blood. Consequently, this particular account of knowledge describes
the constitution of human nature in Islam. This idea has double significance when it comes to the
relationship between knowledge and action after the Fall. The verses that follow give us an
important account regarding the nature of Adam and Eve’s being:
And We said, "O Adam, dwell, you and your wife, in Paradise and eat therefrom in [ease and]
abundance from wherever you will. But do not approach this tree, lest you be among the
wrongdoers." 2:35
But Satan caused them to slip out of it and removed them from that [condition] in which they had
been. And We said, "Go down, [all of you], as enemies to one another, and you will have upon
the earth a place of settlement and provision for a time." 2:36

The materiality of existence is already in the original state in which Adam and Eve were created.
Their material body is not a product of the Fall. The duality of existence between the spiritual
and the physical is absent from this account of Adam. This narrative contrasts with the Christian
account of the original state of creation, which is spiritual. In Islam the meaning of heaven is not
limited to an eternal and ethereal Godly bliss, but it also includes the enjoyment of eternal
rewards and an abundance of physical pleasures. This includes sex, food, and eternal youth and
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beauty. This dissertation argues that the dualistic approach is absent in the Islamic orientation
toward being and politics due to the absence of “original sin.” Therefore, “unlike Christianity,
where original sin precludes salvation without God’s grace, here each person’s nature enables
her to act in ways that merits God’s grace” (Gould 2008, 4).
Most important, in Islam, the Fall never damaged human nature. The following verses
illustrate this account:
Then Adam received from his Lord [some] words, and He accepted his repentance. Indeed, it is
He who is the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful. 2:37
We said, "Go down from it, all of you. And when guidance comes to you from Me, whoever
follows My guidance - there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve. 2:38

These verses assume a certain type of human nature that gives rise to subjectivities that are
different in character and configurations than in Western political and social writings. More
precisely, what we are investigating here is how Christian and Islamic political theologies frame
the original state of the subject.
In Islam the symbolic and the biological were not remained severed forever due to their
immaterial sovereignty. Accordingly, symbolic (God) never took the form of flesh in Islam or
interfered in the biological realm of existence. The physical body of a king or a priest remains
worldly and profane in Sunni Islam and does not share any divine qualities. Consequently,
institutions as well remain profane and lack divine or supernatural qualities that require
obedience. On the contrary, institutions of Caliphate and Ulu Al Amr remain profane, limited to
authority over expert knowledge. The sovereign remains in heaven, never descending in the flesh
to earth, rendering all institutions profane, and preventing the figure of a sovereign from
appearing in Sunni Islam. The following verse in the Qur’an demonstrates the idea:
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Say, "O Allah, Owner of Sovereignty, You give sovereignty to whom You will and You take
sovereignty away from whom You will. You honor whom You will and You humble whom You
will. In Your hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all things competent.3:26

God (the symbolic) never stepped into the biological realm; thus, the flesh or blood remained
profane in significance limiting claims to the divine right to rule. Thus, temporal power never
possessed a divine quality in Sunni Islam. Furthermore, the Qur’an implores: “Say, ‘He is Allah,
[who is] One, Allah, the Eternal Refuge, He neither begets nor is born, Nor is there to Him any
equivalent” (112:1-4). This account of sovereignty has prevented a similar sovereign in Western
legal and political sense from emerging in Islamic political and legal writings. The idea that God
is the only sovereign means sovereignty has always remained in the symbolic realm and never
taken on a physical reality. Accordingly, obedience to temporal authority must be limited to the
expert model. “Hence, the real question which is being asked by who wishes to question
authority is not ‘Why should I obey?’ but ‘Why should I agree?’ It is the capacity for reasoning
or, more precisely put the capacity for reasoned elaboration of communication matters”
(Friedrich 1972, 53). This is precisely why chapter one rejected the focus on sovereignty in Islam
for a focus on Ulu Al Amr. The scope of authority and obedience to Ulu Al Amr has historically
remained at the level of the expert over esoteric knowledge.

The argument here is not to set up a political theology in Islam in binary opposition to
Christianity’s. Instead, the argument here is to underline the problems that arise from using
political concepts without investigating their internal configurations and historical dynamics in
different systems of meaning. For example, Marcuse gives us an account of Protestant Christian
conceptions of authority and freedom on Earth, which later become the foundation of bourgeois
concepts of freedom. He argues:
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Man is embedded in a system of earthly order which by no means corresponds to the fundamental
teachings of Christianity. This contradiction provides a function for “double morality” as
combined with the sharp distinction between the “Christian” and the worldly human existence,
between “Christian” morality, and “external morality, which is the motive force in offices and
works.” The former refers only to the “inner” man: his “inner” freedom and equality, his “inner”
poverty, love and happiness (as its clearest in Luther’s interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount,
1530). The “external” order, on the other hand, is measured completely by the rules to which
praxis and works are subjected when taken in isolation from the person. It is very characteristic
that here- in accordance with the idea of praxis as the discipline and service performed by an
utterly sinful existence the earthly order appears essentially as a system of “authorities” and
“offices,” as an order of universal subordination, and that these authorities and offices in turn
essentially appear under the sign of the sword.” (15-16)

This type of obedience to temporal authority has a specific worldview regarding earthly
existence that has its roots in the Christian account of the Fall. But I think that the split between
heaven/earth in the above account is to some extent contradicted by the political theology of the
Christian God’s son as God in the flesh, on earth. “This thought reappears in a secularized form
in Kant: man’s freedom as a rational being can only be ‘saved’ if as a sensual being he is entirely
abandoned to natural necessity” (Marcuse 2008, 8). Consequently, the logic of the contemporary
political concepts of human rights of freedom and autonomy follows a similar line. The logic of
the dual existence of the self versus temporal world is absent in Islam with the exception of some
of the schools of Sufism. The temporal world is the place to achieve salvation, which takes place
without the guidance of a church or clergy. Earthly existence underlies the logic of salvation,
authority, and obedience in Islam. Consider the following verses, which make the point that
authority is not absolute and the subject is held accountable to praxis or deeds in accordance with
Sharia:
And [yet], among the people are those who take other than Allah as equals [to Him]. They love
them as they [should] love Allah . But those who believe are stronger in love for Allah . And if
only they who have wronged would consider [that] when they see the punishment, [they will be
certain] that all power belongs to Allah and that Allah is severe in punishment. 2:65
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[And they should consider that] when those who have been followed disassociate themselves
from those who followed [them], and they [all] see the punishment, and cut off from them are the
ties [of relationship], 2:66
Those who followed will say, "If only we had another turn [at worldly life] so we could
disassociate ourselves from them as they have disassociated themselves from us." Thus will Allah
show them their deeds as regrets upon them. And they are never to emerge from the Fire. 2:67

Accordingly and contrary to the Christian account of the Fall, in Sunni Islam people are assumed
to have a sound nature and knowledge and able to make sound judgments regarding obedience to
authority. Thus, obedience on Earth is not absolute since praxis is ultimately what achieves
salvation. Therefore, praxis in accordance with Sharia guarantees salvation. Sayyid Qutb argues
that this is actually the foundation of monotheism, which is to follow one law that is above
people and does not enslave one group to the other. He writes:
Indeed, He knows that there is no other way. The way is not to free earth from Roman and
Persian tyranny in order to replace it with Arab tyranny. All tyranny is wicked! The earth belongs
to God and should be purified for God, and it cannot be purified for him unless the banner “No
deity except God,” is unfurled across the earth. Man is servant to God alone and he can remain so
only if he unfurls the banner, “No deity except God—“La ilaha illa Allah”—as an Arab with the
knowledge of his language understood it: no sovereignty except God’s, no law except from God,
and no authority of one man over another as the authority in all respects belong to God, The
“grouping” of men which Islam proclaims is based on this faith alone, the faith in which all
peoples of any race or color—Arabs, Romans or Persians—are equal under the banner of God.
(26)

This quote presents us with an account of authority and obedience that produces different
accounts of subjectivities and new views about freedom of the subject and the limits of
obedience to authority. Accordingly, only by submitting themselves to God, can Muslim subjects
actually be free, meaning that subjugation is as an act of free will, a conversion that one has
chosen to impose on oneself. The collective that adheres to Sharia cannot subjugate others nor
can individuals subjugate others. This verse from the Qur’an illustrates the idea:
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And Satan will say when the matter has been concluded, "Indeed, Allah had promised you the
promise of truth. And I promised you, but I betrayed you. But I had no authority over you except
that I invited you, and you responded to me. So do not blame me; but blame yourselves. I cannot
be called to your aid, nor can you be called to my aid. Indeed, I deny your association of me [with
Allah ] before. Indeed, for the wrongdoers is a painful punishment." 14:22

Thus, obeying laws that contradict the Sharia is a voluntary act by which the subject is held
accountable and judged. Every act is judged according to adherence to the law. According to the
Qur’an:
So whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it. And whoever does an atom's weight of evil
will see it. 99:7-8

This type of judgment emphasizes praxis and simultaneously limits the scope of earthly power,
authority, and obedience. Obedience that is tied to praxis guarantees the achievement of
salvation and sets limitations on temporal power political control. Therefore, the word “freedom”
never received attention similar to that paid it in Western political thought, meaning that for a
Muslim to follow God’s law is to be free from arbitrary earthly laws. Freedom or liberty has
never been a central theme in Islamic Fiqh because obedience to God’s Law addresses the same
concerns that the concept of freedom does in Western political writings. Montgomery-Watt
echoes the argument:
freedom has never has any place in Islamic thought. There is a word for freedom, namely
hurriyyah, but this refers to the condition of the freemen (hurr) as contrasted with the slave
(‘abd). ..despite such points, however, it seems likely that there is a combination of ideas
somewhere in Islamic thought, which performs much the same function as the concept of
freedom does in the West. (Kamali 2002, 8)

Yet, his argument overlooks possibilities that may arise if the concepts of Hurr and Abd are
scrutinized linguistically in relation to one another before and after the advent of Islam.
At this point I would like to warren the reader that this chapter and the subsequent one
rely heavily on the writing of Hakim Al-Mutairi who is contemporary Kuwaiti Salafi Islamic
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thinker and political activist and a member of Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma al-Islami). Through
his party he is aiming to reform the Kuwaiti monarchy, hoping to bring about constitutional
changes that limit monarchical power in government and politics. The justification of choosing
Al-Mutairi’s work is the relevance of his research to the topic of this dissertation. As a Salafi he
belongs to the most orthodox schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Accordingly, he is expected to be
the least critical of Islamic traditional legal sources and the Sharia .Yet, his work is primarily on
freedom from tyranny and autonomy of the Muslim subject. Accordingly, his research is ideal
for the purpose of demonstrating how local qualities of freedom and equality framed and argued
in Sunni Islam context.

Al-Mutairi argues that “Hurr (freedom) in classical Arabic and the language of the
Qur’an has a wider meaning than the Western and contemporary use of the term. In the Arabic
tongue, Hurr (free) is the opposite of Abd (slave) and Tahreer (to free) a child is by raising him
obedient to God” (b).69 Accordingly, freedom is not an act to possess an object or achieve a
desire. Moreover, freedom is not to act or think without a constraint. Instead, freedom is a
characteristic that a person may or may not possess. Instead, Al-Mutairi argues that “the free
person (Hurr) is the highest in honor and the best among his/her people and the most honest and
generous regardless of wealth” (b).70 This means a person who holds this character is a person
who is free to keep a promise and act according to these treats without fear of consequences.
Such a person has no master but her/himself. Accordingly, being free is an innate quality that
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 ففي، غير ان للحرية ف ي لغة العرب و لغة القران معنى أشمل و أرحب يختلف اختالفا جذريا عن معناها في الثقافة الغربية األوروبية التي تشيع اليوم
 أن يفرده لطاعة هللا:  و تحرير الولد، لسان العرب الحر نقيض العبد
70

 و الحر من كل شي أعتقه أي أكرمه و أجوده و أحسنه،  و حرية العرب أشرفهم، خيارهم و أفاضلهم

الحر من النا
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flows in the opposite direction of the material environment; from an inward to outward direction.
Therefore, the Hurr label holds more than the quality of being physically free, for a person can
be free but act in a slavish manner. Thus, being free requires action in accordance with the
collective standard of being Hurr. This description of the freedom is before the advent of Islam
and after Islam the qualities of freedom are emphasized further by God and revelation. AlMutairi claims that to be free is “to be free from the enslavement of other. Thus, whoever obeys
other next to God; he is an idol worshiper of that person whether that person is a king or
clergyman” (b-g).71 Conversely, the word Abd (slave) has the opposite connotation since by
definition a person who is a slave is unable to act according to his/her own innate character. So a
person can be a slave to material conditions if it prevents her innate moral character from being
expressed. Hence, a free person is one who shapes the environment and not shaped by it.
However, historically Ulu Al-Amr in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah emphasized less this
character of freedom and demanded obedience form the Muslim subject in in accordance to
Maslaha. This idea is illustrated in chapters two, four, and five.
This is the logic behind the argument that Islam has equalized relationships between the
master and the slave. Sharia holds both master and slave are equal in value and legally both must
obey Sharia. Of course, this argument has to answer many questions and concerns regarding the
institution of slavery in general, but that is not the aim of this investigation. Here we are
concerned with authority and obedience, which are never absolute in a master-slave relationship.
Thus, one who acts in accordance with Sharia is the Hurr, and one who follows the law of
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 كالملوك و،  سواء صرفها لألوثان البشرية،  فمن بذل طاعته و خضع لغير هللا فهو عبد لمن صرف له طاعته، تحرر االنسان من عبودية غير هللا
رجال الدين
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another person is a slave to that person. As a matter of fact a Muslim cannot be a Muslim unless
she accepts Islam as a free act. Consider the following verse one more time:
There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear
from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in Allah has grasped the most
trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. 2:253

Faith secures freedom from arbitrary laws by temporal power. And the free act of becoming a
Muslim, a necessary condition, ensures action in accordance with the standard of the religion and
gives legal legitimacy to acts of resistance. The freedom from being ruled by the laws of other
persons was the ethos of pre-Islamic Arabia and remained so in a different context after the
advent of Islam. It is these types of relationships between authority and obedience that temporal
power has historically struggled to change. In manipulating Ulu Al-Amr, it has sought to
emphasize obedience to temporal power over action.
In sum, we have established in this chapter the local and particular legal characteristics
of authority and obedience in Sunni Islam. Sunni Islam has a universal character that is present in
all collectivities whether theologically sacred or profane and secular. Its most important
universal character is obedience to a set of rules that Sharia represents as “good” and avoidance
of others that are “bad or evil.” Universally, rules and some basic agreement on the “good” are
necessary for a collectivity to come into existence. It is hard to conceive of a collectivity that
does not follow some general rules or laws that allow for the constitution of meaningful relations
and interactions among its members. Consequently, members of a collectivity must obey at least
a minimal set of rules that govern the collective. Logically, an agency must hold authority to
enforce a collectivity’s rules. Therefore, some type of obedience to authority is a universal
quality that is present in every collectivity.
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This dissertation argues that these universal characteristics of authority and obedience
exist in every collectivity across time and space, but to understand how authority and obedience
operate one must account for the local legal, social, and political frames of a collective setting. In
the context of Western European history, authority and obedience evolved into the legal principle
of sovereignty, which is currently a basic principle of international law. Only by understanding
the religious roots of contemporary Western secular states can the sovereignty of the nation state
and the people be grasped.
Similarly, authority and obedience in Sunni Islam have a local and particular quality that
allows for the universal characteristics to operate coherently. This chapter has established that
Fiqh al siyash al shariah in Sunni Islam has evolved from the authority of Ulu Al Amr as a body
of legal experts. Legally, Ulu Al Amr in Sunni Islam are profane in character and lack divine or
supernatural qualities in understanding and speaking on behalf of the text. They are learned
expert judges who gain their authority from other judges by recognition of their grasp of the
subject matter. Consequently, obedience in Sunni Islam is limited to Sharia that instructs how to
ordain the “good” and to forbid “evil.” Moreover, because the Muslim subject achieves salvation
through praxis and not grace obedience to authority is limited to the understanding the legal
injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunna. Authority in Sunni Islam lacks supernatural qualities. As a
result, challengers who understand sacred texts differently subject the Ulu Al Amr to constant
scrutiny and limitation.
The highest degree of obedience to the authority of Ulu Al Amr in Sunni is in the realm of
Fiqh al siyash al shariah. This legal branch of Sharia evolved to accommodate political change
through the historical sediment of legal opinions according to Maslaha. The central role of Ulu
Al Amr, a profane authority, regulates Muslim obedience to temporal power, be it a city state,
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dynastic empire, principality, or finally the modern sovereign nation-state. It is the combination
of expertise in Sharia and the evolution of Fiqh al siyash al shariah that provides the basis for
legal opinions that other experts can use to achieve Ijma regarding new legal matters.
Historically, temporal power was able to extract obedience from Muslim subjects or the Umma
via the legal legitimacy Ulu Al Amr had over the text and over political and legal issues, such as
the form of government, which had no reference in the Qur’an or Sunna. Empires and other
forms of government were toppled on the legal claim that they had no legitimacy. They lacked
legitimacy because the Ulu Al Amr at the time were corrupt and had lost their authority due to
unlimited legal accommodations to temporal powers that were viewed as corrupt.
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CHAPTER IV
Ulu Al Amr, Temporal Power and Wilayah al Ahed

Nearly two decades after accession to power, the emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin
Khalifa Al Thani was set to hand control of a transformed country to his son and heir apparent
Sheikh Tamim (Aljazeera 24 June 2013). Tamim was to receive Wilayah al ahed from his father
in the year 2003 (Aljazeera 24 June 2013). The historic event signified the legal continuation of
concept that appeared in the history of Islam in the year 56 AH (676 CE) and still provide the
legal foundation today for all Arab monarchies. As Al-Mawardi (972-1058 CE) relates,
“Imamate comes exists in two manners: the first by election of those in social power and
influence and the second by the delegation of the previous Imam” (Al-Mawardi 2005, 12).
Wilayah al ahed is the Arabic term for “delegation of power” in Fiqh al siyash al shariah.
This chapter focuses on the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed to demonstrate the
particularities and unique character in the Islamic legal conception of temporal power. More
important, it further clarifies the historical role of Ulu Al Amr’s authority in providing
governmental legitimacy in Islam. Neither the Qur’an nor Sunna provides any reference to the
type of government or means through which temporal power is delegated from one person to
another. Fulfilling this task falls to the authority of Ulu Al Amr.

I would like to start with preliminary remarks regarding the use of the historical method.
Since this chapter relies extensively on historical events that have legal consequences for the
development of Fiqh, I will clarify how this historical record is treated as evidence. First, the
record’s authenticity is of secondary importance. I am unconcerned with questions of historical
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authenticity but intend to investigate the historical layers of legal discourse of Fiqh that are
accepted by Muslim intellectuals and jurists who abide by Fiqh and constitute Islam’s
“tradition.” This means that whatever the Ulu Al Amr has considered legally binding through
Ijma is treated by this dissertation as valid evidence. Hence, the focus here is on how Fiqh
evolved as a foundational tradition for the development of legal rulings. This includes the
historical evolution of the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed, which later morphed into Wlayah
al qaher.
An example that elucidates the method above is the statement of the Grand Imam of AlAzhar of Egypt Ahmed El-Tayeb. On the 30th of June 2013 he provided legal legitimacy to the
military coup that ousted President Morsi of Egypt claiming it was the lesser of two evils. This
lesser evil is founded in the principle of Fiqh whereby ousting a legitimate president can be
justified to prevent the greater evil of civil war and bloodshed. In other words, Wlayah al qaher
legally binds the Umma to obey whoever usurped the state by force since obedience of the
community ideally would prevent further bloodshed. As such, whether the foundational principle
in early Islam is authentic or not is unimportant. What is important is that such a principle
remains legally valid in Fiqh in 2013. Regardless of the criticism that the Grand Imam received
for arriving at his Fatwa, my aim is to demonstrate the traditional basis for contemporary law.

Before discussing the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed—the delegation of power—it is
beneficial for the sake of clarity to investigate Al siyash al shariah, a subfield of Fiqh and the
locus of the historical development and evolution of Wilayah al ahed. Wilayah al ahed is shaped
by the general principles of Sharia. Meaning, Al siyash al shariah is a subfield that is governed
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by Sharia’s overall objectives, limited by it. Once this clarification is achieved, it easier to follow
the historical evolution of the principle of Wilayah al ahed in Fiqh. According to John Esposito:
In its broad scope, Shariah-oriented public policy (siyasah shariyyah) authorizes government
leaders to conduct government affairs in harmony with the spirit and purpose of the Shariah, even
at the expense of a temporary departure from its specific rules. The two most important objectives
of this policy are the realization of social benefit and the prevention of evil. Shariah-oriented
policy is an instrument of good government, and it applies both within and outside the parameters
of the established Shariah, although some ulama have held that there is no policy outside the
Shariah itself. (143)

Accordingly, Al siyash al shariah is an instrument for the realization of Sharia and a subfield of
Fiqh that historically elevated Ulu Al Amr authority as the ultimate source of legitimacy of
temporal power. Furthermore, Esposito’s account of Al siyash al shariah is comprehensive but
lacks the agency that is in charge of implementing the standard of the “government affairs in
harmony with the spirit and purpose of the Shariah” (143). Hence, this dissertation argues that
historically Ulu Al Amr’s authority provided the legitimacy to temporal power according to the
Sharia and sometimes beyond it. Even though, historically there was a lack of consensus
regarding the legal capacity of Ulu Al Amr to depart from Sharia. This lack of consensus was
clear in chapter one regarding the three legal opinions on state sovereignty. Historically,
important jurists have held strong views regarding the legal ability of Ulama to depart form the
Sharia. The scholar Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350 CE / 691–751 AH), the student and
closest disciple and successor of ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 CE/ 662 AH-729 AH), argued:
Siyasah shariyyah includes all measures [including Wilayah al ahed] which bring the people
closer to beneficence and furthest away from corruption, even if it has not been approved by the
Prophet (peace be upon him) nor regulated by divine revelation. Anyone who says that there is no
siyasah shariyyah where the Shariah itself is silent is wrong. . . .(Espsito, 2001)

This statement illustrates how Wilayah al ahed became an established legal practice even
though it is neither found in the Qur’an nor Sunna. The principle of Wilayah al ahed was first
advanced as a legal solution under the principle of Maslaha for the realization of social stability
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and the prevention of further civil wars by discouraging competing groups from seeking the post
of Khilafa. Yet, historically the legal outcome of Wilayah al ahed placed Maslaha or “the good”
of the community above the legal restrictions of obedience to temporal power. More precisely,
unlimited obedience to the temporal power suddenly became a pillar of faith. A pious Muslim is
the one who remains in Jama’ah (the theological or physical main body of Muslims) and avoid
starting Fitnah (connotations of secession, upheaval, and chaos) demanding and fighting for full
legal rights such as a public Bay’a and the practice of Shura by the Khalifa. To secure unlimited
obedience to temporal power, Ulu Al Amr as legal experts creatively provide the legal evidence
in the primary texts that supports their opinion and undermines the contrary evidence. The
following Hadith is frequently cited as support of unlimited obedience to temporal power“…he
who separates himself from the community (Jama’ah) by even so much as a hand span and dies
(in this state), he will die the death of Jahiliyyah.” (Bukhari and Muslim). While the Qur’an and
Sunna hold ample injunctions that demands Jihad for what is right.
We have established already in earlier chapters that Al siyasah al shariah and the issues
of the Imamah are secondary matters in Sharia and just a branch of Fiqh and not foundational
rendering legal differences in opinion regarding the good or harm to the community as a normal
outcome of legal debates outside the realm faith. Moreover, Sunni legal Ulama agree that the
subject of the state and the nature of governance are not related to theological junctions. The
scope of authority of Ulu Al Amr as legal experts is operative in the legal opinion that renders
branches of the Sharia more important than the roots. To borrow a Marxist analogy, by
demanding a total obedience to temporal power, Ulu Al Amr have put the Qur’an and the Sunna
on their head. Wilayah al ahed have effectively reversed the priority of the primary texts
according to what Ulu Al Amr consider the Maslaha of the Umma in a particular historical
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moment. “According to Al-Ghazzali (450-505 AH/1058-1111 CE), they are able to do this due to
their [the ulama's] principal political function, which has been the interpretation of shariah in
terms of the problems facing the community, and by their approval of the sultan's choice of imam
in the bay’a . . . and their fatwa, they expressed the functional authority of the shariah (Dabashi
.92/Lambton 1989, 115).” Only the Ulu Al Amr are historically able to shift the role and function
of temporal power according to social and political change facing the Umma. This shift in legal
opinion is indicative that “the caliph of the Sunnis [had] no authority to dispense spiritual
instruction” (Dabashi 90 /Goldziher 1989, 182-83). Temporal power remained dependent on its
entitlement from the Ulu Al Amr to rule over the Umma. Nevertheless, the Ulu Al Amr never
claimed sovereignty over the interpretation of the legal source of sharia. Ulu Al Amr authority is
the equivalent of an opinion by a legal expert, the province of the legal principle of Ijma
(consensus). A consensus of opinion is legally binding if the majority agrees on a particular
controversy or legal matter. While disagreements between the Ulu Al Amr have always been
present and disputes among scholars over legal matters have existed and sometimes been
debated, the principle of Ijma historically trumped those holding minority opinions.
Thus, legally the Khalifa cannot be the source of law and directly command obedience
from the Umma. Instead, temporal power remained limited to Sharia in their governance of the
Umma. This is the central character in understanding how government functions in Sunni Islamic
political and legal writings. This local Sunni character directly redefines the scope of authority,
obedience, emancipation, autonomy, equality, and freedom in the particular local context of
Sunni Islam. Hence, the khalifa “as ruler […] is nothing but the successor of the one who
preceded him . . . and not entitled by the qualities inherent in his personality” (Dabashi 90
/Goldziher 1989, 182-83). Accordingly, God is the only Sovereign and all subjects are equal in
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distance and value to his reign thus depriving temporal power of any supernatural qualities.
Obedience to temporal power is based only on the Khalifa’s adherence and implementation of
the law. Clearly, the Hobbesian concept of sovereignty has no roots in Islamic political and legal
thinking, which stands in contrast to Western political thought with its secularized but Christian
roots.
In Islam the sovereign God remained invisible. Consequently, Islamic political and legal
writing historically and legally lacks the Incarnation Christian quality in the evolution of its legal
concepts and institutions. In Islam, God the sovereign, who is invisible, forbids iconic
representations or impersonation of his divine qualities. This rejection of an incarnation of godly
presence effectively denied the Ulu Al Amr the power to attribute divine qualities to their actions.
With temporal power fleeting and without sovereignty the Khalifa occupied the legal domain of
Sharia without a specific mandate from the Qur’an or Sunna. As a result, Ulu Al Amr legally
adopted Fiqh al siyash al shariah to accommodate changing historical circumstances and with it
the role of transitory power that governs a city state, empire, or fragmented competing
principalities. This was possible by developing Wilayah al ahed, a legal principle that cannot be
found in the Qur’an, Sunna, or the early founding period of the Four Guided Caliphs. Perhaps
“we are here in a universe of guile which should remind us of what the Islamic tradition knew
and developed under the name of hila… (Mondzain 2005, 6). How this religious trick or guile is
central theme of this chapter.

Before we examine the historical record, I would like to the focus first on the linguistic
meaning of the term Wilayah al ahed so that a clear correspondence in the English language is
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developed and explained. First, the term Wilayah al ahed is a composed of two words, Wilayah
and Ahed. According to Thouaqan:
The first section of the term, Wilayah, is derived from the root verb Wally and when it is said a
person is Wally something, means that person responsible for that matter and in its service. Ibn
Jarir al-Tabari (224 – 310 AH; 838–923 AD) explains the meaning of the word Al-wlliah from the
following verse in the Qur’an: Unquestionably, [for] the allies of Allah there will be no fear
concerning them, nor will they grieve (10:62) as those who allied with Allah, the most sincere of
the believers due to their affinity with God through obedience. And the Wally (ally) is called
Wallyyan (ally) due to his Mowallat (allegiance) and obedience to God’s command. Also the term
Al-willaiah linguistically means those who are closer in position…And the word Willayah means
kingship and command that pertains to ability to deliberate and govern in accordance principality.
(45)72

Linguistically the term Wilayah in Arabic confers a sense of guardianship and responsibility over
something that requires the ability to deliberate and execute in accordance with the good of that
thing.
The second part/section of the term, Al ahed (promise), is derived from the root verb
Ahed meaning Wassiah (commandment/will) and when it is said a person delegated Ahed it
means Awssah or made it conditional; thus Al ahed is Al wassyyah (Thouaqan 2005, 46).73 The
term appears in the Qur’an as Aheed (enjoin) and Aheedna (plural for made a promise). The
following two verses illustrate the idea:
Did I not enjoin upon you, O children of Adam, that you not worship Satan - [for] indeed, he is to
you a clear enemy. 36:60 And We had already taken a promise from Adam before, but he forgot;
and We found not in him determination . 20:115
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 ويفسر ابن جرير الطبري...  فيقال ولي الشيء بمعني ملك أمره و قام به و الولي هو الحافظ و الناصر،انشقت كلمة والية من الفعل الثالثي ولي
 و ذلك لقهم من هللا سبحانه بطاعته و، و هم خلص المؤمنين، "اال ان أولياء هللا ال خوف عليهم وال هم يحزنون" بأنهم أنصار هللا:األولياء في قوله تعالي
 وتحمل كلمة الوالية معني االمارة م السلطان و التي تشعر بالتدبر و القدرة. و سمي الولي وليا ً من مواالته الطاعات ا ي متابعته لها،اجتناب معصيته
 و تحتاج اليها ليتمكن صاحبها من القيام بواجب هذه اإلمارة،والفعل
73

 فالعهد هو الوصية، فيقال عهد اليه بمعني أوصاه و شرط عليه،اشتقت كلمة العهد من الفعل الثالثي عهد بمعني أوصي
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And the term Ahed (covenant) also means to attend to a matter and attain peace and harmony as
for example in the Qur’an verse 7:102: “And We did not find for most of them any covenant”
(Thouaqan 2005, 46).74
Thouaqan explains that by combining the two terms Wilayah and ahed “means ruler-ship
and governance while the second term means covenant, the combination of those two terms
Wilayah al ahed means the covenant and the heir of the throne … thus the term Wilay al ahed
was used to refer to the person who follows the ruler and inherits the throne and governs after the
state due to fulfilling the covenant that was given to him from those who could legally give
Bay’a to the Khalifa” (47).75 Hence, the closest thing that corresponds to the term Wilayah al
ahed in Western legal and political thought is “binding covenant.”

To illustrate the political and the legal context before the appearance of Wilay al ahed in
Islamic legal discourse I focus is on the period from the death of the Prophet in “11 AH (632 CE)
until 73 AH (692 CE)” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 6).76 First, Al-Mutairi argues that Islamic legal and
political discourse can be divided into three distinct historical periods in which legal discourse is
tied to the political system and governance of each particular period. Political discourse is “the
total sum of the legal rulings and principles that guide the Islamic state rules and regulations”
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 ما وجدنا ألكثرهم من عهد:كما جاء في قوله تعالي

75

 و العهد يحمل معني ال وصيه فقد ظهر مصطلح ولي العهد ليعني الوصي او الوارث للملك و،و بما ان الوالية تحمل في معانيها اإلمارة و السلطان
ذلك النه ولي الميثاق الذي يؤخذ علي من بايع الخليفة
76

 هـ١٣ - هـ١ المرحلة االولى مرحلة الخطاب السياسي الشرعي المنزلي
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(Al-Mutairi 2003, 8).77 With each historical change in the mode of governing, the legal discourse
changed accordingly.

Before the advent of Islam, the Arabs of central Arabia never had a unified government.
They were united for the first time under the leadership of the Prophet and produced a new
entity, Umma. “The establishment of umma as the Islamic community was the most significant
expression of Islamic solidarity against traditional tribal structures” (Dabashi 1989, 76).
“Without a succession plan the death of the Prophet (11 AH- 632 CE) presented a challenge to
the unity of the umma and a vacuum in leadership” (Donner 2010, 146). (Shia scholars dispute
that the Prophet did not select a successor.) According to Donner:
On the death of Muhammad in 11/632, the Believers in Medina agreed to recognize Abu Bakr as
their political leader. This act not only secured the succession but also institutionalized the notion
that the Believers should remain a single, united community. We also noted that Abu Bakr was
succeeded by 'Umar ibn al- Khattab (ruled 13-23/634-644) and then by 'Uthman ibn 'Affan (ruled
23-35/644-656) and how under these leaders the first great wave of expansion of the Believers'
movement took place. (146)

But how did the Umma choose its leader and what conditions were required in a leader?
The political matter was left to the Umma, and as a result, Fiqh al siyash al shariah as a branch
of the Sharia developed and evolved. As long as both political leadership and the state help in
implementing Sharia and remain under its junctions, then they are necessarily legal. The matter
is left entirely to the Umma.
It is important to point out that during the founding period the class of Ulu Al Amr had
not yet formed. Most of the Companions of the Prophet possessed a direct knowledge in
religious matters from the Prophet. Therefore, the First Four Guided Caliphs represented
77

 إلى-  و هو منظومة األحكام و القواعد التي يقوم عليها نظام الحكم في الدولة اإلسالمية- يمكن تقسيم المراحل التاريخية للخطاب السياسي اإلسالمي
 لكل مرحلة مالمحها و معالمها التي تميزها عن المراحل األخرى، ثالثة مراحل رئيسية
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temporal power and Ulama as well. The class of Ulu Al Amr crystalized only in the second
period and with the appearance of Wilayah al ahed.
What are the conditions that must be available in the person who governs the community
affairs? It seems that the issue of piety is the supreme condition in the Khalifa. Certainly,
dynastic rule based on blood and family rule were out of the question during the founding period.
Even when the tribe of Quraysh claimed that they were the first Muslims and as such they should
rule, their assertion was not primarily based on the superiority of their tribe over other tribes;
instead it was based on their proximity to the Prophet during the thirteen years in Mecca when
He was propagating His message. The First Caliph Abu Baker gave the following speech once he
received the Bay’a from the community:
"I have been given authority over you but I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me, and if I
do ill, then put me right. . . . Obey me as long as I obey God and His apostle, and if I disobey
them you owe me no obedience." (Ibn Hisham 1955, 687) (Dabashi 1989, 83)

Hamid Dabashi disagrees. He argues instead that tribalism after the death of the Prophet
dominated the political process and that the first violation of equality appeared between Arab and
non-Arab Muslims. He contends:
The selection of Abu Bakr was not bound to any particular stipulation of Muhammad's authority,
the Qur'an, or the Hadith but was a designation framed primarily within tribal rivalries as well as
affiliations. The intricate relationships among the Aws, Khazraj, and Quraysh fundamentally
shaped the outcome of the tribal council in Saqifah Bani Sacidah, as discussed in previous
chapters. (83)

Dabashi fails to clarify that what took place in the Saqifah Bani Sacidah was a nomination
process and not actual Bay’a. The actual Bay’a was given in the mosque in front of the Umma or
to Abu Baker by the Umma or more precisely, by those who inhabited the Medina during that
time. Only after the Umma gave Abu baker Bay’a was he able to give the above speech. Muslims
who were present in the mosque may have very well refused his leadership if they wanted to,
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especially because the Medina was a city of Aws and Khazraj, not Quraysh, and they could have
overwhelmed the Qurayshi vote. Furthermore, the first Caliph Abu Bakr (573 - 634 CE) was the
closest lifetime companion of the Prophet before and after Islam. Thus, the issue of piety was the
main reason behind the selection. As well, once the Bay’a was given to Abu Bakr, there were no
signs of discontent with his leadership. Donner further argues “the First Civil War had involved
economic and other practical issues but was fundamentally a debate over the nature of future
leadership in the community of Believers, particularly its relationship to issues of piety and
morality” (Donner 2010, 167). Yet, Dabashi’s claim has some justification since nothing in the
Qur’an or Sunna gives Quraysh, despite their claims to be the first Muslims, this right.

This chapter sets out to prove that the post of temporal power originally created after the
death of the Prophet was to serve the Umma, the good of the community, and faith; the focus
later shifted 180 degrees. Despite the conflict that ensued in the wake of the Prophet’s death,
particularly during the time of the Third ('Uthman ibn 'Affan 577 – 656 CE) and Fourth Caliph
(Ali ibn Abi Talib 601 – 661 CE), Sunni Muslims hold this founding period, next to the period in
which the Prophet was the leader of the Umma, as embodying the highest of the ideals of Islam.
It is this early period (1- 73 AH) that ideally should be used for Qiyas (reasoning by analogy, a
source of Islamic law) in Fiqh al siyash al Shariah for future generations of Ulama. Instead,
historically, the Ulu Al Amr, in developing Fiqh al siyash al shariah, relied on the period of
Taweel (73- 1350 AH) (allegorical interpretation or departure from the manifest [Zahir] meaning
of a text in favor of another meaning where there is evidence to justify the departure) as the
primary source upon which legal rulings were made and not the period of the founding.
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According to Al-Mutairi, “the period of revealed political legal discourse (Mounazel)
with its distinctive interchange of ideas spans the dates from 1 AH- 622 CE to 73 AH- 694 CE”
(8).78 He argues that there are legal principles that underlie the entire period and were used as
references to solve recurrent political crises the Umma faced. His contention is primarily relevant
to Fiqh al siyash al shariah. At the time, Fiqh al siyash al shariah, as a branch of Sharia, was in
its infancy and did not exist as an independent field in Fiqh. It was closest to the original sources
in the Qur’an and Sunna. He argues that these legal principles that were established in the period
achieved Ijma among the Umma during that particular period, so no one disputed these legal
principles among the Islamic groups that were then developing. Al-Mutairi lists nine principles
of the Mounazel period as follows:

1. The necessity of the state for the establishment of the faith religion
2. The necessity of a governing authority
3. Government authority is based on the legal principle of Bay’a. Consequently, no Imam can
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

legitimately rule without a Bay’a
The Bay’a is conditioned on the consent of the Umma.
And consent of the Umma is conditioned upon Shura (consultation among the members of
the community) among Muslims
Shura is conditioned on freedom to deliberate and consult
Absolute Hakemyah (sovereignty) and obedience belongs exclusively to Allah and the
Prophet
The realization of justice and equality among Muslims
The realization and protection of individual and collective rights and duties. (8-32)79

The nine principles were woven into the tapestry of Sharia and existed before the advent
of Fiqh al siyash al shariah. They were general in character and represented the main aim of the
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 هذه،  و هي المرحلة التي تمثل تعاليم االسالم كما نزل علي النبي صلى هللا عليه و سلم:  مرحلة الخطاب السياسي الشرعي المنزل: المرحلة االولى
 الى آخر عهد خليفة صحابي و هو عبد،  بعد هجرة النبي صلى هللا عليه و سلم إليها،المرحلة التي تبدأ تاريخيا بقيام الدولة االسالمية في المدينة المنورة
١٣ هللا بن الزبير سنة
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 و انه ال-٤  فال إمامة بال عقد، ضرورة عقد البيعة-٣  ضرورة إقامة السلطة و أنه ال دولة بال إمام-٢ ضرورة الدولة للدين و أنه ال دين بال دولة-ا
 و أن-١  و انه ال شورى بال حرية-١  و ال رضا بال شورى بين المسلمين في أمر اإلمامة و شئون األمة-٥ عقد بيعة اال برضا األمة و اختيارها
 حماية الحقوق و الحريات اإلنسانية الفردية و الجماعية و صيانتها-٩  تحقيق مبدأي العدالة و المساواة-٨ الحاكمية و الطاعة المطلقة هلل و رسوله
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political struggle and strife among Muslims in the early period. The breakdown of the Umma
into small groups and the eventual outbreak of the First Civil War were the results of
disagreements about how these general principles were to be applied. Donner argues that the
piety of the Khalifa was a central issue leading up to the First and Second Civil Wars.
It is also important to highlight the role of the public in choosing the Khalifa via Bay’a as
the main source of the legitimacy of governance. Legitimacy flows from the Umma, which limits
the role of the Khalifa through the principles of Bay’a and Shura. During the founding period,
both principles legitimated temporal power’s ability to secure obedience. This process prevented
a reversion to pre-Islamic monarchical rule, which had guaranteed temporal power based on the
blood of the tribe. Arab tribes were united under the message of Islam because it explicitly
denied the superiority of any group based on lineage. Conversely, Islam emphasized piety as the
metric that differentiates Muslims. Dabashi illustrates this point further by explaining that:
The ten most distinguished companions of the Prophet, to whom he had promised paradise
(al~asharah al~Mubashsharah), were Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali, Abd ar-Rahman ibn Awf,
Abu Ubaydah, Talhah, Zubayr, Sa d of Zuhrah, and Sa id, the son of Zayd the Hanif (Lings 1983,
329). To these one might add Salman the Persian and Ammar, of whom a prophetic hadith says
"for three doth Paradise long, for Ali, Ammar, and Salman" (ibid.), and Bilal the Abyssinian, the
slave whom Muhammad bought and released and who then became famous for his beautiful
voice to which the Prophet loved to listen when reciting adhdn (the Muslim call to prayer).
Salman and Bilal were particularly important, being non-Arabs, for symbolically signifying the
supratribal solidarity of the Islamic community. (78)

These individuals shared positions of high status due to their proximity to the Prophet. Among
these ten individuals were the Four Guided Caliphs, whose piety proved Donner’s point that
devotion was essential to command obedience from the Umma.
The Four Guided Caliphs were revered due to their piety, not tribal affiliation. In
addition, there were Companions, some of whom belonged to the highest tribal power, who were
not included among Four Guided Caliphs; a prime example is Mu’awiya, the fifth Khalifa who
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was the founder of the Umayyad dynasty and ruled from (661-680 CE). These companions were
recognized as pious because of their close proximity to and struggle with the Prophet to establish
Islam during its founding phase. It is precisely “this proximity [that] later became the source of
authority for these companions” (Dabashi 1989, 78).
Finally, those companions, during the founding, established the political practices of
Bay’a and Shura to include the public in the social and political matters of the Umma. Without
going into further details regarding the justice that was achieved during their rule, the period of
the Four Guided Caliphs is historically held in high regard (at least among Sunni Muslims)
because the Umma was included in political matters. Furthermore, as Al-Mutairi explains, “The
third principle of the Mounazel political discourse in the founding period of Islam was closer to
the spirit of the faith where the relationship between the Umma and the Imam is based on a
contract. In this contract the Umma is the principle actor and the Imam is a Wakeel (a
representative) running the state. Thus governance and authority are not divinely ordained or
hereditary; instead, the relationship is based on a contract (Bay’a)” (16).80 This fact illustrates
that the office is primarily for the service of the Umma and not a prize to be captured and
exclusively reserved for a dynasty. This legal condition would change when Wilayah al ahed
appeared.

How and why did the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed appear? The obvious obstacle to
the adoption of Wilayah al ahed was that it contradicted the legal principles of Bay’a and Shura
that had been established in the founding period as a condition for the legitimate transfer of
80

 فالعالقة بين األمة و االمام،و هذا هو األصل الثالث من أصول الخطاب السياسي الشرعي المنزل في المرحلة االولى التي تمثل تعاليم الدين الحق
 فالحكم و السلطة ليسا بالتفويض اإللهي و ليسا، و اإلمام هو الوكيل عنها في إدارة شئونها، تكون األمة فيه هي األصيل،تقوم على أسا عقد بين طرفين
 بل بعقد البيعة بين األمة و االمام و بهذا سيق االسالم الغرب في تحدي األسا الفلسفي الذي يتم بموجبه،بالحق المور وث
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temporal office. These principles guaranteed that the Caliphate serve the Umma as it was
originally intended. In this sense Muslims were equal since the office was not a monopoly of one
family or tribe. Conversely, the Caliphate functioned primarily as an executive (in modern terms)
to facilitate the services needed to run a state.
Wilayah al ahed, in contrast, legitimated the seizure of the Umayyad Caliphate. Wilayah
al ahed violated the reason and justification for why the office was created. Logically, this
change creates an environment of contention and competition over who is entitled to rule. More
important, Wilayah al ahed, where one clan or tribe has an exclusive right to rule the community
without a legal justification in the Qur’an or Sunna, violates legal equality among Muslims. The
question is: How can a Muslim or the Umma obey a person who claims that his clan or tribe has
a right to office by blood but lacks consent from the Qur’an or Sunna? This question has yet to
be answered directly. Not a single verse in the Qur’an or Sunna or Hadith speaks of the rule of a
tribe, dynasty, or a clan over the Umma. This problem is still a source of legal challenges over
monarchical legitimacy. The invention of Wilayah al ahed was the legalistic solution to the
problem. Yet, as it is has been practiced it has created legal issues and contradictions that
historically have been resolved by violence.

“Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan (647 –683 CE) was the first Khalifa to ask for Bay’a for his
son, Yazid ibn Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan/ Yazid I (680-683 CE), and who ruled using Wilayah
al ahed. The First Civil War was fought between Mu’awiya, who did not recognize Ali ibn Abi
Talib (601-661 CE) (the nephew of the Prophet) who ruled (656 to 661 CE)” (Al-Mutairi 2003,
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16).81 The First Civil War was a renewal of old tribal animosities between Banu Umayyah/Abd
Shams and Banu Hashim. More important, it produced the Sunni-Shi’a split among Muslims.
Thouaqan argues that “the Umayyad tried to accomplish several goals by inventing the
system of When Wilayah al ahed, thus Mu’awiya wanted in the year 60 AH-697 CE to secure
the Bay’a for his son Yazid I before his death to prevent division and discord and secure the
interest of the community” (51).82 I disagree with the author due to the fact that more bloodshed
and civil war followed the legal adoption of the system of Wilayah al ahed. A power grab is a
more accurate description to what occurred during Mu’awiya’s reign. The sons of the
Companions challenged this principle because it imitated the non-Islamic Byzantium and Persian
monarchies. Indeed, Mu’awiya ruled the Shaam province, which bordered on the Byzantium
Empire. Wilayah al ahed first appeared among the Ulama of the Al-Shaam who accepted the
idea of this legal practice according to sharia. When Mu’awiya openly asked for the Bay’a for
his son the issue was met with great resistance. The struggle for Wilayah al ahed started in 53
AH 672 CE. Its resolution was ultimately achieved on the battlefield.
What followed after the death of Mu’awiya was a violent campaign over Wilayah al ahed
that is still painful to discuss openly among Muslims today. The gruesome violence
institutionalized the historical memory of Fitnah (upheaval and chaos), which produced the legal
opinions that discouraged the Umma from fighting injustice and illegal force. Hence, historically
Ulu Al Amr regarded Wilayah al ahed as a source of stability that prevented violence and
81

 و عبد، و هم عبد هللا بن عمر، اعترض عليه كبار الصحابة و فقهاؤهم تلك الفترة، و يعهد باألمر إليه من بعده، ابنه
 و الحسين بن علي، و عبد الرحمن بن أبي بكر،  و عبدهللا بن عبا،هللا بن ال زبير
82

و لما أراد معاوية أن يبايع النا

م) يرى في اخذه البيعة البنه يزيد ما096-06 فكان معاوية ابن ابي سفيان (ت،سعي األمويون لتحقيق عدة أهداف من خالل ابتداعهم نظام والية العهد
 و يعمل علي الحفاظ علي وحدتهم و مصلحتهم بعد وفاته،يمنع من اضطراب امر المساهمين و افتقارهم
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bloodshed among Muslims. Wilayah al ahed was produced as a legal solution that allowed
dynastic rule in exchange for stability and the prevention of bloodshed. A similar contemporary
example of this legal rationale is the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahmed El-Tayeb’s justification of
the 3rd of July coup that legitimized the ouster of President Morsi of Egypt as the lesser of two
evils (Malsin, 2014).
During the Second Civil War the Ulu Al Amr rewarded the Umayyad’s brutality and
legitimated it with Wilayah al ahed. This principle in Fiqh al siyash al shariah is still practiced
today in most Arab monarchies providing the legal legitimacy for hereditary rule. One could also
argue that the principle of Wilayah al ahed saved Muslims from brutal civil wars and needless
bloodshed; after all, Sharia is still developing by finding practical solutions to new problems that
are neither addressed in the Qur’an nor Sunna. In other words, piety was replaced by stability
and order, the avoidance of Fitnah. Such an argument is valid, but in the same breath one cannot
maintain that Muslims are equal under Sharia. Historically, Wilayah al ahed created at least two
classes of Muslims: one group with the right to rule and the rest with the obligation to obey, all
based on lineage. This practice institutionalized and created further social and political classes
and inequalities. Most important, Wilayah al ahed was the first legal step on the path to
justifying the subservience of the Umma to temporal power.

In this section I would like to discuss the social and political changes that occurred with
the adoption of the Wilayah al ahed. The conflict of who should rule the Umma was behind the
First Civil War (35-40 AH /656-661 CE) and Second Civil War (60-73AH /680-692 CE). These

130

were wars that divided Muslims into groups and sects based on who should rule. The purpose of
examining the historical record is to demonstrate that Wilayah al ahed was met with much
resistance socially and politically and that much of this resistance was crushed on the battlefield.
Thus, the argument here is that starting with Mu’awiya and ending with Abd al-Malik ibn
Marwan (646 –705 CE), the fifth Umayyad Khalifa, who was the victor of the Second Civil War
(60-73AH /680-692 CE) Wilayah al ahed became a foundational legal principle in Fiqh al siyash
al shariah through force and violence. Moreover, the aim here is to illustrate that the Ulu Al Amr
were not a unified and institutionalized class and that the upper hand was with the Ulama of
Bilad al-Sham [Fertile Crescent, the center of power of the Umayyad dynasty] the Umayyad’s
province. Those Ulama were institutionalized after the Second Civil War with the adoption of
Wilayah al ahed, which later became orthodoxy in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Nevertheless, it is
important to point out that violence forced a permanent change in Fiqh al siyash al shariah but
not in Sharia itself. And this fact emphasizes the argument in Islamic legal and political thought
that there was never a sovereign in a European sense. Temporal power was able to govern
primarily by implementing Sharia as the Ulu Al Amr saw fit. In fact, the Abbasid’s major claim
for toppling the Umayyad dynasty was for non-adherence to Sharia and its principle of justice.
As a result, Muslims have historically been ruled by temporal power and not sovereignty, and
this legal character is central to Islamic political thought.
The violence of the First and Second Civil Wars demonstrates the consequences of
neglecting a community’s political life, including how it is organized and who is qualified to
rule. Theologically, questions of governance were left to the Umma to decide under the guidance
of Sharia, with its conception of justice and rights. Initially, after the death of the Prophet,

131

resolution of conflicts over who should rule was relatively peaceful; later, during the period that
Wilayah al ahed appeared it faced resistance from the Kharijites sect and the Ulama.

One of the earliest groups that appeared as a consequence of the First Civil War was the
Kharijites sect, which never recognized Mu’awiya as Khalifa. In fact, they were against Ali’s
(the Fourth Guided Caliph) agreement to peacefully dispute the Caliphate with Mu’awiya.
Because they never recognized the legitimacy of the Umayyad’s rule, they considered legal
matters decided under the Umayyad heretical. For the Kharijites, the most important matter in
the Khalifa was piety. They treated Wilayah al ahed as a legal heresy both in its source, which
was the illegitimate Umayyad, and as a principle that ran against the Islamic belief in equality
among believers. They did not believe in a class of Ulama since all Muslims must educate
themselves as righteous members of the community (Thouaqan 2005, 86-88).

Al-Mutazilah, another group, disputed the legality of clan rule and refused to recognize
the Umayyad’s claim as the rightful rulers of the Umma. They regarded Wilayah al ahed as
heretical. As rationalists, they rejected the philosophical claim behind Jabariyah (the belief that
human action is foreordained by divine decree or purpose). Consequently, they held the
Umayyad responsible for their indiscretion and condemned the principle of Wilayah al ahed as a
corrupt innovation (Thouaqan 2005, 93-94).

Finally, there is Shia Islam, which appeared as a consequence of the battles of Karbala
(61 AH- 680 CE) and Al-Harrah (63 AH- 683 CE), battles, ordered by Mu‘awiya, and later his
son Yazid I, that took place in the First and Second Civil Wars, respectively. The Shia reject the
Umayyad as legitimate rulers up to this day. Moreover, they considered the Umayyad as sinners,
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if not apostates, who had to maintain their power by the sword. They claim that the Imamate
belongs to the House of the Prophet and his offspring and do not recognize Wilayah al ahed as a
legal or legitimate principle. In fact, Shia opposition to contemporary monarchies and kingdoms
in the Middle East stems from their rejection of the legitimacy of these rulers as a pillar of the
Shia doctrine (Thouaqan 2005, 81-86).

It is necessary to examine the reaction of the Ulama to Wilayah al ahed among the Sunni
Ulama. The reaction of the Ulama was contradictory and can be divided in three geographical
regions, Ulama of Bilad al-Sham, Mecca/Medina, and Al-Iraq [Baghdad, Basra, and Kufa].
There are those who were in favor of and those who opposed Wilayah al ahed. According to
Thouaqan, “the Ulama of the Muslim Umma were legally divided on the legality of Wilayah al
ahed. The Ulama of Bilad al-Sham supported this new system and gave the Bay’a accordingly.
On the other hand, the Ulama of Mecca, Medina, and Al-Iraq held mixed reactions. Some had
supported Wilayah al ahed for the purpose of stability and the unity of Muslims. Others flatly
rejected the system of Wilayah al ahed. Each side had justifications for their stand on the legal
matter. Therefore, Wilayah al ahed never legally achieved consensus (Ijma) among the Ulama”
(122).83 Thus, the legal principle was not unanimously accepted at its initial stage and was
rejected by a group of Ulama who refused to recognize either Umayyad’s rule or Wilayah al
ahed. Most important, these Ulama who objected to Wilayah al ahed were on the side of those
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 ففي حين أيد قسم منهم هذا النظام و بايع لخلفايهم و أولياء عهدهم و خاصة علماء،و كان لعلماء األمة االسالمية مواقف متناقضة من نظام والية العهد
 و ذلك، نجد ان هناك تباينا في مواقف علماء مكة و المدينة و العراق من هذا النظام حيث مال قسم الي المهادنة و بالتالي تأييد نظام والة العهد،الشام
 و كان لكل طرف مبرراته في القبول او، و لجأ القسم االخر الي رفض هذا النظام عدم التعامل معه و رفض بيعة أولياء العهد،حفاظا عل وحدة الجماعة
الرفض و بالتالي لم يكن عندهم إجماع علي هذا النظام
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who lost the Second Civil War. To the Ulama who supported the legitimacy of Wilayah al ahed
the Umayyad’s victory was a sign from God that they were on the right path. While the Ulama
on the losing side viewed Wilayah al ahed as an illegal innovation to be tolerated only as a
Maslaha that ended the bloodbath of Fitnah. Nevertheless, once victory was secured both sides
of the Ulama viewed the end of civil war as a Maslaha that ended the Fitnah.

The Ulama of Bilad al-Sham were the first to advise and encourage Mu‘awiya to pass the
Caliphate to his son Yazid I. They helped propagate the legality of Wilayah al ahed in Bilad AlSham and beyond. Its geographical proximity to and status as a former Byzantine territory made
the idea of hereditary kingship familiar to Bilad Al-Sham’s Ulama. Furthermore, the Umayyad
dynasty had its own close-knit Ulama, which were treated with generosity both financially and in
status. The Umayyad dynasty had secured the loyalty of the Ulama by repeatedly seeking their
advice and opinion. It was the Ulama of Al-Sham that encouraged the idea of clan rule on the
grounds that doing so would avoid a Fitnah of repeated civil wars and the splitting of Jemaah
(the collectivity of the Muslim community). The logic was that having Yazid I rule after his
father was a way to forestall conflict and competition for the post of Khilafa. But this meant that
Mu‘awiya had to ask for Bay’a for his son while he was alive and not on his deathbed; this was
an innovation that contradicted the practice of his predecessors. Yet he was resisted by
prominent members of the Umma at the time. In response, Mu‘awiya resorted to violence for the
first time to secure a Bay’a for his son, which he failed to do. This practice of Mu‘awiya was
later legalized by Ulu Al Amr and the practice of coerced Bay’a became a permanent feature of
Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Historically, this practice had grave consequences legally, socially,
and politically.
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Moreover, it was the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham who were geographically adjacent to the
Byzantine Empire and among the first Ulama to institutionalize the legal justification of the
unconditional obedience to the Khalifa as equivalent to obedience to God. If the Umma does not
approve who governs it, through Wilayah al ahed, they are still legally required to obey the new
ruler. Even if the new Khalifa turns out to be a tyrant, the Umma must be patient and obey. These
injunctions comport with Donner’s argument that the qualities of who should rule the community
had shifted, and that by the Second Civil War the issue of piety became secondary to
institutionalized expansionism (190).
Furthermore, “the Umayyads relied on the theological view of Jabariyah [Ulama who
deny free agency of the individual] to emphasize their right to rule the Umma in the face of
opposing forces. Moreover, they used this theological view as a justification to give Bay’a to
their offspring. And if Mu‘awiya was the first to introduce Wilayah al ahed, he is also credited
for using the theological view of Jabariyah as a tool to fight his enemies who opposed his rule”
(Thouaqan 2005, 52-53).84
The idea was “Mu‘awiya must rule because God enabled him to rule” because everything
was determined by the will of God and that the actions of the individual had no intrinsic will of
its own independent from that of God’s. In other words, freewill contradicts the all-knowing
powerful God. The tyranny and evil of the Umayyad rulers are to be tolerated because they are
ordained by God, and people cannot change the will of God. Unjust governance is a punishment
ordained by God and the best the Umma can do is to be patient and pray. Now, it is important to

 فانهم اعتمدوا عليه أيضا ً لتسويغ حقهم اعتمدوا،و مثلما استند األمويون علي مذهب الجبر لتأكيد حقهم في الخالفة و االحتجاج علي المعارضين لهم
ً  فانه أيضا، و اذا كان معاويه بن ابي سفيان هو اول من جاء بنظام والية العهد.عليه أيضا ً لتسويغ حقهم في عقد البيعة ألولياء عهودهم و االحتجاج به
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 "ان امر يزيد قضاء من القضاء و لي للعباد الخيرة من:اول من استند علي الفكر الجبري لمواجهة خصومه الذين عارضوا استخالفه يزيد حيث يقول
 "إنما هو الملك يؤتيه هللا من يشاء:"أمرهم" كما أعاد قضية االختيار الي هللا و في هذا يقول
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note that it is not Mu‘awiya literally who developed these views even though he is a Companion
of the Prophet. This is the work of legal experts of the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham.

Second, the legal views of the Ulama of Al-Hejaz regarding Wilayah al ahed were
mixed. Two reasons for agreeing to give Bay’a based on the principle of Wilayah al ahed stand
out. First, there was the priority given to avoiding Fitnah and bloodshed. The second was the call
for the Umma to remain in Jemaah, the unity of Muslims as one body. For example, Thouaqan
argues that “Sa'id Ibn Al-Musayyib (642-715 CE) is an example of the Ulama who resisted every
type of pressure from the Umayyads rulers to accept their reign and Wilayah al ahed” (Thouaqan
2005, 101).85 While Abdullah ibn Umar (614 – 693 CE) “after the death of Mu‘awiya gave
Bay’a to Yazid I fearing Fitnah and division among Muslims” (Thouaqan 2005, 101).86
Donner’s historical accounts confirms the division between Ulama of Al-Hejaz were over
Wilayah al ahed and dynastic rule on the legal ground of Maslaha. Donner confirms that by the
Second Civil War the matter of piety was secondary and no longer a primary condition as it was
during the First Civil War (189). For example, “Abd Allah Ibn Abbas (3 AH - 68 AH/619–620
AD) refused to give bay’a to Abd Allah Al-Zubayr (73 AH 624 – 692AD) who was contesting
Marwan Ibn Al-Hakam (623-683 AD) the fourth Umayyad Khalifa, because Al-Zubayr did not
know his friend from his enemy; while Yazid, who for his commonsense, was more fit for the
post” (Donner 2010, 99). Furthermore, he campaigned for the Bay’a of Wilayah al ahed in AlHejaz to prevent Al-Zubayr from becoming the Khalifa. Yet, it is Yazid who was the first to
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 ففي حين عاب ابن السيب علي معاوية بن ابي سفيان أحداثه نظام،كان لسعيد بن المسيب موقفه الخاص من نظام والية العهد الذي جاء به األمويون
 و تحويل الخالفة الي ملك،والية العهد
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اال انه بعد وفاة معاويه بايع يزيد بل خالفه

136

destroy the Kaaba (the Sacred House) in his campaign to capture and kill Al-Zubayr and enforce
Wilayah al ahed and his right to rule the Umma.

Finally, in the Al-Iraq region the reaction of the Ulama represented the greatest resistance
to the Umayyad’s reign. The most influential of the Ulama of Al-Iraq is Sa'id bin Jubayr (665714 CE) who was a Mawaly (non-Arab). His position in regard to the Umayyad’s reign and
Wilayah al ahed is a good example of how the Ulama outside Bilad al-Sham were forced to
accept the reality of power and choose the best outcome from the worst choices. Ijma, and hence
legitimacy of the principle of Wilayah al ahed, was achieved by force and not on clear
theological principles. “Sa'id Ibin Jubayr was openly critical of the evils of the tyrannical rule of
Abd al-Malik and his clan. He resisted their rule by galvanizing an insurrection against them”
(Thouaqan 2005, 108)87 He personally joined the fight with Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash‘ath (died
704 CE), an Umayyad general who abandoned the dynasty and became the celebrated leader of
the revolt (699–701CE) against the governor of Iraq, Al-Hajjaj (661 -714CE). His views of the
Umayyad’s reign and Wilayah al ahed are summed up in the speech he gave in the decisive
battle of Dayr al-Jamajim (701):
Fight them for their tyrannical rule and their offenses against religion. Fight them for their
despotism over the people and of their emptying religion of its content and the humiliation of
Muslims.(Thouaqan 2005, 108)88

The battle of Dayr al-Jamajim was lost, and Ibin Jubayr was captured. “He recanted his legal
views under pressure and accepted the Umayyad reign and ratified Wilayah al ahed. The rest of
87

 و أمرهم باتباع الجماعة و كان من ابرز، و حذرهم من المشاركة في الفتنة،عن االلتحاق بالثاءيرين علي األمويين
علماء العراق في الدعوة الي ذلك
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و كان البصري قد نفر النا

 و حرض علي قتالهم و قال في دير الجماجم "قاتلوهم علي، و مساويء حكمهم،و قد صرح ابن جبير بعيوب عبدالملك و ذكر شرور و شرور قومه
" و استقاللهم المسلمين، و اماتتهم الصالة، و تجبرهم علي عباد هللا،جورهم في الحكم و خروج هم من الدين
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his life he spent preaching the importance of avoiding of Fitnah and remaining in Jemaah”
(Thouaqan 2005, 108).89
Contrary to Ibin Jubayr in the Al-Iraq region, Al-Hasan Al-Basri (642–728 CE) a
prominent Alim, supported the Umayyad’s rule. Ultimately, Al-Basri accepted the legality of the
practice of Wilayah al ahed not for religious reasons but based on Maslaha, the best outcome of
the worst of choices. He theological views were obedience and patience, even if a ruler was
unjust. He chose to pray and increase one’s own piety instead of revolting. Apparently, he saw
that revolt had feeble chances to change political conditions.

In sum, the Ulama during the period that Wilayah al ahed appeared were not unanimous
in their view over the legality of hereditary monarchy. The Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham encouraged
the practice of Wilayah al ahed and argued for its legality based on the stability for the Umma.
Some were not comfortable with the change of Khilafa to a kingship, but in the end they agreed
on the legality of the matter. While both the Ulama of Al-Hejaz and Al-Iraq had mixed reactions,
ultimately those who disagreed were coerced into accepting the legitimacy of Wilayah al ahed.
As a result, Bay’a and Shura practices during the early founding period were replaced by the
new and coerced type of Bay’a of Wilayah al ahed to avoid bloodshed and Fitnah and remain in
Jemaah. The nature of Fiqh al siyash al shariah allowed for such practices to be adopted, but the
matter was left for the Umma to decide as long as they implemented sharia, which most Khalifas
did. Consequently, the nature of tyranny in Islam has had a different character than in other
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 و، و انه يتمسك بالجماعة، و انه يتمسك بالجماعة، و ذكر له انه اجبر علي الخروج،فقد اعتقل ابن جبير بعد هزيمة ابن األشعث و أرسل الي الحجاج
ينكر الفتنة
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systems of thought because while violence and arbitrary practices were part of the fight over who
should rule, once a ruler was in place Sharia was respected and implemented.
Finally, one could argue that those who shed the most Muslim blood and were most
willing to fight, by, for example, destroying holy sites or killing members of the Prophet’s
family, were rewarded with Wilayah al ahed. Yet, it did not end the bloodshed over who should
rule.
After Abd al-Malik secured victory in the Second Civil War and consolidated his power
he implemented Wilayah al ahed with the legal support of the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham. The
popular view is that God chose Abd al-Malik and bestowed victory on him, which consequently
legitimized Wilayah al ahed. It was only during this period that Wilayah al ahed became the
orthodoxy in Fiqh al siyash al shariah.
“Although Mu'awiya had emerged in 40/661 as the victor of the First Civil War, the basic
questions over leadership that had been at issue during the war had never really been settled; they
had rather been made temporarily moot by the fact that the logical claimants for leadership at
that time had been reduced to one” (Donner 2010, 177). Mu'awiya introduced Wilayah al ahed at
the end of his reign to at least the Muslims Bilad al-Sham who gave him Bay’a and recognized
him as the Khalifa after his victory over Ali (the Fourth Guided Khalifs) in the First Civil War.
He asked those who had given him Bay’a to extend it to his son. He wanted to secure the elite’s
agreement to Wilayah al ahed by making it publically clear that it had Ijma, that the Umma
supported it unanimously. Yet there was no such Ijma. In fact there was opposition to Wilayah al
ahed, primarily concentrated in Medina. “It was in the year 65 AH -686 CE when Mu'awiya
asked to give Wilayah al ahed to his son Yazid, most senior Companions of the Prophet and
Fuqaha objected to his request; among them Abd Allah ibn Umar, Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr, Abd
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Allah ibn al-Abbas, Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr, and Husayn ibn Ali” (Al-Mutairi 2003,
116).90 Interestingly, Abd al-Rahman was the son of the First Guided Caliph, Abd Allah was the
son of the Second Guided Caliph, and Husayn was the son of the Fourth Guided Caliph. One
could argue that the rejection was twofold; it could be ambition or because their fathers never
nominated any of them to become Khalifa, and as such Mu'awiya was claiming the spoils of the
First Civil War for his son.
Nevertheless, Wilayah al ahed was rejected, and what Mu'awiya actually did was sow the
seeds of the Second Civil War. He never secured for his son Bay’a that was based on the legal
principle of Wilayah al ahed. Abd al-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr turned out to be the staunchest
rejectionist among the Companions; he openly questioned Mu'awiya’s speech, accusing him of
rejecting the Sunna of the Prophet and instead following the Sunna of Heracl (the term used by
Arabs at the time to designation the Byzantine Emperors) and Kissra (a designation of the
Persian kings). Finally, they all fled Medina quietly fearing death from Mu‘awiya who wanted
to extract their Bay’a for his son with the sword of necessity.
Yazid, as mentioned before, fought two of the most traumatizing battles in the history of
Islam: the Battle of Karbala (61 AH- 680 CE), where Husayn ibn Ali (the grandson of the
Prophet) was killed with every single member of his family, and the Battle of Al-Harrah (63 AH683 CE), where Yazid ordered a three day pillage of Medina that enslaved members of the
Prophet’s family. And finally, there was the siege of Mecca in 683 CE when the holy site of
Ka'ba was burned to the ground. Yazid’s sudden death prevented an Umayyad’s victory and
saved the life of Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr. Al-Zubayr’s death came at the hands of Abd al-
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 و هم عبد هللا بن، اعترض عليه كبار الصحابة و فقهاؤهم تلك الفترة، و يعهد باألمر إليه من بعده، ١٥ ابنه يزيد سنة
 و الحسين بن علي، و عبد الرحمن بن أبي بكر،  و عبدهللا بن عبا، و عبد هللا بن الزبير،عمر

و لما أراد معاوية أن يبايع النا
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Malik’s forces on the battlefield in 692 CE when the Ka'ba was destroyed a second time. It was
only then that the Ulama of Bilad Al-Sham could carry out Wilayah al ahed.

What are the consequences of the acceptance of Wilayah al ahed as a legitimate legal
principle in Fiqh al siyash al shariah? More important, is force a legitimate means to rule the
Umma? The victory of Abd al-Malik and the conclusion of the Second Civil War
institutionalized and legitimized a role for violence. This major event became a foundational
moment in Fiqh al siyash al Shariah where force and violence are legitimate to dynastic rule or
Wilayah al ahed. In this case, the Ulu Al Amr, which at the time were outside the scope of Sharia
itself, made the killing and bloodshed of Muslims in pursuit of temporal power a special category
under the principle of Maslaha.
Ulu Al Amr’s success at instituting Wilayah al ahed can be explained by two contending
but not necessarily contradictory variables; the first was sheer exhaustion from the level of
violence and savagery that spared neither religious symbols nor the family of the Prophet.
Donner explains:
The civil wars were striking for the savagery with which they were carried out. There are many
episodes in which our sources describe captives being executed in cold blood, in which sons are
executed before their fathers, or men killed by, or at the order of, their relatives (Amr ibn alZubayr by his brother Abd Allah; Amr ibn Sa'id by Abd al-Malik), in which the vanquished were
massacred in large numbers (Nahrawan, Khazir, Mukhtar s followers in Kufa, Battle of the
Harra). This may have something to do with the crude temper of the age and with the brutal
manners of many participants, who were rough and unrefined bedouins or peasants. But it surely
also owed much to the ideological character of many of the conflicts within the civil wars. This
led people to demonize their opponents as the very embodiment of evil and also made them
keenly aware that a defeated enemy who had not fully repented was, for ideological reasons,
always a threat to rebel again, so it was safer to eliminate him. Moreover, the intensely
ideological character of the early Believers' movement made the elimination of such "allies of the
devil" morally acceptable, even praiseworthy, in peoples' minds. (189)

Accordingly, Wilayah al ahed created much needed stability and peace and was a testament to
the genius of the flexibility of the Fiqh al siyash al shariah as an expression of Ulu Al Amr. It is
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important to reiterate that historically most of the rulers actually respected Sharia and
implemented it according to what Ulu Al Amr proposed but constantly violated and reshaped Al
siyash al shariah.
A second plausible variable is that Wilayah al ahed is the result of victor’s justice. Once
Abd al-Malik was able to eliminate all of his competitors, the guile of the Maslaha-oriented
Ulama of Bilad al-Sham provided the dynastic rule of the Umayyads a rule that required the
Umma’s obedience.
Regardless of which variable had a greater effect on the introduction of Wilayah al ahed,
its presence in Fiqh al siyash al shariah had enormous legal and political consequences. The
death of Abd Allah Al-Zubayr (73 AH) was the sign that Wilayah al ahed is a reality and
dynastic rule had been established. Since then the right to Bay’a of the Muslim subject was taken
away. Al-Mutairi argues that “from 73 AH to 1350 AH, the year the Ottoman Caliphate ended, a
shift took place in the Islamic legal discourse from one that was revealed to Taweel” (44).91

Taweel is a self-enclosed period where legal references of the founding period are not
included in producing legal opinions. Fiqh al siyash al shariah is based on precedents that were
established in 73AH. Unlike Tafsir which is the literal meaning of a verse in the Qur’an or a
Hadith, Taweel focuses primarily on the actual intent behind the verse or a Hadith and not the
literal meaning. Thus, Taweel is a form of Ijtihad (independent human reasoning in Sharia law).
Al-Mutairi argues that there are legal themes that are specific to this period and serve as a
guideline to logical legal arguments. For example, “Al-Mawardi (972-1058 CE) is a good
example of the Abbasid’s Fiqh that uses legal sources during the period of the Companions not
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 انتهي الخطاب المنزل و استقر ا لخطاب المؤول من حكم مروان بن الملك الي سقوط الخالفة العثمانية67 باستشهاد الزبير عام
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to change the status quo but to provide legitimacy to the political practices of his time” (AlMutairi 2003, 45).92 Historically, “it is this type of Mawardian Fiqh that provided the legal
grounds for political tyranny and allowed it to spread by imitating the Sunna of Heracl [Caesar]
(the term that Arabs used when referring to a Byzantine Emperors) and Kissra (a designation of
the Persian kings) as the Prophet predicted in the Hadith (45). 93
Al-Mutairi argues that there are four main themes in the Taweel discourse:
1. The usurpation confiscation of the right of the Umma to choose its leader and the
transformation of rule by Shura to hereditary rule (37)94
2. The confiscation of the right of the Umma to participate in political decision making via
Shura and Ra'y (personal opinion in adapting Sharia law) (47)95
3. The Umayyad reign marked the end of public oversight of Bayt al-mal (House of money or
wealth” the treasury that is responsible for the administration of the wealth generated by war
booty, taxes, and Zakat [that which purifies" or alms-giving] for the purpose of social
welfare) (49)96
4. The decline of the Umma’s role in the face of corruption and injustice (51)97

These four themes, absent in the founding period, set new precedents in Fiqh al siyash al
shariah. Despite a consensus among Sunni legal scholars that the founding period represented a
period of ideal government, the Ulu Al Amr responded to the immediate aftermath of the period
with Wilayah al ahed, a practice that permanently trumped all other principles from the founding
period. The Taweel period of Fiqh al siyash al shariah served up violence and bloodshed. This
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-  يوظف النصوص من حيث ال يشعر في خدمة الواقع بخالف الصحابة الذين صاغو الواقع-  و هو يعبر عن فقه العصر العباسي- لقد كان الماواردي
 و من أجل، بحسب ما جاءت به النصوص اي صار الواقع هو الذي يملي مفاهيمه التي يجب تأويل نصوص الشريعة من أجلها- أو أرادو صياغته
 ال العك،إضفاء الشرعية عليها
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 و إستقرت سنن هرقل و قيصر كما أخبر بذلك النبي صلى هللا عليه و سلم،و بمثل هذا الفقه الماواردي شاع اإلستبداد السياسي
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 مصادرة حق األمة في اختيار اإلمام و تحول الحكم من شورى إلى وراثة-١ الخطاب السياسي المؤول
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 مصادرة حق األمة في المشاركة في الرأي و الشورى:الثاني
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 غياب دور األمة في الرقابة على بيت المال:الثالث
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 تراجع دور األمة في مواجهة الظلم و اإلنحراف:الرابع
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shift of discourse guaranteed Wilayah al ahed in perpetuity and denied a return to the legal
discourse of the founding period.
Sociologically, this movement also represented the gradual institutionalization of Ulu Al
Amr into a class that was influenced and controlled by temporal power. A suggestive piece of
evidence was the Khalifa’s provision of Ulama salaries. The Khalifa now arbitrarily controlled
the wealth of Bayt al-mal without oversight. Dabashi sketches out the formation of the class of
Ulu Al Amr:
Another major office which gradually developed in the Islamic state apparatus, again due to the
exclusively political and administrative limitation of the caliphal authority, was that of the ulama
(religious scholars). A firm and extensive knowledge of the religious sciences—the Qur'an and
Hadith in particular—provided the ulama with a crucial area of expertise and thus authority. As
the custodians of institutionalized Islam, this class of religious scholars and their religious
authority had to be recognized. (92)

The scope of Ulu Al Amr’s authority is clearly demonstrated in the historical change of the
discourse of Sunni Islam. A good example of their authority is in the change in discourse that
Ulu Al Amr adopted to delegitimize rebellion against temporal power. Al-Mutairi argues that
these Ulama “who hold the Taweel discourse viewed Khurooj (rebellion) and political protest
movements from a reductionist and negative one-sided view. Historically, they viewed these
movements as a cause Fitnah that cause bloodshed and destruction of property and overlooked
the role of these movements in resistance to tyranny and injustice that may result in making the
Umma prone to be conquered by the enemies of Islam” (61).98 They are able to change the
political discourse by applying their legal expertise to social and political conditions and inflate
the legal injunctions that promote their view and deflate others according to what they perceive
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 هي ما يحدث بسببها من فتنة قد يذهب،لقد نظر أصحاب هذا الخطاب المؤول إلى حركات الخروج و اإلحتجاج السياسي نظرة سلبية من زاوية واحدة
 الذي قد يؤدي، دون نظر إلى ضرورة قيام مثل هذه المقومات التي تحول بين السلطة و بين الظلم و االستبداد و اإلنحراف،بها بعض النفو و األموال
إلى سقوط األمة كلها تحت سيطرة عدوها الخارجي

144

as Maslaha of the Umma. For example, “Al-Mutairi argues that some of the reasons behind the
spread of the Taweel discourse are the emphasis on the Hadiths that discuss secession, upheaval,
and chaos to prove their fatalistic views about the future as worse than the present. Thus, later
generations of Ulama adopted theological views to maintain the statuesque and discourage
political change out of fear of the future” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 64).99 Lambton argues that “their
[the Ulama's] principal political function was the interpretation of sharia in terms of the
problems facing the community, and by their approval of the sultan's choice of imam in the bay’a
. . . and their fatwas, they expressed the functional authority of sharia” (Lambton 92) (1981,
115). The authority to interpret Sharia according to the changing political and social
circumstances guaranteed the dependence of temporal power on the authority of Ulu Al Amr,
especially in the matters of obedience and the use of force.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the adoption of Wilayah al ahed was the
change in the relationship between temporal power and the Umma. “A legal dispute arose in the
second period of Taweel regarding the legality of the person who was acting as a Khalifa. Was
he acting as a Wakeel (deputy or agent) or a Waley (guardianship)” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 177).100
Accordingly, in the first period the Khalifa was acting as a Wakeel since the Bay’a was given by
the free consent of the Umma. Al-Mutairi “explains the legal consequence of capturing of the
Khilafa by force changes the nature of the post from one where the Khalifa is acting as a deputy
on behalf of the Umma to a guardian acting as a parent on behalf of minors (Al-Mutairi 2003,
 دون، التي تؤكد أنه ال يأتي زمان إال إذا بعده شر منه، شيوع أحاديث الفتن: ً و من األسباب التي آذت الى شيوع هذا الخطاب السياسي المؤول أيضا
 خوفا من المستقبل الذي هو أسوأ من الحاضر كما تؤكد، و الدفاع عنه، فصار أكثر المتأخرين يعملون على ترسيخ األمر الواقع،فهم لمعناها الصحيح
ذلك النصوص
99
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 هل تصرف اإلمام على األمة بطريق الوكالة أم الوالية: و هو.كما طرأ خالف في المرحلة الثانية في هذه القضية
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177).101 This legal opinion ushered the new method of wlayah al qaher or capturing the post of
Khliafa by the sword. Moreover, “the Khalifa cannot be removed from the post by the Umma
since the guardianship of the Khalifa changed the legal status of the Muslim subject to the status
of a minor or child” (Al-Mutairi 2003, 177-178).102 Accordingly, this legal change altered the
nature of authority/obedience in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah from a contractual legal
relationship that is conditional and can be dissolved, to a paternal relationship that is natural and
an unalterable. Al-Mutairi argue that change in the nature of discourse led to a change in the
legal quality of “the Imam quality changed with the change of discourse from a Wakeel (deputy
or agent) that the Umma can legally remove form office; to a Waley (a guardian) that cannot be
removed according to the Taweel political discourse” (178).103 Precisely, Wilayah al ahed is the
legal tool that furnished the change with the legitimacy of dynastic rule and ended legal equality
among Muslims, turning their relationship from contractual to paternal one.
Thus, the legal shift in the nature of the Khalifa coincided with a major legal shift in Fiqh
al siyash al shariah from an emphasis on the priority of Bay’a and Shura to giving priority and
legal backing to avoiding Fitnah and remaining in Jemaah. Consequently, the two civil wars
served as the basis for a public retreat to security, order, and peace. Historically, Fiqh al siyash
al shariah has more or less supported a state of war locked in a permanent state of emergency.
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 ا بصفة،و هكذا أدى القول بأن اإلمامة تنعقد باإلستيالء و القهر إلى القول بأن تصرف االمام عن األمة بصفة الوالية كوالية األب على ابنه القاصر
 و ليست الوكالة كذلك؛ إذ الوكيل ال يكون إال بإختيار الموكل،الوكالة عنهم؛ النه توالها بالقوة بال اختيار منهم كالولي
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ترتب على هذا عدم عدم إمكانية عزله؛ اذ لي لألبناء الصغار و ال للمراءة عزل وليهم؛ اذ ليست-أي أنه يتصرف بصفة الوالية-فلم قيل بهذا الرأي
 و كذلك إذا ثبت ذلك في اإلمامة لي له عزل نفسه أيضا، فال يمكن له عزلهم،والية األب على أبنائه باختيارهم
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 إلى وال ال يمكن عزله في الخطاب الثاني-  كما كان عليه الحال في مرحلة الخطاب السياسي األول- و هكذا تحول اإلمام من وكيل يمكن عزله
 بل اإلمام يظل إماما حتى الموت،المؤول ؟ ! و هذا الرأي أدى بدوره إلى القول بأن اإلمامة عقد دائم ال يمكن توقيته
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Capturing the post of Khilafa and maintaining it created a temporal appetite for bloodshed and
cruelty.

Finally, some concluding remarks follow regarding the legal consequence of Wilayah al
ahed on Fiqh al siyash al shariah. This chapter argues that historically Ulu Al Amr provided the
legal legitimacy for the shift in the role of temporal power: from a servant of the community or
executive of Sharia to a condition where Sharia is subservient to temporal power. This was
possible by introducing the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. Most
important, the legitimacy given to the use of force and violence to capture the post of Khilafa
changed the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Wilayah al ahed could be
praised for finally putting an end to Muslim bloodshed, especially during the Second Civil War,
but violence was rewarded by locating it in an area outside any legal accountability. Nothing in
Fiqh al siyash al shariah refers to the possibility of subjecting the ruler to a crime committed ex
post facto after capturing the post of Khilafa. In fact, Fiqh al siyash al shariah is mute on this
subject, contrary to the Qur’an and Sunna which clearly prohibit the unjustified shedding of
blood and equates it to the killing of all the people on Earth. Without a doubt such a practice
creates two classes: those who are weak and judged for their actions and those who use force and
escape with massacring the Prophet’s family. The Maslaha principle could be the genius of Fiqh
al siyash al shariah in particular and Sharia in general, but it can also lead to grave injustices
and inequalities. For example, one could argue that from the Second Civil War to the present
Fiqh al siyash al shariah has actually been under legal emergency status. For example, the Ulu
Al Amr, who are fully institutionalized in the modern Arab nation-state, called upon Muslims not
to revolt against their presidents in Egypt, Libya, and Syria during the 2011 Arab Spring. Their
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statements make it clear that the vocabulary of avoiding Fitnah and remaining in Jemaah has
been carried over from the historical experience of the Second Civil War. This period became the
permanent reference of Fiqh al siyash al shariah, but a question remains: When will it be
possible to restore a state of normality? Paradoxically, when contemporary Muslim scholars ask
about the greatness of justice in Islam, they immediately refer to the period of the Four Guided
Khalifs and the ideal conditions that Muslims then enjoyed. But why does the Ulu Al Amr still
accept Wilayah al ahed under the principle of Maslaha as a permanent principle in Fiqh al siyash
al shariah? Modern reformers from outside the institutionalized establishment of Ulu Al Amr,
starting with Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838/1839 – March 9, 1897), challenged deeply
held legal views.
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CHAPTER V
Ulu Al-Amr, Modernity, Sovereignty, and the Modern State

“Since December 2010, the Middle East has been undergoing upheavals that have
challenged despots who have held onto the reins of power for decades. These uprisings
underscored the sovereignty of the people, a significant majority of whom supported the
implementation of Shari’a in some form” (Ahsanuddin 2013, 12). Due to factionalism and
partisanship among political forces, it is clear that in this post-revolutionary period “Arab
Spring” states are struggling. These difficult and tumultuous conditions have been exacerbated
by the ideological commitments of Islamist and secular political parties. Domestic and
international counter revolutionary forces, which are trying to stifle the success of the 2011
revolutions, further complicate the situation.
Divisions between these political parties generally relate directly to ideological splits
between the Islamists and secular political groups over constitutional principles of civil rights
and liberties and the role of the state in the public and private spheres of its citizens. The
differences mainly concern core political and economic issues, which have resulted in
irreconcilable political divisions. These ideological gaps have been and still are exploited by the
domestic (the former regimes of Tunis, Egypt, and Yemen) and international (Saudi Arabia,
United Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain) counter revolutionary forces. International forces
have exploited the ensuing turmoil to contain and reverse the spread of the revolutionary change
into their own states.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, Islamist political parties met with initial success.
Egyptian parliamentary elections in January 2012 resulted in Islamist parties winning 71.5
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percent of the seats, and five months later, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi was
elected president. In Tunisia, leaders like Rachid Ghannouchi sought to emulate the
conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey (Ahsanuddin 2013, 12-13). In the
case of Egypt the MB rule came to an abrupt halt when the military jumped at the first
opportunity to regain its historical role of ruling Egypt. Moreover, since the July 3rd 2013
Egyptian military coup many voices in Western and Arab academic circles and media have
argued that “today, what we are facing in a post-Arab Spring and post-Turkish model Middle
East is a new type of failure for political Islam's future” (Taspinar, 2014). Some academics
reached similar conclusions after the Algerian military coup of December 1991 toppled the
Islamic Salvation Front. In his 1992 book, The Failure of Political Islam, French social scientist
Olivier Roy argued that political Islam as a project of governance, politics and public
administration had precious little to offer. Such academic and media voices have wasted no time
declaring that political Islam, freedom, equality, citizenship, and other ideals of modernity are
impossible to reconcile. They point out that the military coup in Egypt was backed by millions of
Egyptians discontented with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) under President Morsi and opted for
the return of the old regime, similar to Mubarak’s, of military rule behind a civilian mask.
Accordingly, the military coup received the support and backing of oppositional political figures
across the political spectrum, including: the secularists of the National Salvation Front lead by
Mohamed ElBaradei; Pope Theodoros II of the Coptic Church; Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad ElTayyeb, the President of Al-Azhar University; and the Salafist Al-Nour party (backed by Saudi
Arabia), which praised the military coup as a correction in the path of the revolutionary change.
In Tunis, the Al-Nahda Party (NP) is facing similar opposition but the military, thus far, has
decided not to interfere. Those forces unhappy with the rule of the MB have united with
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elements of the “deep state” or the old regime to halt the success of the democratically elected
Islamist governments from succeeding in ruling. Consequently, the military coup in Egypt, at
least for the time being, brought the Arab Spring to a complete stop. Leading the attack on the
Islamist parties of the Arab Spring states are Gulf States whose religiously conservative
monarchies continue to justify their autocratic rule with the legitimacy of Wilayah al ahed. At
the forefront of the coalition is the Islamic Saudi Kingdom, the most conservative force in Sunni
Islam and the center of Salafi Islam in the world. Since the advent of the Arab Spring the Gulf
monarchies (with the exception of Qatar) are actively assembling political influence and
petrodollars in the West to insure the failure of political Islam. For example, “[t]he United Arab
Emirates has thrown its support behind neighboring Saudi Arabia's decision to label the Muslim
Brotherhood a terrorist organization, increasing Gulf Arab pressure on the Islamist
group”(Associated Press, 2014). In fact, the Gulf monarchies were instrumental in exploiting the
ideological divide between the Islamist and liberal political forces that appeared once Ben Ali,
Mubarak, and Saleh of Yemen were toppled.
While the news out of Egypt is grim, in other parts of the region it is less so, “on January
26th, 2014, the Tunisian Constitutional Assembly approved a new constitution. Contrary to the
Egyptian experience, Tunisians, in partly preserving the goals of the Jasmine Revolution,
managed to overcome their country’s security and political challenges” (Farhoui, 2014). After a
difficult protracted struggle among organized political forces “the Tunisian constitution, a
carefully worded comprise between Islamic identity and modern day concepts of human rights
and good governance, has been described as one of the most liberal constitutions in the Arab
World” (Tunis Times, 2014). Rival political factions signed the document signaling a
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compromise on its basic civil rights and liberties. Thus far, Tunis seems to be the most positive
case as the Arab Spring states struggle for democracy, but that may change at any moment.
Conflicts in this transitional period indicate that toppling decades-long dictators is easier
than managing the challenges and obstacles in achieving the goals of the revolution. Histories of
revolutions are full of difficult transitions. Without a central mediating force promoting a unified
idea of the good, revolutions bring to the surface contentious ideological commitments.
Ideological divisions turn yesterday’s revolutionary partners into today’s mortal enemies. I argue
in this chapter that the current ideological divide between organized political groups in “Arab
Spring” states has its roots in the nineteenth century displacement of the foundational Sunni
conception of authority by the colonial European concept of sovereignty. Modernity and its
corollary European colonialism have changed the social and political reality of Muslim physical
and metaphysical realms. Through military force, European colonialism displaced the core logic
of historical political, economic, and social institutions that were organized around the Sunni
conception of authority. The core the concept of sovereignty displaced the Sunni conception of
authority mainly via physical and metaphysical force.
European colonization’s main consequence was the rearrangement of global colonial
territories according to the logic of the modern nation-state. It physically redrew the Islamic
geographical map under international law and according to the logic of Western conceptions of
sovereignty. Consequently, the construction of modern nation-state was not historically organic
to Muslims; on the contrary, physical and metaphysical violence imposed the nation-state on
Muslims and forced a new reality that led to the rise of configurations of identities based on
racial and linguistic origins emphasizing new loyalties to the national territorial state. The
process of constructing the nation-state in the postcolonial period fell to local elites.
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To illustrate the argument I have chosen the contemporary Islamic legal scholar Wael B.
Hallaq as my interlocutor in this chapter. Professor Hallaq’s brilliant scholarship on the Sharia
and Islam makes him an ideal candidate for this task. There are similarities between our
approaches regarding the significance of sovereignty and modernity but more importantly, we
differ in the scope of sovereignty in relation to the Sharia or more precisely Sunni authority.
Similar to my approach, Hallaq appreciates the profound impact of the European
colonialism on Muslims and the impact of the European legal system on the Sharia which is
central to Muslim subjectivities and system of meaning. He illustrates in the following quotation
the impact of European colonial experience and the change that was imposed on local
populations in the post-independence nation-state structure:
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of
power they had inherited from the colonial experience and that, as a rule and after gaining socalled independence for their countries, they often aggressively pursued the very same colonial
policies they had fiercely fought against during the colonial period. They inherited from Europe a
readymade nation-state (with its constitutive power structures) for which the existing social
formations have not been adequately prepared. The paradigmatic concept of the citizen, without
which no state can last, has been slow in coming, and the political lacunae have not been properly
filled. (16)

Largely, the militaries of newly independent states constructed the nation-state based on the
same colonial military model of governing. The process by which newly independent Arab states
constructed the modern nation-state represented a top-down European colonial style of
governing, which lacked organic local characteristics. This is truer of the Arab postcolonial
republics than the conservative monarchies in the Middle East. In short, modernity through
European colonialism displaced archaic Muslim identities based on religious membership in
favor of new subjectivities based on the modern logic of European sovereignty. Accordingly, the
nature of the legal system:
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Until the early nineteenth century, and for twelve centuries before then, the moral law of Islam,
the Sharia, had successfully negotiated customary law and local customary practices and had
emerged as the supreme moral and legal force regulating both society and government. This ‘law’
was paradigmatic, having been accepted as a central system of high and general norms by
societies and dynastic powers that ruled over them. (Hallaq 2013, 8)

Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the role of Sharia ended in public life as
European colonialism, or local elites themselves, successfully introduced the modern codes of
law. More important, in nineteenth and twentieth century Islamic political thought a link was
made between European domination and the decline of the role of the Sharia in public life. New
European laws were introduced as rational laws necessary for the construction of a modern
national homeland. The new codes were constructed according to the logic of the nation-state
where national rather than religious loyalties were the moral end of law. Dealing with this legal
rupture was a major theme that subsequent Muslim thinkers had to address. Wael Hallaq
explains the significance of this change:
The political, legal, and cultural struggles of today's Muslims stem from a certain measure of
dissonance between their moral and cultural aspirations, on the one hand, and the moral realities
of a modern world, on the other---realities with which they must live but that were not of their
own making. In one sense, the entirety of this book seeks to substantiate this claim. The West (by
which I mean here mainly Euro-American) lives somewhat more comfortably in a present that
locates itself within a historical process that has been of its own creation. It lives in an age
dictated by the terms of the Enlightenment, the industrial and technological revolutions, modern
science, nationalism, capitalism, and the American-French constitutional tradition, all of which,
and much more, have been organically and internally grown products. The rest of the world has
followed or, if not, has felt the pressure to do so. There is in effect no other history but that of
Euro-American, not even pre-Enlightenment European history. (17-18)

The self-confidence of the European empires sought and succeeded in shaping the world through
its moral and technical superiority. The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt (1798-1801) exemplifies
European self-confidence in relation to the declining Muslim Empires. Edward Said in his study
of Orientalism argues that Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt symbolized European hegemonic power
over the Muslim subject. He contends that this invasion “although it was almost immediately
preceded by at least two major Orientalist projects, Napoleon’ invasion in 1798 and his foray
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into Syria have had by far the greater consequence for the modern history of Orientalism” (Said
1977, 76). Said is referring to the metaphysical consequences of this colonial expedition on the
European subject, who is able not only to conquer a territory but to use the local population as
the subject of the European sciences. This type of domination has no parallel in the history of
Islam. Consequently, any form of local resistance had to cope with this nascent domination or
hegemony in a physical/metaphysical totality that constructs the world according to the logic of
sovereignty. As such, invasions and decline are not new phenomena in the history of Islam; their
impact has always been physical at the material level but unable to change the metaphysical core
of Islam and its values. Both the Mongols and the Crusades conquered Islamic Empires and
occupied large geographical territories, but they were unable to impact the metaphysical core of
the legal system, e.g. Sunni authority of Ulu Al Amr and the Sharia. For example, Mongols
converted into Islam during their rule over Muslims and the Crusades ended their venture
without impacting the central role of Sharia in public life. But starting with Napoleon’s invasion
of Egypt, “it soon became apparent that Western challenges were more fundamental and that
even the attaining of modern military capabilities required wide-ranging social, economic and
even political reorganizations. Between the mid-nineteenth century and the end of the First
World War, almost all parts of the Muslim world were touched by this process, which amounted
to a remoulding of Islamic societies in a modern European cast” (Nafi 2008, 36). This remolding
was by force and required the restructuring of physical and metaphysical aspects of Muslim
reality. The change crushed historical economic, social, and political ties in favor of new ones.
Social and political classes declined and new classes accumulated massive political and
economic power. Moreover, prominent Islamic cities such as Damascus experienced dramatic
decline due to the rise of new coastal cities that were at the center of urban and economic
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systems in the region. Physical changes were accompanied by metaphysical changes. The
introduction of European legal codes, which governed the state and the economy, produced the
novel legal logics. Wael B. Hallaq explains this unprecedented change:
However, beginning in the nineteenth century, and at the hands of colonialist Europe, the
socioeconomic and political system regulated by the Sharīa was structurally dismantled, which is
to say that the Sharīa itself was eviscerated, reduced to providing no more than the raw materials
for the legislation of personal status by the modern state. Even in this relatively limited sphere,
the Sharīa lost its autonomy and social agency in favor of the modern state; Sharīa was henceforth
needed only to the limited extent that deriving certain provisions from it—provisions that were
reworked and re-created according to modern expediency—legitimized the state’s legislative
ventures. (8)

The dismantling process was through the centralizing policy of the colonial powers’ military
might, which enabled them to impose their legal and political will on the colonies. Consequently,
the nineteenth century colonial experience was a unique and unprecedented event in the history
of Islam changing its physical and metaphysical characteristics, which were held intact by the
Sharia. The scope of decline at the metaphysical level presented Muslims with the challenge of a
reality lacking any reference point in the Sharia or history of Islam to guide them out of the
colonial crisis. Because the nineteenth century decline was hegemonic, Muslim states were
unable to thwart the European physical and the metaphysical system of meaning. Consequently,
there was no Sunni system of meaning that could any longer impose its will in the physical
world. Instead it receded to a ceremonial role. This moment in history we call modernity
represents modern Islam’s decline.
This study will utilize Eduard P. Archetti’s conception of modernity by arguing that:
Modernity refers to a historical period which began in Western Europe with a series of cultural,
social and economic changes during the seventeenth century, and it is usually characterized by
three features: first, culturally, a reliance on reason and experience conditioned the growth of
science and scientific consciousness, secularization and instrumental rationality; Second, as a
mode of life it was based on the growth of industrial society, social mobility, market economy,
literacy, bureaucratization and consolidation of the nation-state; and third, it fostered a conception
of the person as free, autonomous, self-controlled and reflexive. Opposed to traditional forms of
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thought and life, modernity can be conceptualized as a mode of social and individual experience
that is shared by many men and women all over the world due to the expansion and prestige of
scientific enquiry, technological innovation, political models of democracy and nation-state
boundaries, and subjective drive for self-development. Modernity is inherently globalizing.
Giddens (1991) has argued that the globalizing tendencies of modern institutions are
accompanied by continuous changes in the perception of the self and redefinition of identities.
(546)

This dissertation recognizes modernity as an extension of the Christian medieval Europe and not
a rupture with the past. More precisely, secular conceptions of the subject as “free, autonomous,
self-controlled and reflexive” are genealogically medieval and Christian. They eventually were
secularized through struggles and unrest in the social, economic, and political history of Europe,
but the internal configuration remained intact. Most important, this dissertation claims that
sovereignty is the core concept and continuous thread that connects medieval Christian Europe
with secular modernity which later is universalized over the globe via European colonialism.
Moreover, “sovereignty is a historical innovation of certain European political and religious
actors who were seeking to escape from their subjection to the papal and imperial authorities of
medieval Europe and to establish their independence of all other authorities, including each
other. It is a post-medieval and, indeed, anti-medieval arrangement of governing authority. It is
one of the defining markers of the modern world” (Jackson 2007, 6). Thus, this dissertation holds
that while modernity has produced universal principles that should be embraced and celebrated
globally, the context of these principles is local in character. Mainly, modernity is structured
around the unfolding logic of sovereignty in the social, economic, and political domains. More
precisely, modernity unleashed the physical/metaphysical logical forces that framed the
historical struggles of the European subject against power and exploitation. The logic of
sovereignty provided the modern subject with the claims of national sovereignty, sovereignty
over the self and body, which framed the logic of autonomy, freedom, equality and dignity.
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Thus, the local character of European sovereignty is saturated throughout with the emancipatory
universal struggles for human rights and human dignity.
This logic of sovereignty presents fundamental obstacles to other peoples and cultures
that share emancipatory struggles against power but frame the struggle according to local
historical ideas such as Sunni Islam authority. A problem arises when human rights and dignity
claim universality regardless of the local character of sovereignty that is the outcome of
historical, political, and social circumstances that have arisen from medieval Europe.
Consequently, insisting on universalizing the local character of autonomy, freedom, and equality
in a European context undermines the very universality of the concepts.

The sovereignty of science, the state, the economy, and the self are particular European
expressions of the emancipatory principles of resisting power and exploitation of the weak. By
insuring freedom and equality to all based on the dignity of the subject. It is the aim of this
chapter to demonstrate that emancipatory universal concepts may be realized if the local
characteristics of European sovereignty and Sunni authority are understood and included. But
first we must analyze the physical and metaphysical of both concepts.
Insisting on the local qualities of sovereignty as universal and ignoring the local historical
quality of authority in Sunni Islam is further proof that human rights are a tool in the hand of
aggressive Western powers to advance the interest of their own imperial states. It is a fact that
the advent of modernity with its universal claims coincided in the case of Islam with European
colonialism and decline of the Muslim Empires. Thus, with European sovereignty at its core the
universality of the modern subject as “free, autonomous, self-controlled and reflexive” becomes
a discourse of human rights and wrongs according to the logic of the sovereignty of the self, the
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nation, and the state while other forms of authority were excluded and absent from these
universal notions. Thus, the role of colonial Western empires was central in forcing a European
model of sovereignty upon other cultures and collectivities by force. The best example is
international law that governs am international community based on the logic of European
sovereignty. Wael Hallaq describes European domination at the physical and metaphysical
realms by arguing:
Africa and Asia, in most cases, continue to struggle in order to catch up, in the process not only
foregoing the privilege of drawing on their own tradition and historical experiences that shaped
who they were and, partly, who they have become but also letting themselves be drawn into
devastating wars, poverty, disease and the destruction of their natural environment. Modernity,
whose hegemonic discourse is determined by the institutions and intellectuals of the powerful
modern West, has not offered a fair shake to two-thirds of the world's population, who have lost
their history and with it, their organic ways of existence. (18)

This dissertation disagrees with Hallaq that there is a history to be lost and with it an organic way
of existence. Instead, I claim that the history of Islam is a history with struggles and resistance
based on local forms of authority and obedience. It is the legal logic of Sunni authority that
produced the history of Islam without an authentic history to be recalled or a moment to which to
return. What is important in Hallaq’s insights is the claim that the modern West depends on its
ability to shape the world according to the European concept of sovereignty and creating a world
that is hostile to other forms of authority. It legally requires adherence to European international
law and the concept of the territorial nation-state for membership in the international system.
Modern state sovereignty entails maintaining a centralized bureaucracy, a defined territory, and a
fixed population. Moreover, the modern nation-state runs on taxation and exploitation of natural
resources on its territory.
In sum, understanding the emancipatory discourse that spread globally through European
colonialism requires an analysis of the local character of European sovereign and how the
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discourse produces hegemonic power whose consequence is the physical and metaphysical
domination of the local subject. In insisting on framing universal emancipatory discourses on
European sovereignty, modernity necessitates a particular kind of subject, an autonomous
individual with a European sense of self-authorship as its reference point. Consequently, unless
the subject abandons local traits and adopts the European conception of the self, that subject is
incompatible with modernity. Hallaq, argues that “as an anthropocentric entity, the state
possesses a metaphysic that resides within its own sovereign will. The metaphysic generates its
own meanings, which is to say that its particular views of the world are of its own creation and
bound by its own standards however changeable these standards may be” (Hallaq 2013, 183).
Sharia in the context of the environment that produced the nation-state became an alien creature
that governed by alien environment. Consequently, the environment of the nation-state
constitutes a unified different subject according to its laws, regardless of culture. As a result, the
European subject is the only natural and compatible creature with modernity. Thus, modernity
with its emancipatory universal projects is framed according to a local European environment
and as such it is impossible to universalize. Hallaq illustrates the consequences of this change as
follow:
Modern Muslims are therefore faced with the challenge of reconciling two facts: first, the
ontological fact of the state and its undeniably powerful presence, and, second, the deontological
fact of the necessity to bring about a form of Sharia governance. This challenge is further
complicated by the recognition that the state in Muslim countries has not done much to
rehabilitate any acceptable form of genuine Sharia governance. The constitutional battles of the
Islamists in Egypt and Pakistan, the failures of the Iranian Revolution as an Islamic political and
legal project, and other similar disappointment amply testify to this proposition. Yet the state
remains the favored template of the Islamists and the ulama (so called Muslim clergymen). (9)

Overall, Hallaq’s description of the predicament of political Islam in the twentieth century is
accurate; it even applies to the Islamist struggle during the Arab Spring. Yet, his account of
what constitutes “genuine Sharia governance” begs the question: When and where did Sharia
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governance genuinely existed. In fact, the body of the Sharia since the death of the Prophet grew
according to accommodations to the changing social and political circumstances that faced the
Umma. In fact, the split of Islam into two main rival groups; Sunni and Shia is a testament of
“genuine Sharia governance” that Hallaq claims never existed. Furthermore, the legal principles
of Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah as are response to the
fact that the Sharia is moot on the subject of temporal power and obedience.
This dissertation views Fiqh al siyash al shariah as series of legal harmonizations
between the changing physical world and the metaphysical ideal of Islamic monotheism. The
violence in the history of Islam and especially in the early founding period as chapter four
demonstrated was a history of compromise producing the legal principle of Wilayah al ahed
under the legal principle of Maslaha. This historical period is what Donner dubbed the “First and
Second Civil Wars” due to the violent nature and struggle against temporal power and
governance of the Umma in early Islam.
Moreover, Hallaq exaggerates the concept of Islamic governance where implementation
of Sharia was primarily grounded in an attempt to realize the “ought.” Modern states, in contrast,
debased considerations of morality to secondary or tertiary status and simultaneously sanctified
the doctrine of progress. Chapter four of this dissertation demonstrated that the “ought” was not
necessarily followed in Fiqh al siyash al shariah, instead, the authority of Ulu Al Amr to decide
on the expedient as a compromise under the Maslaha was the norm and not the exception. While
this dissertation agrees with some aspects of Hallaq’s conception of Western sovereignty, the
central reservation is related to his methodological commitments. Accordingly, he explains
sovereignty as follows:
Inasmuch as it is inescapable for the modern state to be a historical contingency and thus of a
context-specific provenance, it is also—if we speak of it as we must—a constructed entity; that is,
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it must consist of something or things, whether these are real or fictional, material or conceptual,
mythical or symbolic. The concept of sovereignty is one such form-property that remains, despite
the changes the state has undergone over the last two centuries or so, one of its hallmarks. While
all premodern rule was sustained by certain political and ideological structures, the modern state
is unique in its impersonal character, an abstract concept that lies at the heart of its legitimacy.
The abstractness of sovereignty therefore requires the evaluation of the state not only as an
empirical set of differentiated institutions but also as an ideological structure that both pervades
and orders the state’s social matrix. (Hallaq 2013, 27-28)

That sovereignty is an enduring core concept of modernity means that it orders the physical and
metaphysical according to its logic. Thus, non-European people must confront modernity as a
political and social fact that holds a different logic from that of their local culture. For Sunni
Islam, this condition requires changes and reorganization in the role of Sunni authority in public
and private realms, which logically produces new legal and political order around new
legitimacies in relation to the modern nation-state according to the logical necessities of
sovereignty.

This dissertation disagrees with Hallaq’s understanding of Islam and modernity on the
ground that he uses the logic of sovereignty in his method to explain the condition of Muslims in
modernity. Accordingly, he uses a European methodological model constructed around a
sovereign core and then applies the logic of his method to Islam ignoring how Sunni Islam
constructs subjectivities according to the logic of Sunni authority. He borrows from Carl Schmitt
the methodological notions that are constructed around European sovereignty and applies them
directly to describe Islam and Muslims. Ahsanuddin clarifies the point:
In framing his argument, Prof. Hallaq utilizes Carl Schmitt’s notion of “central” and “peripheral”
domains, or the primariness/secondariness of certain communal pursuits, to assess the
weltanschauungs that define the modern state and premodern Islamic governance. According to
Schmitt, the central domain defines a worldview because the objectives of the central domain
constitute the primary objectives for the worldview. The peripheral domain, on the other hand,
includes objectives of lesser importance: “the problems of other domains are solved in terms of
the central domain – they are considered secondary problems, whose solution follows as a matter
of course only if the problems of the central domain are solved.” Yet Hallaq distinguishes his
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approach from Schmitt by emphasizing “the centrality of the values adopted in the central domain
as ideal values that remain the distinctive desiderata and the locus of purposive action and
thought,” even though the values and ideals may not be realized. (Ahsanuddin. 14)

Thus, Hallaq constructs a method of analysis around the logic of European sovereign core where
the “Truth” of the system guides the entire system of meaning as a paradigm. In contrast, this
dissertation argues that authority of experts in Sunni Islam constructs different subjectivities and
notions of the self than those constructed around European sovereignty. This is the logical
justification of the role of Ulu Al Amr in the Sunni Fiqh. Their role was primarily as harmonizers
similar to Islamic philosophy that harmonized Greek philosophy around God. Consequently,
there is no body or a church in Sunni Islam that can claim “Truth” knowledge in Islam.

Once Hallaq constructs his method on the Schmittian notion of “central” and “peripheral”
domains of power and knowledge he differentiates his method by claiming that:
While Schmitt is right in insisting on the central domain as a driving force, our account of
paradigm emphasizes the centrality of the values adopted in the central domain as ideal values
that remain the distinctive desiderata and the locus of purposive action and thought, even when
their application and realization are not always achieved and even when the competing forces
within the domains constituting the paradigm undermine such application and realization. For
paradigms represent fields of “force relations,” encompassing opposing and competing discourses
and strategies. This is what led Foucault to declare that these discourses of power, in their
oppositional trajectories, are inseparable, for discourses “are tactical elements or blocks operating
in a field of force relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the
same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy
to another, opposing strategy.” If power is to deserve the name it bears, if it were to produce
effects over its subjects, then its processes and strategies—in their confluence and opposition—
must yield such effects that both directly and obliquely flow from these processes and strategies.
(Hallaq 2013, 17)

This is precisely the reason behind his claim that an Islamic state will always stand in
contradiction to modernity since European sovereignty of the “modern states debased
considerations of morality to secondary or tertiary status and simultaneously sanctified the
doctrine of progress considerations of morality to secondary or tertiary status and simultaneously
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sanctified the doctrine of progress. This preference of “is” over “ought,” of progress over
morality, is perhaps most visibly demonstrated in the destruction of the environment and the
various inequalities and ills that plague society” (Hallaq 2013, 13). Consequently, the European
subject sits comfortably in a world of political projects based on the “is” while the Muslim
subject struggles hopelessly to achieve the “ought” rendering him incompatible with modernity.
The aim here is to deny agency to both Western and non-Western subjects. Hallaq’s account
renders emancipatory project and struggles against power such as the global left and feminism as
meaningless achievements. Moreover, he nullifies the free, autonomous, and reflexive subject
whether European or non-European.
Conversely, this dissertation demonstrated in the previous chapter the struggles between
temporal power and Ulu Al Amr to legitimize the dynastic rule of the Umayyad and the
Abbasids. The absence of agency in his method I argue is due to his reliance exclusively on
Schmitt’s method in explaining the core character of Sharia. In contrast, this dissertation uses the
“exception” thesis of Schmitt but only in relation to the local core character of Ulu Al Amr and
authority in Sunni Islam. Thus, the legal structure of authority in Sunni Islam operating via Ulu
Al Amr demonstrates that Sharia is not a closed system applying metaphysical legal standards.
Instead, historically the task of Ulu Al Amr is to harmonize the Sharia with the social and
political changes the Muslims encountered in their history. And modernity and sovereignty is
another phase in history. More precisely, Sharia is an adaptive form of authority relationships
that changed in accordance to Maslaha and it was not an ideal system imposed on the material
world.
Thus, while throughout the dissertation the emphasis is on the difference between a
system of meaning that is based on European sovereignty and a Sunni system of meaning based
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on authority, human agency remains my central claim. The centrality of authority in the absence
of sovereignty in Islam’s system of meaning was not the result of “paradigmatic Islamic
governance” alone, as Hallaq claims, but the result of textual and historical circumstances that
thrust Ulu Al Amr in the role of authority in Sunni Islam with its particular type of obedience.
The following section will analyze the concept of European sovereignty in relation to Sunni
authority while avoiding the absence of agency in Hallaq’s account.
First, modernity produced fundamental changes in the physical and metaphysical realms
on a global scale by holding time and space in a specific relationship that created new realities
constructed around a specific logic of sovereignty. Carl Schmitt explains this claim as follow:
All pre-global orders were essentially terrestrial, even if they encompassed sea powers and
thalassocracies. The originally terrestrial world was altered in the Age of Discovery, when the
earth first was encompassed and measured by the global consciousness of European peoples. This
resulted in the first nomos of the earth. It was based on a particular relation between the spatial
order of firm land and the spatial order of free sea, and for 400 years it supported a Eurocentric
international law: the jus publicum Europaeum. In the 16th century, it was England that dared to
take the step from a terrestrial to a maritime existence. A further step was taken with the
industrial revolution, in the course of which the earth was newly conceived and newly measured.
It was essential that the industrial revolution occurred in the country that first had taken the step
to a maritime existence. This is the point at which we can approach the mystery of the new nomos
of the earth. (49)

Schmitt argues that the new terrestrial and maritime nomos changes the relationship between
physical and metaphysical affect that is universal in character. Clearly, the new nomos depends
on the military might of Great Britain whose global colonization redefined international law
according to the logic of the new nomos of the earth, which has sovereignty at its core. More
precisely, at apex of this nomos is the mysterious sovereign power “who decides on the
exception” (Schmitt 2005, 5). This sovereign is above the law with emergency powers to decide
when to suspend the law. Accordingly, “Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and
indivisible, which cannot be participated in and admits of no degrees, and which belongs to the
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Sovereign independently of the political whole, as a right of his own” (Maritain 1951, 38). Thus,
the quality of the sovereign as an entity above and separate from the collective is central to the
ability of the sovereign to disrupt the political process and suspend the laws even in democratic
political systems. “Accordingly, law and legitimacy emanate for the agent who is at the same
time a temporal and transcendental actor, the highest in power, the final power, general in effect,
and finally independent” (Jackson 2007, 92-94). The supernatural extraordinary powers of the
sovereign are theological, and Christian qualities exist in contemporary modernity in secular
qualities.
How and why does the sovereign possess such qualities? Moreover, who is the
sovereign? The answer is in the historical, social, and political conditions of Europe in its path
from medieval Christianity to contemporary modernity. Thus, the medieval European holds the
seeds of modern contemporary secular concepts of modernity. “The idea of sovereignty was
expediently arranged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by European rulers in the course
of their rivalries and struggles, religious and secular. Political and legal thinkers captured the
idea, its modus operandi and its underlying principles, in commentaries on the subject. Those
commentaries are interdisciplinary: the idea is at the heart of political and legal theory,
diplomatic as well as religious history, constitutional law and international law” (Jackson 2007,
1). As such, understanding contemporary political and legal concepts requires understanding the
theological aspects that must be investigated and taken into account. In this context, the political
writing of Carl Schmitt successfully captures the theological character of the contemporary
secular concept of sovereignty. For example, he argues that:
Whether God alone is sovereign, that is, the one who acts as his acknowledged representative on
earth, of the emperor, or prince, or the people, meaning those who identify themselves directly
with the people, the question is always aimed at the subject of sovereignty, at the application of
the concept to a concrete situation. Ever since the sixteenth century, jurists who discuss the
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question of sovereignty have derived their ideas from a catalogue of determining, decisive
features of sovereignty that can in essence be traced to the points made by Bodin. To possess
those powers meant to be sovereign. (10)

Accordingly, the religious question regarding sovereignty remained the same throughout the
evolution of the European legal system from emperor to prince and finally to the people. The
religious qualities of God’s representative on earth share Divine characteristics that then
transferred to the emperor, or prince, or the people in the modern era, “but it is not fixed and
unchanging. On the contrary, it has evolved and taken on different personas over time: it has
been reformulated periodically to fit the demands and exigencies of specific historical periods or
episodes” (Jackson 2007, 1). Yet, the enduring, supernaturally religious quality of sovereignty
as a link between the physical and metaphysical realms transferred from God’s incarnation to
emperor, prince, the people, and later the self, all of which are constituted as the same
supernatural character of a Sovereign God contextualized in personalized, earthly emancipatory
struggles against power and oppression. Jean Bethke Elshtain explains this personalization
process in the following quote:
This personalization of earthly rule is documented masterfully in Ernest Kantorowicz’s classic,
The King’s Two Bodies, as he unpacks the king’s “twinned nature,” embodied in mortal “natural”
man and the office which perdures in perpetuity with another “body” holding that office when a
previous fleshy monarch dies: the King is dead. Long live the King! The king comes to supplant
the pope as the mediator between the earthly and the divine. Thus, in the embodied account, “the
king appears the perfect christomimetes … with regard to power, since his power is the same as
that of Christ... the One who is God and Anointed by nature, acts through his royal vicar who is
‘God and Christ by Grace.” The will of the ruler brings the body to life. The head must “literally
by an individual mind or will. Most clearly of all, supreme power we cannot be except…in one,”
else it would be supreme. (62)

By sharing the qualities of a sovereign God, the earthly sovereign is able to rule over of his
subject with laws that emanate from his body. Thus, the European masses in their struggle must
possess the same supernatural quality to be successful in revolting against the sovereign’s laws
and liberate themselves from his tyranny. Nevertheless, it is this supernatural quality of
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sovereignty and the sovereign that holds sway in modernity. It is the ability to put the sovereign
and the sovereign nation state above all as an article of faith. It is the link the holds the physical
and metaphysical world together in a way meaningful to the subject who is now a citizen of the
nation state. Susan Buck-Morss explains this essential quality as:
The sovereign figure as personification of the collective demonstrates the power of the visible
image to close the circle between constituting and constituted power, explaining why even when
the illegalities of an individual sovereign are exposed, the faith of the believer is still not shaken.
As long as the circle appears closed, sovereign power remains intact; likewise, and conversely, as
long as sovereign power remains intact, the circle appears closed. The closing of the circle
demands a miracle, and the icon of the sovereign figure provides it. (2)

It is this enigmatic quality of the sovereign that persists in modernity. Accordingly, as “a
metaphysical figure, the sovereign connects the world of lived politics with the Platonic world of
eternal forms. The legitimacy of political power continues even in secular modernity to maintain
this ideal connection” (Buck-Morss 2007, 3). It is this religious quality of sovereignty that is
globalized with the advent of modernity, and it is the new environment that all non-European
people around the world must configure accordingly to their local legal, political, economic, and
social world. Thus, “the truth of the matter is that politics and religion are never severed from
each other so long as the figure of the sovereign holds sway. ‘All significant concepts of the
modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts,’ writes Schmitt, and none more
so than sovereignty” (Buck Morss 2007, 3). The consequences of this conception of sovereignty
are amplified further once it is transferred to other parts of the system of meaning.
This is precisely the argument of Jean Bethke Elshtain who claims in “Sovereignty: God,
State, and Self” that the birth of the new logic of sovereignty was historically a consequence of a
change in the conceptualization of Western Christendom’s God from a God of love and miracles
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to a willful God. Accordingly, this transformation of the Christian conception of a willful God
was transferred to the state and finally to the self. Explaining her claim, she argues:
A streamline version of my thesis would go like this: As sovereign state is to sovereign God, so
sovereign selves are to sovereign states. Given that sovereignty in the political sense “names”
self-determination for a territorial, collective entity, it is altogether unsurprising that this logic of
sovereignty came unbound and migrated, becoming attached more and more to notions of the
self. (159)

Ipso facto, modern subjectivities and the self are embedded in the European characteristics of
sovereignty. They are present in the universal concepts of justice, freedom, equality, and
autonomy. These universal concepts are expressed in a European historical framework that,
rightly so, attaches to them local qualities, which are necessary to make them meaningful.
Herbert Marcuse provides a historical evolution of the rise of the modern sovereign, but
in his example he argues that the Christian conception of freedom and its attitude toward
authority necessitated the rise of the sovereign. Marcuse differs from Elshtain in regard to the
causal direction of the evolution of the sovereign. In his case the Protestant conception of
freedom and attitude toward the external world necessitate the rise of the sovereign and the
territorial state. Nevertheless, Marcuse’s argument confirms the centrality of Christianity in the
rise of the sovereign. It is with Immanuel Kant that the theological basis of modernity is
secularized. The following quote illustrates the point:
The Protestantism of Luther and Calvin which gave the Christian doctrine of freedom its decisive
form for bourgeois society, is bound up with the emergence of a new, “young” society which had
first to conquer its right to exist in a bitter struggle against existing authorities. Faced with the
universal bonds of traditionalist feudalism it absolutely required the liberation of the individual
within the earthly order as well (the individual free subject of the economic sphere later
essentially became the model of its concept of the individual) – it required the liberation of the
territorial sovereign from the authority of an internationally centralized Church and a central
imperial power. It further required the liberation of the “conscience” from numerous religious and
ethical norms in order to clear the way for the rise of the bourgeoisie. In all these directions an
antiauthoritarian attitude was necessary…’ (Marcuse 2008, 9-10)
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Thus, the rise of the sovereign required a theological notion of the self that would assert certain
claims to autonomy and freedom against the church and the sovereign king. That autonomous
self would, in turn, produce secularized conceptions of freedom in modernity.
In sum, “to be sovereign means to exercise absolute power over one's self and one's fate.
But another way of putting this is that the sovereign — whether it is a god, a king, a state, or a
mere self — cannot be held answerable to anyone. When push comes to shove, sovereignty
always trumps law and morals” (Adam Kirsch, 2008). This is precisely the local European
characters of the universal concepts freedom, equality, and autonomy that should not be
universalized on global struggles against power. More accurately, the European framing of these
concepts is not the only process of development of modern subjectivity nor is it the
universalization of these concepts. Thus, according to the European historical record, struggles
against a sovereign with supernatural qualities are embodied in Western hostility to all forms of
external religious and secular authority. This hostility is necessary to emancipate the self from
the web of supernatural qualities and is precisely the local European context that requires the
subject to act hostilely and skeptically to external authorities and constraints, which emanate
from the sovereign. But that certainly does not mean the struggle is to be applied similarly
without taking into account the local qualities and context of the struggles for justice, freedom,
equality, and autonomy. The consequences of these supernatural qualities of the sovereign and
sovereignty are enormous in terms of the formation of subjectivities and struggles against power.
More important, these qualities are directly related to the project of the modern subject in
relation to the external world, laws, and authorities.
But what are the consequences of the absence of supernatural qualities in the Sunni Islam
system of meanings? How are the formation of the subject and subjectivities constituted? What
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obstacles frame the emancipatory project of the subject if the internal and external or the
physical and metaphysical realms are framed absent of a sovereignty with supernatural qualities?
If the Christian subject “as ‘internally’ free being man is born into a social order which, while it
may have been posited or permitted by God, by no means represents the realm in which the
existence or non-existence of man is decided upon. Whatever the nature of this order may be, the
inner freedom of man (his pure belief and his pure will, provided they remain pure) cannot be
broken in it. ‘The power of the temporal authority, whether it does right or wrong, cannot harm
the soul’” (Marcuse 2008, 9).

Conversely, subjectivity in Sunni Islam is constituted and framed according to the
subject’s understanding of the relationship between the physical and metaphysical realms or the
internal and external world as they stand in relation to one another. This dissertation claims that
the absence of duality in Sunni subjectivity nullifies the role of a temporal sovereign in the Sunni
system. Hence, freedom and emancipatory struggles are not framed dualistically, as they are
Protestantism, in a relationship of sovereignties, which set the trajectory of the unfolding of
modernity. Marcuse argues that Christian subjectivity constitutes the world as dual oppositional
realms internal/external. The consequence of his theological account ultimately leads back to the
Fall. According to Marcuse:
The Christian doctrine of freedom pushes the liberation of man back until it pre-dates his actual
history, which then, as the history of his unfreedom, becomes an “eternal” consequence of this
liberation. In fact, strictly speaking there is no liberation of man in history according to this
doctrine or, to put it more precisely, Christian doctrine has good reasons for viewing such a
liberation as primarily something negative and evil, namely the partial liberation from God, the
achievement of freedom to sin (as symbolized by the Fall)…As “internally” free being man is
born into a social order which, while it may have been posited or permitted by God, by no means
represents the realm in which the existence or non-existence of man is decided upon. Whatever
the nature of this order may be, the inner freedom of man (his pure belief and his pure will,
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provided they remain pure) cannot be broken in it. “The power of the temporal authority, whether
it does right or wrong, cannot harm the soul.” (8-9)

It is precisely these local qualities that frame the universal emancipatory project and
subjectivities in a particular order that must be taken into account to construct a global struggle
against power and the oppression of the weak. Overlooking such local qualities usually leads to
the confirmation of Ali Mirsepassi’s claim that modernity and modernization are mere discourses
of power to dominate the other. By insisting on universalizing the local qualities of European
sovereignty in discussions and debates about universal projects of struggles and emancipation
leads to discourses of power that:
(1) [define] the “Third World” as a singular essentialized entity not in terms of its own existing
qualities, but in term if “First World” qualities which it lacks…
(2) [define] contemporary conditions in the Third World in terms of abstracted conditions of
European historical experience; the Third World is seen as embodying aspects of Europe’s past
(feudalism, etc.)…
(3) [make] the assumptions that only one essential path to modernity exists in the world, and
Europe has experienced this path in advance of non-Western world. (Mirsepassi 2000, 8)

Accordingly, the insistence on looking at the world exclusively form a European subjectivity as
the only “True” self, is to nullify global emancipatory projects and struggles again the oppression
of power. Oppression is universal but unfolds in a local context based on geographical frames of
reference. Thus, this dissertation claims that there is much to gain from theorizing the
commonalities in Sunni Islam and European subjectivity for a dialogue about social justice,
tolerance, freedom, equality, and dignity.
Similarly, the conception of the self in Sunni Islam frames the subject according to local,
historical, social, and political conditions. Absent a sovereign in the European sense, Sunni Islam
situates the formation of the self against the backdrop of its own local, historical circumstances.
In this case, the duality of the internal and external world in relation to liberty has no significance
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in Sunni subjectivity. The physical and metaphysical divide as a problem in the mind of the
subject is absent. The question of the return to Adam’s innocence before the Fall as the original
the ideal condition for emancipatory struggles against power is not present in Islamic subjectivity
in general. To explain this point further the Islamic political theorist Eltigani A. Hamid gives us
an account of the Fall according to the Qur’an and its political consequences. He chooses Surat
al-Araf (chapter seven) and divides the chapter it into sections for the purpose of understanding
the origins of political thought in the Makkan (the chapters and verses that were revealed during
the first ten years of the Qur’an in Mecca). This verse in the Qur’an:
Presents a conceptual framework of the reality of the human condition. It deals with the relations
between humans and God, human beings and themselves, and human beings and the universe.
Two main concepts can readily be defined: 1. All human beings are created from a single soul,
and have a sound innate nature (fitrah salimah). God has established them on earth, and made it a
source of sustenance for them. 2. All human beings are under God’s command. He sends
messengers to humankind chosen from among themselves, to convey His commands to them; and
the people must renounce all other forms of allegiance, follow the guidance of their messenger,
and devote themselves fully to their Creator and sole Sovereign…All human beings are created
from a single soul, and have a sound innate nature. God has established them on earth, and made
it a source of sustenance for them. (Hamid 2004, 32-33)

The material/spiritual or the physical/metaphysical realms are not separate, and with a different
narrative of the Fall, they do not stand in binary opposition. Subjectivity is based on a continuum
between the two realms in relation to the liberty, resistance, and dignity of the subject. Therefore,
the Sunni subject does not frame liberty and resistance to power based on the Protestant divide of
internal/external; instead, obedience to external authority is the frame of resistance against
arbitrary temporal power. That obedience prevents temporal power from legislating moral laws
or locating itself above the moral. More precisely, the subject’s constitution of the self unfolds
against the background of the local quality in which there is an absence of a supernatural or
enigmatic earthly power.
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In this context the interpretation of Sharia via the external authority Ulu Al Amr is the
subject’s field of struggle against oppression and a constraint on power. The historical struggle in
Sunni Islam is over the usurpation of Sharia by temporal power’s bending of the meaning of the
Qur’an and Sunna attempts to legitimize oppression and injustice. Thus, the central difference
here is that temporal power in Sunni Islam never achieved the supernatural status of the
European sovereign. The historical dilemma of temporal power in Islam is how to usurp Sharia
and the authority of Ulu Al Amr. The lack of religious icons or a miracle of incarnation in Sunni
Islam’s system of meaning deprived temporal power of the ability to acquire sacred or
supernatural qualities. Thus, the entire edifice of Fiqh al siyash al shariah revolves around the
question of the legitimacy of temporal power and why and when Muslim subjects must obey or
disobey. Moreover, the very same condition devolves on Ulu Al Amr as experts who decide on
the legal conditions of obedience, which is what in Sharia lends it legitimacy. On the other hand,
in Islam temporal power achieves legitimacy through realist accounts and compromise based on
the legal principle of the Maslaha of the Umma, i.e., the good of the community. This task is in
the hands of members of the community, the Ulu Al Amr, whose legitimacy is based on legal
expertise not supernatural qualities. Therefore, in Sunni Islam the subject’s autonomy, freedom,
and equality are attached to the interpretation and meaning of the law. Historically, the success
of emancipatory movements against temporal power and oppression depends on the ability to
hold temporal power to the movements’ interpretation of Sharia. Hence, it is absolutely central
for any Muslim emancipatory project that the authority of Ulu Al Amr remains free from the
usurpation of temporal power. This is precisely the unfolding of struggle in the history of the
Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah.
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This dissertation argues that the root difference between Sunni authority and Western
sovereignty finds its articulation in the Christian and Islamic accounts of the Fall. It follows that
accounts of the Fall are relevant to conceptions of sovereignty. Embedded in the European
subject are attitudes about how power in the external world is framed, and that framing is related
to the presence of a supernatural sovereign with supernatural qualities. This discussion will be
revisited again later in the chapter but for now the focus is on the consequences of the
displacement of Sunni authority by the European concept of sovereignty.

For Islam, modernity and colonialism share the same historical roots of violence. They
have made the European sovereign nation-state an unavoidable historical fact. Thus, “as far as
the Middle East was concerned, it was generally the dominant colonial power that first created
the essential features of a modern state, by giving it a centralized administration, a legal system,
a flag and internationally recognized boundaries” (Owen 1998, 6). As a result, new identities of
national language and geographical territories were constructed according to European notions of
the self. Furthermore, “the new states were also given new bureaucracies and a new emphasis on
homogeneity and equality. There was now to be one center of authority, issuing standard rules
and regulations which were supposed to be applied equally to all those who lived within its
boundaries as citizens” (Owen 1998, 10). At the same time, it was the presence of the military
and its use of force that made these new states possible and created a legacy of states structured
by oppressive modern armies.
Violence displaced Sunni authority and put in place new European constructs, that is to
say the modern sovereign state, without organic, local negotiations. The ripple effect of this
modernization can still be observed in the ideological divide that haunts the Arab Spring states.
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The response to the historical moment of European colonialism and domination divided local
responses over how best to reform and challenge this new reality making it a critical junction for
the reform movements in the region. Historically, local responses can be divided around the
ideological spilt that divided Islamist and national projects. These ideological divides were
fundamental and produced different subjectivities based on a European sovereignty of universal
principles and values or Sunni authority.
The intensity of the ideological divide varied geographically from one region to another
and varied according to whether political system were kingdoms, monarchies, or republics. In
Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen divisions were overlapping, while in Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf monarchies the division was less pronounced. Furthermore, the intensity of this division
varied within the same republic or monarchy with the in split urban centers clearer than in rural
areas.

In this section I will focus on the Ottoman Empire with its principal Sunni political
structure the Sunni Caliphate. The declining Ottoman Empire was a member of an international
system in which major European powers were expanding globally. These major powers
redefined the international system according to their domestic legal codes and customs. Once
they expanded globally, they defined international law according to the core logic of their own
laws. These external forces and constraints shaped the Ottoman Empire to structure itself
according to European conceptions of sovereignty. This globalized process has created a modern
epoch of European hegemony, which codified European conceptions of sovereignty in
international law through agreements such as the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights
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and Duties of States. Accordingly, a sovereign state has a fixed population, a defined territory,
and a functioning government.
Consequently, in response to European powers the Khalifs of the Ottoman Empire
embarked on the modernization of domestic institutions with the goal of emulating centralized
European bureaucracies. The resulting institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr in the person of the
Grand Mufti in the state bureaucracy was a logical outcome of the modern-state. The Ottoman
Empire was willing to endanger historical institutions that eventually lead to the unraveling of
the logic of Sunni authority. Nafi and Taji-Farouki describe this process as follow:
With the rise of the bureaucratized Islamic empires in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, two
major developments came to affect the position of the ulama. First was the incorporation of a
large segment of the ulama class into structures of the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mogul states.
Second was increasing identification of the Sufi tariqas with the ulama institutions. While leading
to a marked reduction in intellectual diversity within the ulama class as a whole, and limiting the
degree of freedom they enjoyed relative to that ulama of preceding centuries, these developments
did not diminish the influence of the ulama. On the contrary: the pervasive diffusion of Sufi
tariqas in Muslim society and the instrument of the state that had thus become available of
“official” ulama in fact consolidated and added further dimensions to the ulama’s status and
influence in society. By the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, sweeping
transformation produced by the modernisation programs and the experience of European
imperialism were leaving their impact on the position of the ulama, opening the doors for the
eventual emergence of new spokesmen for Islam. (Nafi/Taji-Farouki. 6)

Interestingly, the authors claim that the authority of the Ulama was further strengthened and
consolidated once they became an institutionalized body of the Empire. Yet, by turning Ulu Al
Amr into a tool of temporal power the consequence of this political maneuver historically
undermined the paradigmatic legal concept of Sunni authority that underlay the entire legal,
social, and political system. Similarly, Esposito and Voll argue that “in some major areas, like
the Ottoman Empire, the ulama had become an institutionalized part of the ruling system. This
gave real power to the scholar but opened the way for the organizations of scholars to become
closely tied to political institutions that were subject to decline” (14). And that “by the era of
peak of power of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, the ‘official’ ulama were a
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significant part of the state structure and the institutions of the status quo” (Esposito/ Voll 2001,
9). Historically the Ottoman Empire established close ties between temporal power and the
institutional Ulu Al Amr. Actually, the Ottoman Empire provided the tool that was essential to
later political entities erected on its ruins. The institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr, which later
established the post of the Grand Mufti, effectively created a church and an official state religion.
The Grand Mufti was elevated to the role of sole speaker on behalf of the faith instead of the
class of Ulu Al Amr who may disagree with one another. The new post could be easily turned
into a rubberstamp of temporal power. The entire process and change, in the guise of a legal
principle, usurped the legitimacy of Ulu Al Amr authority through the violence of temporal
power. This was a central moment in the history of Sunni Islam where for the first time temporal
power was at the apex of the political structure, and force was effectively exercised over Sharia
and justified by Sharia. Yet, it must be noted that Ottoman Caliphate were able to introduce
drastic changes to the Empire as long as they appeared to adhere during the process to “the most
fundamental duty of a Muslim ruler, and that which both expressed and strengthened his
alliances with the Muslim population, was to maintain the shari’a” (Hounrani 1991, 223).This
could not have been achieved unless temporal power was free from historical ties to the authority
of Ulu Al Amr. Consequently, only a change in the legal logic of the entire system would allow
such a massive scale of change and enable the empire to introduce foundational changes in all
aspects of life. A similar process was taking place in independent Egypt and other parts of the
region. Consequently, these new modern changes undermined the remaining authority of Ulu Al
Amr or the Grand Mufti effectively marginalizing them/him form the social, political, economic,
and legal structure of the Empire. For example:
Modern education brought with it new disciplines, depriving the ulama of their centuries-old
monopoly of the educational process. At the same time, it produced new types of professionals
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and intellectuals, for whom the traditional Islamic knowledge of the ulama was becoming
increasingly irrelevant. Similarly, modern court systems based on foreign legal procedures and
laws, and the appropriation of the legislation process itself by the centralized state, undermined
the law. The waqf sector, a major source if the economic power of the ulama and of their
economic independence, was largely taken over by the modern state in the nineteenth century,
and finally abolished in many Muslim countries during the course of the twentieth century. (Nafi/
Taji-Farouki 2004, 6)

Similarly, Mohammed Ali Pasha (1769-1849) single handedly embarked on the task of
modernizing Egypt (once a part of the Ottoman Empire) into a nation with a central power and a
modern bureaucracy. Consequently, a massive project was established displacing traditional
institutions on an unparalleled scale. It dismantled the social, economic, and political sectors of
society that depended on Sharia for its legitimacy. Esposito and Voll illustrate this process of
decline in the legal role of the Ulama:
The majority of the ulama in the most Muslim societies emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth
century as a declining conservative force. The educational institutions under their control lost
resources, students, and influence and in many places were simply taken over by the states, which
were increasingly dominated by secularist modernizers. Perhaps the major symbolic culmination
of this trend was the nationalization in 1961 of the great historic Islamic university of al-Azhar in
Cairo. The justification was the need to “train a new generation committed to and capable of
contributing to modernization and development. As a result, the university lost much of its
independence both academically and politically. (Esposito/Voll 2001, 15)

Moreover, in Tunis the dismantling process took the shape of uprooting Islamic centers such as
“the Zaytouna, a famed center of Islamic learning in North Africa and the Muslim world, was
closed. The ulama were debilitated, rather than, as occurred in many Muslim countries, coopted
by the government” (Esposito/Voll 2001, 92). The symbolism signifies a divorce from the past.
Al-Zaytouna had produced over its history important Muslim scholars such as Ibn Khaldun. The
signal here was that these learning centers and institutions were no longer needed due to their
“backwardness”. More important, specialists in Islamic law were no longer needed after the
adaptation of French law to regulate personal and public life.
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Once European imperialism conquered the Muslim empires and ruled over them, it was
logical that the legitimacy of the entire system including Islam and its institutions was put in
doubt and questioned by Muslim reformers. Consequently and for the first time ever, questions
about the role of Islam in public life and the place of Islam as a state religion became central to
those who wanted to reform the state. They became legitimate discussion topics and occupied
center stage among contemporary reformers. More important, the hegemony of Sharia in public
and private spheres was questioned and gradually replaced by the introduction of European laws.
These practices marked a turning point in the history of Islam. It is important to note that such
challenges to social and political reality were true to all non-European people who had their
reality redefined and shaped in accordance of international law and at its core the European
conception sovereignty, the nation-state. It was this new identity that the ruling elite of the
Middle East adopted and that was imposed on the public as modernizing project for the state to
achieve. Hallaq explains this process by arguing that “elsewhere, I have suggested that the
postcolonial nationalist elites maintained the structures of power they had inherited from the
colonial experience and that, as a rule and after gaining so-called independence for their
countries, they often aggressively pursued the very same colonial policies they had fiercely
fought against during the colonial period. They inherited from Europe a readymade nation-state
(with its constitutive power structures) for which the existing social formations had not been
adequately prepared” (16).

The questions regarding the role of Islam and Sharia in public life and the state were
never resolved intellectually or theologically. Furthermore, the institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr
was an inevitable outcome of the legal exceptions of Wilayah al ahed leading to Wlayah al qaher
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in Fiqh al siyash al shariah. The outcome of such judicial opinion produced permanent legal
exceptions for temporal powers to use force under the legal category of Maslaha, as I illustrated
in chapter four. This legal concession to temporal power set in motion an evolutionary legal
trajectory that increased the power of the Caliphate and brought about a decline in the
independence and authority of Ulu Al Amr. Thus, once temporal power was able to expand its
domain of power under Sharia there was no turning back to a smaller role in the social and
political spheres. Thus, following the steps of the Umayyad and the Abbasid empires, the
Ottomans Caliphate were set on the path of increasing its power via more exceptions and
concessions, thereby undermining the independence of Ulu Al Amr’s authority. This historical
change in the legal and political structures resulted in a paradigmatic change in the relationship
between power and authority in the Sunni legal structure. Temporal power in the nineteenth
century was finally above Sharia shaping according to needs and necessities of the modern
nation-state. Accordingly, the institutionalized Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti became a tool of state
power to legitimize the state monopoly of the use of force regardless of Sharia. Thus the
replacement of Sunni legal concepts of authority with European sovereignty was never
negotiated or open to a debate. Instead, force was the dominant instrument to impose the new
change both by the occupying imperial powers and the local elites that ruled the region in the
postcolonial era.
Yet, all monarchies and republics that resulted from dissolution of the Ottoman Empire
followed the footsteps of the Ottoman Empire by institutionalizing the Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti
as a component of the modern state apparatus and turning it into a mouthpiece to state-power.
This phenomenon presents us with an interesting question: Why self-professed secular states
such as, Turkey or Tunisia, establish state institutions such a ministry of theology and a Grand
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Mufti? This dissertation argues that the answer is in the process of how European sovereignty
displaced Sunni authority. More precisely the institutionalization Ulu Al Amr as part of the
apparatus of the sovereign nation-state undermined the legitimacy of their legal authority in the
eyes of the Sunni Muslims throughout the region. Thus, imposing the legal concept of European
sovereignty led to the democratization of the post of Ulu Al Amr which eventually led to the rise
of political Islam in the twentieth century as a reform movement challenging legitimacy of rulers
and the state. This dissertation labels this reforming class of Ulu Al Amr the “modern Ulu Al
Amr” and argues that modernity and sovereignty forced Islamic empires to reorganize their
domestic structures to institutionalize Ulu Al Amr and effectively establish a church as part of the
state bureaucracy, which dismantled the authority of the entire system. Consequently, the
delegitimization of Ulu Al Amr’s authority undermined state institutions in economic, social and
political matters. Thus, the ruling power unintentionally provided the new Ulu Al Amr an
opportunity to be a new class in charge of reconciling Islam with the universal concepts of
modernity such as sovereignty, democracy, equality, and freedom.

In chapter three we discussed the concept of authority and the nature of obedience in
Sunni Islam that made authority and not power the paradigmatic legal concept that entire system
is constructed around. This problematic of power is directly related to the question on how and
who legitimately rules Muslims. As the Prophet did not designate a ruler or a designate a system
of governance for the community, this task was historically developed in Sunni Fiqh al siyash al
shariah according to the legal of Maslaha or expedience according to what is good for
community. The Qur’an as a primary source of the Sharia made no demands on Muslims to
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obey a king, emperor, Sultan, or Khalifa. Instead, the only command in the Qur’an is obedience
to Ulu Al Amr and only according to the teachings of God and the Prophet.
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. (4:59)

The violence that followed the death of the Prophet, what Donner has dubbed the First Civil War
(35-40 AH /656-661 CE) and Second Civil War (60-73AH /680-692 CE), is a testament to the
inability of temporal powers to enforce a sense of legality without the sanctions of the authority
of Ulu Al Amr. The ripple effect of the violence committed in the early history of Islam is still
present with us today dividing Muslims into Sunni and Shia Islam. Thus, Wilayah al ahed and
Wlayah al qaher are not commands or injunction in the Qur’an and the Sunna. Instead, these
legal principles were developed via legal authority of Ulu Al Amr under the legal principle of
Maslaha or expedience. Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (1263 – 1328 CE) noted that the
more Muslims departed in history away for the founding period of Islam the more they need to
rely on Fiqh al awalyyat (i.e. legislating in accordance of the expedient rather than what is legal
according to Sharia). Fiqh al awalyyat is based on sacrificing a legal principle expediently to
implement a more important principle according to Maslaha e.g. the good of Umma the
community. Accordingly, Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah and ultimately the body of Sharia is a
product of the centuries Ulu Al Amr’s rulings in accordance to Maslaha or expediency in specific
historical moments and not a set of divine injunctions. Moreover, he comments on how Ulu Al
Amr authority avoided direct clash with temporal power especially after the Second Civil War by
emphasizing the three principles that the evolution of Sunni Fiqh al siyash al shariah is based
on. The first principle is the spread of Islam; the second is the legality of the temporal power;
and finally the unity of the Umma. He further argues that all three principals were present during
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Prophetic rule and the Guided Caliphate. During later periods it was impossible to implement all
three principals at once thus the legality of Khalifa was sacrificed on the condition that the other
two principles are implemented. Hence, Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher were invented
legal principles in accordance with Maslaha.

By the nineteenth century the decline of Muslim empires undermined the historical and
legal justification of the Khalifa post rendering it meaningless and outdated. As I argued in
chapter four, the legal exception granted to temporal power, is no longer applicable to the
modern conditions of Muslim empires. It was precisely the logical explanation behind the
institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti during the Ottoman period that eliminated legal
opinions that may have questioned the legitimacy of the Khalifa. The temporal powers of the
Ottoman, Safavid, and Mogul Empires followed the same legal process of institutionalizing Ulu
Al Amr and effectively blocked any possible dissenting juridical opinions that may undermined
the legitimacy of their power. Thus by institutionalizing Ulu Al Amr as a part of the state
bureaucracy the outcome was the establishment of a state-church speaking on behalf of the
sovereign who was no longer constrained by Sharia. Moreover, the sovereign is the new author
of Sharia. As a result of this change in the pragmatic nature of Sunni authority any possible
reform to the establishment was prevented since it would eventually lead to questioning the
legitimacy of temporal rule. This apparent stagnation and lack of genuine reform in the
established church of Ulu Al Amr and the empire set the stage for new energy and a reformer-led
evolution in Islamic legal and political thought. Thus, while modernity was responsible for the
paradigmatic shift in the nature of authority in Sunni Islam by simultaneously providing the
physical and metaphysical force of institutionalizing Ulu Al Amr according to the logic of
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sovereignty, it also allowed for the challenges to role of the modern Ulu Al Amr. Hence, this
dissertation claims that the modern Ulu Al Amr are those reformers who appeared in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries setting the stage for the rise of political Islam. Their primary
authority stems from their ability to challenge orthodoxy by appealing to new interpretation of
tradition and calling for Ijtihad. They have been successful in capturing the public imaginary by
clothing reformist thought in the language of Islam. The establishment Ulu Al Amr were and still
are prevented from addressing the new challenges due to the replacement of Sunni authority with
state sovereignty. As a result it is difficult to hide that they are state bureaucrats who are
appointed for the purpose of sanctioning state action as Islamic in accordance with Sharia.
The task of facing the new challenge has been further complicated by the intrusive nature
of the modern state, which dominates every aspect of the life of its citizens. This domination was
further amplified by the types of states that were established on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire
and postcolonial rule. They were authoritarian, intrusive, and undemocratic and further
undermined the legitimacy of the institutionalized Ulu Al Amr’s authority. Moreover, the
intrusive nature of the modern-state contradicts the minimal role of the state under Sharia, which
regulates the state and keeps temporal power at check by governing Muslim social and economic
lives. Thus, modernity, and the new class of Ulu Al Amr or nineteenth century reformers who
were the products of modernity, and the legal concept of sovereignty, was directly responsible
for the rise of the modern Ulu Al Amr and ultimately what came to be called Islamism or political
Islam.
This dissertation claims that advent of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838/1839 –1897) and
his disciple Muhammad Abduh (1849– 1905) signaled the arrival in the nineteenth century of the
challenge of the modern Ulu Al Amr. Their key task was to be critical of the status quo, to
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criticize simultaneously the establishment Ulu Al Amr, propose reforming the entire system, and
call into question the legitimacy of the Khalifa. But certainly we are speaking here of a matter of
degree from one person to another. But overall, they were critical of the established institution of
Ulu Al Amr/Grand Mufti. They challenged their/his legal juridical justification of temporal power
on the basis of fundamental physical and metaphysical questions. Nafi illustrates this new class’s
critical challenge to the establishment:
At the heart of the reformists’ call for ijtihad is their belief in the notion of ta ‘lil [definition], of
intelligibility of God’s injunction…the reformist call for ijtihad became a modern-Islamic
celebration of the objectivity of the law in Islam… Yet, reformist thought was not a mere
reflection of theological and juristic preoccupation; it was not an idealist intellectual exercise, but
rather an undertaking embedded in a specific socio-political context. Never since the Umayyad
and early Abbasid periods was Islamic thought so interconnected with, and so expressive of, the
socio-political questions of the time as reformist thought was, almost every single major idea of
the reformists had socio-political implications. The reformist rejection of predestination (‘aqidat
al-qadar, as Abduh put it) was not only an attack on the Ash’ari-Sufi ethos but essentially a
denunciation of political despotism and its perceived inevitability. (43)

Appealing to tradition to justify contemporary decline is no longer acceptable to the new class of
individuals. They dismiss the appeal to authority and appealed to the Qur’an and Sunna as a
source of authority by passing Fiqh al siyash al shariah and producing new legal arguments that
they feel are adequate to addressing the crisis and decline.
Thus, the question that requires further elaboration is: Who are the members of Ulu Al
Amr and what do they have in common? This dissertation claims that the modern Ulu Al Amr
have four common characteristics. First, they are critical reformers and by definition they
challenge the authority of the establishment and the state over the social, economic, and political
conditions, and the direction of reform led by the state. Second, they are able to capture the
imaginary mind of the public and have followers that share their views and hold them in high
regard. Third, they use Qur’an and the Sunna to challenge the establishment and capture the
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public mind. Finally, they don’t necessarily hold formal training in Sharia and Fiqh. This is
precisely the democratizing consequence of modernity where religious/political matters are open
for discussion and critique in the Muslim public sphere. Accordingly, the modern Ulu Al Amr
ranges from Al-Afghani, Al-Banna, Al-Ghannush, to Malcolm X. Or, it could be someone like
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi “the leader of the self-proclaimed Islamic state that stretches across
eastern Syria and much of northern and western Iraq...” (Rubin, 2014). The leader of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is an example of a return to the Ulu Al Amr during the founding
period of the Four Guided Caliphs by uniting temporal power once more with piety by appearing
in public for the first time leading the July 5th Friday sermon in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul.
Al-Baghdadi tactically demonstrated his intensions during Friday sermon broadcast by all major
global satellite Arabic news channels. He used the same words used by the First Caliph Abu
Baker (573- 634 CE) in his well-known speech to the Umma by asking “for the congregation’s
support and struck an almost humble and pious tone... ‘I was placed as your caretaker, and I am
not better than you,’ he said” (Rubin, 2014). This demonstrates the importance of the founding
period of Sunni Islam which is directly tied to the authority relationship between the authority
and the Muslim Subject.
Modernity and at its core European sovereignty, produced the modern Ulu Al Amr who
are the “new spokesmen for Islam, lawyers, teachers, journalists or modern professionals, lacked
the formal training of the ulama class along with its established criteria of learning and piety.
Above all, they lacked the world-view of this class. What contributed yet further to the rupturing
of traditional Islamic authority was the powerful case made by the Muslim reformers for
reasserting the primacy of the foundational texts, the Qur’an and Sunna” (Taji-Farouki/ Nafi
2008, 10). They assert their newly founded authority against the establishment Ulu Al Amr’s
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claim on authority by appealing to a higher source of authority than the traditional foundations of
Fiqh al siyash al shariah. We are back to the central verse 4:59 in the Qur’an, which concerns
the conditions and the limitations of obedience to those in authority, for example, Ulu Al Amr in
Sunni Islam. The modern Ulu Al Amr claim that once earlier members of Ulu Al Amr disagreed
about the body of Sharia they produced new laws according to Maslaha, which then called for a
return to the primary sources of the Qur’an and the Sunna. That return to primary sources is
justified according to the Qur’an:
O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you.
And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in
Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result. 4:59

Furthermore, since “those in authority among you” are regular learned individuals and are
neither saints nor supernatural beings, their opinion once challenged is conditioned by the
situations and cases to which they are applied. In this sense, a disagreement arises from the
applicability of Fiqh al siyash al shariah to the social and political crises of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. This legal maneuver and usurpation of authority is explained further by TajiFarouki and Nafi:
As the salafi idea of returning directly to the founding texts gradually displaced the assumptions
of the ulamatic traditions of learning as the necessary credentials for speaking on behalf of Islam,
the Islamic cultural arena became wide open to an assortment of voices, reflecting new notions of
authority. Alternative modes of authority were derived from the dominant and pervasive
influence of modern education and professions, form political activism, and from the power and
influence of modern information technology and modes of communication. In many cases, the
intensifying conflict between the ruling classes and political Islamic forces even the modern
nation-state to appropriate for itself the authority to speak on behalf of Islam. (10)

Accordingly, they used Ijtihad to bypass the tradition of Fiqh al siyash al shariah to undermine
the authority of the establishment Ulu Al Amr. The tool of Ijtihad allowed them to present new
solutions that are independent from the colonial and temporal power. To further illustrate the
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commonality among the members of modern Ulu Al Amr, Shireen Hunter argues that the
“reformist Islam,” or what this dissertation labels as modern Ulu Al Amr, share the following
common characteristics:
1. Islamic reformists argue that what they are trying to reform is not Islam per-se, but
human understanding of Islam.
2. All reformists are dissatisfied with traditionalist class of ulmma who are insisting on
the taqlid and refuse ijtihad to maintain the statues-quo.
3. All thinkers all advocate ijtihad.
4. They emphasize the difference between Shari’a and fiqh. They further argue that this
distinction is ignored by traditional class of ulmma.(12)

In sum, all four conditions demonstrate the tacit claim on authority to speak on behalf of the
public and Islam and the genuine voice of Islam. It is important that this claim is recognized by
the masses and captures the public imaginary in form of mass movement. Otherwise, the
reformer is just a public intellectual who expresses dissenting views against the establishment.
Thus, the public sphere becomes the essential tool for reforming and organizing the public
around political demands and claims over economic, social and political demands on power. Of
course, some individuals resort to violence against states and society at large. These individuals
take it upon themselves and with a following to dismantle the entire system both domestically
and internationally. This variety of approaches is also a consequence of Sunni conceptions of
authority and the absence of a church in Islam. For example, Osama Bin Laden, Ayman alZawahiri, or Al-Baghdadi who consider themselves authoritative voice speaking on behalf of
Islam and Muslims; if they are able to capture the public imaginary then the outcome leads to
murderous attacks on innocent civilians. But the principle of authority in Sunni Islam allow for
different and contending interpretations that consider such acts un-Islamic. The problem is to
judge such a phenomenon using the logic of sovereignty and consider Islam in general sanctions
the killing of innocent civilians. After all, it is modernity with the logic of state sovereignty at its
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core that created the contradictions that necessitate the institutionalization of Ulu Al Amr and the
intellectual forces that challenge authority and demand renewal and reform. Most important, this
condition is global and not solely Islamic. The condition that specifically affected Islam was that
the legal concept of European sovereignty, which caused a paradigmatic change that displaced
the Sunni conception of authority. Muslims live today under the conditions of modernity, which
are global and in sovereign territorial nation-states, whether they agree to them or not, but it is
precisely this condition that has brought about the Sunni authority and it’s opposite, the modern
Ulu Al Amr, a necessary condition to address modernity.

In Conclusion, the consequence of European sovereignty at the physical and
metaphysical realms modernity challenged and changed the legal conditions around the logic of
Sunni authority. The most important change is the rearrangement of international law according
to the legal logic of sovereignty with the nation-state as its fundamental basic unit. Consequently,
the logic of sovereignty produced new notions of the self that frame the world in relation to the
territorial nation-state and the sovereignty of the body. Gradually, these subjectivities were
globalized and universalized emancipatory struggles according to the logic of sovereignty.
Similarly, Sunni Islam produced subjectivities that frame emancipatory struggles against
arbitrary power in the context of the authority Ulu Al Amr. Thus, this dissertation argues that
while resistance to arbitrary power via emancipatory struggles of the subject is universal, these
struggles must be understood in the context of the local logics and frames of reference.
Therefore, overlooking the these local characters renders the universality of human rights a
top/down Western hegemonic discourse of power that impose Western values as the only
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genuine subjectivity and conception of the self. Instead, the aim should be to focus on the
commonalities in the struggles against the oppression of arbitrary power which is universal. The
most important obstacle in the “Arab Spring” between the Islamists and secular political forces is
the absence of a vision of common platform that holds the secular modern subject and the
Muslim subject in their resistance to arbitrary power and oppression. This understanding is
important to a global dialogue that is based on mutual understanding and appreciation and the
possibility of a common global project overlooking the “clash of civilization” thesis.
Finally, this chapter argues that the consequence of modernity was twofold. First, due to
the logic of sovereignty the nation-state centralized the Ulu Al Amr by institutionalizing the class
as a part of state bureaucracy. Consequently, the logic of state sovereignty undermined Sunni
authority undermining Ulu Al Amr’s legitimacy. Second, as state sovereignty undermined the
legitimacy of the institutionalized Ulu Al Amr leading to the rise of the modern Ulu Al Amr who
opposed to traditional establishment rejecting Wilayah al ahed and Wlayah al qaher with the aim
of reinterpreting Fiqh al siyash al shariah free from tradition as autonomous and reflexive
agents. Thus, modern Ulu Al Amr are as much a product of modernity as feminism, civil rights,
civil liberties, or the global left resisting oppressive power and global capitalism. Thus,
modernity provided modern or reformist Ulu Al Amr the physical and metaphysical conditions
that undermine the traditional pro-establishment Ulu Al Amr is a central feature of Sunni Islam in
the epoch of modernity. This explains the rise of political Islam as challenge to autocratic rule in
the Muslim world.
This precisely explains the panic of traditional monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, which
are the guard of the establishment Ulu Al Amr, and have the most to lose if their authority is
undermined. Thus, it is understandable that the Gulf monarchies are clear in their intention to
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defeat any reform by modern Ulu Al Amr. As long are Sunni Muslims are willing to look
elsewhere for authoritative voices that speak on behalf of Islam modern Ulu Al Amr are going to
thrive.
Finally, Hallaq’s account of the impossibility of the Islamic state would be accurate if
had a “true” Islamic state did exist since the Prophet’s death, but historically that is not the case.
Thus, this dissertation argues that Fiqh al siyash al shariah is a testament to the authority of Ulu
Al Amr as the agency that harmonizes the ideals of Islam with the ever-changing concrete world.
It is precisely the role of agency that is absent from Hallaq’s “paradigmatic Islamic governance”
that accounts for the title of his work the “impossible state.”
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CONCLUSION
“Arab Spring”

The following are concluding remarks related to contemporary events in the Arab world
in the light of the findings of this dissertation. When research commenced on this dissertation,
the self-immolation of the street vender Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia and the Arab
Spring had already been underway. While the change took everyone by surprise it was a
welcomed moment for many who argued that democracy has finally arrived to a region lagging
in democratic rule, social justice, and basic respect for human rights. Yet, soon the optimism and
the aura around the populist uprising of 2011 eroded, and many questioned whether the Arab
Spring had turned into an “Arab Winter” (Totten, 2012). One thing for sure is that the dominoeffect of change that seemed to be spreading in the region overwhelming everything in its path
had been effectively halted and reversed. Vulnerable states such as Morocco, Jordan, Algeria,
and Sudan that experienced popular demonstrations and were on the path of revolutionary
change are much more stable at the moment than they had seemed in 2011. These regimes seem
to have survived the revolutionary wave, but not without eliciting panicky decisions such as:
the announcement in mid-May [2011] by the newly appointed Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
secretary-general, Abdul Latif al-Zayani, that Jordan and Morocco had been invited to discuss the
possibility of membership of the bloc seems to have been on the initiative of the Saudi king,
Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud. Given Jordan and Morocco's status as Arab Sunni hereditary
regimes, it appears that the king is concerned that, should these states succumb to the regional
popular clamour for change, the Arab wave could would be more likely to sweep the Gulf than at
present (The Economist 2011).”

While the idea did not materialize into an enlargement in the GCC, it was indicative of the mood
at the time.
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Currently, the Saudi king is openly on the offensive with the United Arab Emirates
monarchs declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization (El Gamal 2014). At the
moment counter revolutionary forces are solidifying their gains where “a proposed donor
conference to support Egypt's economy is expected to dominate Saudi King Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz's talks with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi in Cairo … The talks will also
focus on regional developments, including the situation in Iraq, the Palestinian cause and the
Syrian and Libyan files …” (El Gamal, 2014). In fact, “Saudi Arabia had been among the first
Arab countries to welcome the army ouster of President Mohamed Morsi last year following
opposition protests, and [Saudi Arabia] offered billions of dollars to prop up Egypt's foundering
economy (El Gamal, 2014).” A monarchy that claims to be Islamic has been instrumental in the
overthrow of the first democratically-elected Islamist government. The obvious justification for
the actions of the Saudis is that they acted out of fear that the winds of change would arrive in
the Kingdom and loosen their dynastic grip on power. But the question becomes how and why?
Why can’t the Saudis follow the footsteps of neighboring Qatar and embrace the Muslim
Brotherhood? The findings of this dissertation are helpful in answering some of the questions
that may have been overlooked by the conventional realpolitik approach to the region.
This dissertation claims that the Arab Spring as it stands today has been effectively
transformed by Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, turning back the clock on the
Arab Spring and turning it into a Sunni/Shia war reminiscent of the Second Civil War (60-73/
AH 680-692 CE) and reviving the question of the legitimacy of who should rule over the umma.
Certainly the United States government is acting accordingly dealing with the region. For
example, “the United Sates, Iran and Saudi Arabia have agreed to allow Iraq's Prime Minister
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Nouri Al-Maliki to stay in office for a third term, Al-Araby Al-Yawm newspaper reported ”
(Middle East Monitor, 2014).
The fear of both states of the sweeping changes that engulfed the region since 2011
turned the basic demands of social justice, good government, and human rights into a sectarian
war. Strategically, rallying Sunni/Shia support domestically and regionally was an effective
strategic path that both states took to ensure their own legitimacy domestically and regionally. In
Bahrain, the Sunni monarchy marginalized its local population by depicting their grievances as a
Shia sectarian war. Indeed, it is the exact strategy that the Saudi monarchy follows domestically
and acts upon regionally in its claim as the sole representative of Sunni Islam.
Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran projects itself as the sole representative of Shia
Islam. In fact, fighters from Iran and Hezbollah of Lebanon are already in Syria helping Al
Assad in his battle against domestic and foreign fighters (Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer 2013).
Consequently, the Shia support that Assad’s Bathist secular government is receiving is reigniting
the clash of the Second Civil War. Now the war is portrayed as Shia from Iran, Iraq, and
Lebanon helping their Alawite brethren in Syria. As a result, this aid is reinforcing Iran’s
revolutionary goal to replace the Saudi Sunni monarchy as legitimate Islamic state for all
Muslims. The current war in Syria and Iraq is presented as a correction to the historical injustice
that the Umayyads committed against the legitimate rulers of the Umma. Many observers of the
region consider this discourse as mere rhetoric; but this is hardly the case. In fact, the basis of
this discourse is legal, and legitimacy and authority are central to the political systems in Saudi
Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, this dissertation hopes to demonstrate that such
claims are present with us in a world governed by territorial European sovereignty. The Sunni
and Shia authority of Ulu Al Amr and not sovereignty is central to the legitimacy of both states
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today. In fact, the proxy war unfolding in the region between the Saudis and Iran is at its base a
protection of the Wilayah al ahed and Wilayah al faqih. The absence of a constitution in Saudi
Arabia and the role of Ali Hosseini Khamene, the current Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Republic, lend importance to the role of the authority and legitimacy that Wilayah al ahed and
Wilayah al faqih play in both states. The danger of the Arab Spring for both states follows from
the precarious nature of the two doctrines and the threat they face to their legitimacy.
In fact, the Saudi monarchy claims the Qur’an and Sunna are the Kingdom’s constitution.
Only in 1992 did the Kingdom decide to list basic principles, “The Basic Law of Governance.”
The following are related provisions:
Chapter I, Article 1:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its
constitution is Almighty God's Book, the Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the Prophet
(PBUH). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the capital.
Chapter II, Article 5:
• Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
• Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants.
• The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and
His Messenger's Sunna (Traditions).
• The Crown Prince shall devote himself exclusively to his duties as Crown Prince and shall
perform any other duties delegated to him by the King.
• Upon the death of the King, the Crown Prince shall assume the Royal powers until a pledge of
allegiance (bay'a) is given.
Article 6:
In support of the Book of God and the Sunna of His Messenger (PBUH), citizens shall give the
pledge of allegiance (bay'a) to the King, professing loyalty in times of hardship and ease.
Article 7:
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the
Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the
other laws of the State.
Article 8:
Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, shura (consultation) and equality
according to Islamic Sharia. (The Basic Law of Governance - Saudi Arabia)

The “sovereign Arab Islamic State” mentioned in Article One is not the basis of the legitimacy of
the Royal family to rule over the Kingdom. Clearly, the term serves the purposes of international
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law. Interestingly, there is no mention of political parties, elections, or a participatory role for
citizens in governance. This is precisely the challenge that the Arab Spring presented the Saudi
monarchy; Bay’a based on Wilayah al ahed is no longer viable. Most important, having Islamist
political parties run elections and form governments based on the will of the people is surely an
idea that must be fought and eliminated.
So what is the cost of turning the Arab Spring into a regional clash between Wilayah al
faqih and Wilayah al faqih? First, sovereignty and national identities have suffered a return to the
Shia/Sunni form of loyalties. These new loyalties and identifications are evident in Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. Even in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt where there is no sizable
Shia population, the Gulf States (including Qatar) led by Saudi Arabia fueled the split between
the Islamist and secularist political forces on the ground. The petro dollar was essential in
bankrolling the secular/Islamist divide exploiting the absence of political language that can
bridge the sovereignty/authority misunderstanding and prejudices. The Saudi Kingdom and Gulf
monarchies realize that the spread of the “Arab Spring” to the east means the end of the authority
of the establishment Ulu Al Amr and with it Bay’a of Wilayah al ahed, which will effectively end
the legitimacy of family rule in the region.
Second, they labeled terrorist those “Islamist politicians [who] swept elections across the
region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, [who] stepp[ed] close to power in Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya and Morocco and undermin[ed] the thesis of Qaeda-style militants that violence offered
the only hope for change” (Kirkpatrick 2014). The consequence of the war waged between
Saudis and Iran as a sectarian war is the rise of the rigid Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
which is unlike the moderate new Ulu Al Amr that hope to harmonize modern European
sovereignty with Sunni authority. These Ulu Al Amr of Ayman Al Zawahiri and ISIS intends to
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replace European sovereignty all together and views the harmonizing efforts of the new Ulu Al
Amr and politicians such as Rashid al-Ghannushi as hypocritical. “Today, those politicians are
in frantic retreat from Riyadh to Rabat, stymied by their political opponents, stalked by generals
and plotted against by oil-rich monarchs. Instead, it is the jihadists who are on the march, roving
unchecked across broad sections of North Africa and the Middle East. Now they have seized
control of territory straddling the borders of Iraq and Syria where they hope to establish an
Islamic caliphate (Kirkpatrick, 2014).” More important, the Saudi/Iran war as a means to stifle
the “Arab Spring” conflates the two types of Ulu Al Amr into one terrorist camp and
consequently reproducing the myth of the “Clash of Civilizations.”
Finally, there are alarming signs in the region that the consequence of the Sunni/Shia war
is that the petro dollar that is financing and fueling the rise of fascist state in Egypt and other
states in the region. It is shocking to witness the speed of the transformation of Egypt form the
“Arab Spring” of the revolution in 2011 to the extreme nationalistic or fascist political discourse
clothed in the “Egyptian War on Terror.” The same discourse is currently used in Syria, Libya,
and Tunis. The Islamist intellectual al Huwaidi describes the situation in Egypt as follow:
From whichever angle you look at it, the situation in Egypt is unbelievable. It is unfathomable
that three years after the Egyptian revolution, for which 1,000 martyrs paid with their lives,
torture has become prevalent in our society. The re-emergence of torture not only constitutes a
serious violation of human rights and dignity, but also marks the return of the Mubarak regime
and the security state…What is no less dangerous than torture, which is a crime against humanity
in every sense of the word, are the online voices that no longer question or deny the state's claims.
Anyone who reads such comments made in response to accounts of torture, imprisonment or
death sentences, will be shocked by the degree of brainwashing and lack of social consciousness;
some people even claim that it is the victims of torture who violate the law and that death, torture
and tyranny are deserved punishments that fit the alleged crimes …This type of thinking brings to
mind the Nazi ideology of 1940s Germany, in which no one blamed or questioned the regime for
its belief in the superiority of the Aryan race and its attempt at the ethnic cleansing of the state.
The problem lies in the fact that such blatantly racist ideology had many supporters in German
society. We find ourselves facing a similar situation in that the revolution that was launched
against tyranny in 2011 somehow paved the way for a quasi-Nazi movement in 2014 Egypt
(Huwaidi, 2014).
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Certainly, the recent mass hysteria of the Egyptian judiciary reflected in the mass sentencing of
hundreds of Egyptians to death confirms Huwaidi’s premonition that Egypt is on the verge of
sliding into a fascist state. Yet Western liberal democracies welcomed Sisi’s election as president
of Egypt. If their reaction is to be taken seriously, it is a sign that we have not learned the lesson
of the horrors of fascism in the twentieth century and a sign that in a moment of crisis the rise of
fascism is always on the horizon. Only a sovereign state may become a fascist state. It is this
unintended totalizing quality that is at the horizon of economic and political crisis that allow that
sovereign state to vent excesses on a particular group. It is the aim of this dissertation to provide
the political language between the European sovereignty with other form of authority to avoid
the totalizing character of sovereignty that historically resulted in countless atrocities and crimes
against humanity.
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